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as its primary tasks. The agency is focusing on
enhancing the information security capacity of
Korea’s ICT industry and expanding global cooperative partnerships based on the K-ICT Security
Development Strategy. The goal is for these twin
pillars to serve as the core competencies of the
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future Korea in equal and harmonious measure.
Based on these efforts, the agency aims to reaffirm
Korea’s position as a future internet powerhouse
armed with global competitiveness and to lead the
Korean economy in making another leap forward
through intensive promotion of the ICT industry.
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Executive Summary

O

ver the past few decades, Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC) has witnessed
numerous changes in its development,
with most being beneficial. Notwithstanding considerable variation, most countries experienced
technological modernization and economic
growth. Positive changes relate to sizable growth
and expansion of the region’s network infrastructure sectors, such as transport, energy, and information and communications technologies (ICT),
among others. Modernization and expansion
revealed old and brought new risks that arose
from the widespread reliance on infrastructure
assets and systems as well as from increasing interconnectivity of different structures on the national
and international levels. If ignored, those risks could
turn into large-scale disruptions of infrastructure,
resulting in significant impact on the population
and vital functions of society. Infrastructures that
could provoke such impacts and possibly cascading effects are known as critical infrastructures. In
many cases, ICT interconnects these critical infrastructures, creating substructures referred to as
critical information infrastructures (CIIs). CIIs are an
important part of critical infrastructures because
they are the telecommunications backbone and
the uninterrupted exchange of data is essential to
the operation of infrastructures and the services
that they provide. Hence, critical infrastructures
and CIIs will not be discussed as completely separate concepts in this publication, rather they will be
referred to as critical infrastructures.

The reality is that, despite risks, modern society cannot evolve and operate without relying on
critical infrastructures. Furthermore critical infrastructures perform numerous vital functions without which today’s life would be inconceivable, such
as energy supply, water and sanitation networks,
financial services, and mobile and fixed communications. It is thus not a matter of choice, but of
a strategic approach to how to manage the risks,
and identify and protect national critical infrastructures. This study was commissioned at an important moment—when LAC is entering an accelerated
path of infrastructure expansion and modernization. This publication is written to provide insights
to the strategic thinking behind the creation of the
national critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) frameworks. It also builds its recommendations on in-depth analysis of the best CIIP
practices around the world, with consideration
of the region-specific landscape to originate a
base line from which further development can be
delineated.
The European Union (EU, as a region), Finland,
Republic of South Korea (Korea), Spain, United
Kingdom (UK), and the United States were chosen
as case studies for this publication. Selection criteria for case studies included risks, challenges, and
specific experiences faced by the countries; geographical variety; and maturity of the CIIP frameworks. The authors decided to look at the EU as a
unique example of regional CIIP coordination that
may be worth considering in the LAC region. The
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EU’s CIIP framework enables region-wide coordination and a response framework for large-scale
cross-border disruptions.
The structure of this publication mirrors a typical structure for a CIIP framework, which comprises
the following pillars:

••
••
••
••
••
••

Strategy and legislation
Governance and regulation
Definition and assignment
Protection
Information sharing
Crisis management

Case studies provide focused input into each
pillar and are thus spread through the publication.
The reader may observe a number of similarities,
but also differences, among case studies. Studied
approaches ultimately emerge around the core
understanding of the vitality of the CIIP agenda.
Many identified critical infrastructures are similar
among the different countries and pillars of different CIIP frameworks are alike. In turn, implementation details vary depending on the national
circumstances (risks), institutional structure, governance framework, and cooperation practices.
Granular analysis of different CIIP frameworks
allowed the authors to highlight the strengths
and successes achieved by individual countries or
regions and thus formulate best practices and lessons learned. The authors believe that experience
and advances in CIIP could encourage LAC countries to benefit from such expertise to secure more
robust and sustainable economic growth.
Beyond analysis of the international case studies, the value added of this publication is its authentic region-wide research on the critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) landscape in LAC. The investigation covered both public and private sectors in 26
countries and comprised desk research, electronic
surveys, and follow-up interviews. Electronic surveys were sent to over 900 private and public sector representatives that were identified in advance.
This challenging exercise allowed the authors to
collect a statistically representative sample, with a
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13.9 percent response rate for the region. Though
the overall response rate could be considered low,
it should not be underestimated because CIP is a
sensitive topic and public institutions and private
companies are reluctant to share any type of information. However, it may also be indicative of lower
awareness about CIP, and CIIP even more so. The
authors chose to focus on CIP instead of CIIP to
improve the inclusiveness of the topic and improve
survey participant response results.
In terms of the response rate, all 26 countries participated in the survey, providing from 1
to 12 responses, with an average rate per country
of approximately 5 responses. The public sector
was more responsive to the survey; the number
of responses from critical infrastructure operators
surpassed the total from public agencies in only 7
of 26 countries. The most responsive participants
were public agencies and public companies in the
ICT, energy, and finance sectors. As is typical of
large-scale surveys, the accuracy of this research
is not absolute and information submitted should
not be treated as fact reflecting the actual situation
with regards to CIP at the country level. Results of
this research were aggregated using empirical and
statistical methods. To achieve higher accuracy
and precision at the country level, the research
would have to be complimented with on-site visits
in individual countries; face-to-face interviews with
CIP-related bodies, companies, and local experts;
and exercises measuring CIP effectiveness.
Overall CIP and CIIP issues appear to be relevant to both private agencies and private companies in the LAC region. This is not surprising
considering 54 percent of LAC countries reportedly experienced large-scale disruption of critical infrastructure in the past five years. In terms
of feedback on CIP awareness and CIP framework
development, analysis revealed disparities between
the individual countries. At the national level, the
surveys also showed inconsistency in awareness
about the national CIP policy since participating
agencies and companies sometimes provided contradictory answers regarding the same aspects of
CIP framework development and implementation.
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Overall, the results of the survey indicated a
good level of strategic CIP guidance, but a lower
level of adoption of CIP-related legislation. Indeed,
42 percent of LAC countries have adopted CIP
strategies or integrated CIP elements in the national
security strategies. However, primary CIP legislation was only adopted in 27 percent of LAC countries and only 15 percent have secondary legislation
where critical infrastructure is directly addressed.
Only 35 percent of LAC countries have a dedicated
government institution responsible for CIP. Results
indicate a gap between government initiatives
(policy) and common political agreement to adopt
a CIP framework (legislation). Therefore, this linkage needs to be strengthened to foster implementation of the CIP agenda.
Those countries that have adopted CIP policies most commonly include transport, energy,
government, healthcare, ICT, emergency services,
and water as critical sectors, which is in line with
international practice. Analysis of the questionnaire results confirmed that, when compared to
public agencies, critical infrastructure operators
are better prepared in terms of crisis management, but are less aware of the CIP policies and
coordination procedures. The majority (65 percent) of LAC countries report cooperation with
the private sector is in place. This is a very positive indication that CIP could improve in the future.
However, consistent national coordination and systematic information exchange are well established
in only a few countries. Therefore, the capacity of
the critical infrastructure operators needs to be
increased regarding national CIP priorities and policy approaches. Establishment of national and sectoral CIP groups may be an efficient way to address
the situation.
Analysis of the responses allowed for a fairly
accurate clustering of the LAC countries into four
groups or stages based on pre-identified criteria
related to CIP framework development. This exercise was performed to allow the authors to adjust
recommendations that were derived from the analysis of international best practices. Thus each recommendation is rated for its relevance for each

of the clusters. Clustering criteria were designed
considering this is the first region-wide study targeting CIP framework in a comprehensive manner.
CIP and CIIP are mostly new to the region, so the
overall objective of this exercise was to establish a
baseline. If this exercise becomes regular, greater
participation rates and progress tracking would
be expected. Also of note, information related to
national CIP frameworks is not always publicly
available in full and therefore details cannot always
be collected.
According to the information collected through
the survey, countries were grouped into four stages
taking into account two criteria: level of CIP framework and governance development; and critical
infrastructure identification practices. Clustering
results (Table 6.4 and Figure 6.12, page 87) revealed
that the majority of countries (17) with different
levels have undertaken steps toward developing
a CIP framework and establishing a governance
model. However, nearly half of the countries (16)
still need to undertake efforts in CIP, such as systematically identifying critical infrastructure sectors and cataloguing critical infrastructure assets
within each sector; working with the private sector
to define and put in place protective measures and
procedures. Recommendations of this study were
specifically designed to support development of
the CIP framework and governance model and to
provide practical insights into protecting critical
infrastructures. All recommendations are derived
from specific examples found across the reviewed
international practices.
The authors note that ours is not an ideal world
and many risks materialize before systems are fully
ready. As the review of the case study countries
proved, many CIIP initiatives and improvements
were, unfortunately, triggered not by advance work
or extensive studies, but by emergency situations,
many of which had catastrophic consequences. No
CIIP framework was developed in perfect sequence
and exactly following the prescribed steps. It is
also unlikely that any CIIP framework ever would.
Nonetheless, countries should continue to strive for
perfection even though life will introduce its own
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adjustments to this process. The most important
lesson to be learned is that any effort performed in
advance to strengthen CIIP can make a great change
in terms of human lives and economic consequences.
The introduction to this publication provides
the overall reasoning and relevance of the topic to
the region. Chapter 2 reviews CIIP framework development and governance models across selected
international cases and concludes with lessons
learned and takeaways. Chapters 3 to 5 focus on
practical aspects of identifying and protecting critical infrastructures, building recommendations on

xvi

the practices applied across international cases.
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the survey methodology and highlights some conclusions from the
replies submitted by the private and public sectors
in the region. It also provides the results of the clustering exercise for the LAC countries. Chapter 7
provides a consolidated list of recommendations,
rating the relevance of each for different groups of
countries. Additional case studies of five countries
in the LAC region (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa
Rica, and Mexico) are provided in the appendices
for comparison.
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Introduction to CIIP

I

nfrastructure is usually referred to as the basic
physical and organizational structure required for
a society to operate. Currently, although there is
no unique or standardized definition of this term,
the concept of infrastructure could be divided
into economic infrastructure, social infrastructure, and soft infrastructure (Alberti, 2015). The
World Economic Forum (WEF) defines economic
infrastructure as a composition of transport facilities (air, sea, and land), utilities (water, gas, and
electricity), flood defenses, and waste management, among other facilities and services (WEF,
2012). There is indisputable evidence that economic
infrastructure expansion and economic growth are
closely related (Calderon and Serven, 2010).
Infrastructure enhancement promotes growth,
equity, and environmental sustainability. The InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) is one of the
major donors to the Latin American and Caribbean
(LAC) region. The Bank supports the achievement of sustainable social and economic progress. Thus, a considerable portion of the IDB’s loan
portfolio is dedicated to infrastructure financing,
such as energy, transport, and water and sanitation (Box 1.1). Other donors active in the region,
such as the World Bank, the Development Bank of
Latin America, and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, are following a similar approach. Yet, the region is lagging and needs
to catch up within a number of infrastructure
advancement parameters. Infrastructure expansion is thus unavoidable and essential to underpin
future economic growth. Nearly 600 million people

populating 26 LAC countries will increasingly rely
on new and existing infrastructure.
Infrastructures of significant national importance are being referred to as critical infrastructures. Modern societies rely heavily on critical
infrastructures such as electricity, gas, financial
institutions, and information technology (IT) to perform day-to-day activities and implement future
growth strategies. In many countries and across
different regions, the topic of critical information
infrastructure protection (CIIP) attracts increasing attention of policymakers. It is progressively
considered an integral part of national sustainability strategies since a large-scale disruption of
critical infrastructures can have cascading effects
and impact a large part of the population and vital
functions of society.
Furthermore, higher attention to CIIP enables
improved conditions for doing business in developing countries. Indeed, as far as needs of the
business community are concerned, “prolonged
neglect of critical infrastructure and its development needs” is ranked fourth among major
concerns in emerging markets and developing
economies for business stimulation, economic
integration, and trade performance (WEF, 2015).
The first three concerns are related to fiscal and
liquidity crises. Unfortunately, according to the
findings of the WEF, in the past 10 years little progress has been made in addressing the risk of failure
of critical infrastructures.
There are two major trends that are expected
to have considerable impact on CIIP approaches

1

Box 1.1. Multilateral Organizations Support Infrastructure Investments
Hard infrastructure projects (e.g., transport, energy, and water) that are traditionally defined as critical infrastructure are also long-standing lending priorities for international multilateral institutions, including major
investors in the region such as the IDB and World Bank.
In 2010, the IDB approved $3.6 billion in loans for transport, energy, and water and sanitation infrastructure. In 2014, this number grew to $4.6 billion. Over the 2010–14 period, the share of the IDB’s lending portfolio for those three infrastructures was on average 36 percent (see Fig. 1.1).
Similarly, during 2011–14, the World Bank’s annual global investments in those three sectors constituted
about 40 percent of its entire portfolio. Of note, the World Bank includes flood prevention in the water and
sanitation sector and includes mining in the energy sector.
FIGURE 1.1. Annual IDB Lending to Transport, Energy, and Water and Sanitation Sectors, 2010–14
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Source: Authors based on IDB 2010–14 annual reports and the World Bank 2014 annual report.

in LAC: urbanization and digitalization of infrastructures. The high concentration of the population in urban centers implies greater reliance
on critical infrastructures and more significant
implications of disruptions. The second trend is
not specific to LAC and is related to technological modernization of economic infrastructures.
Advanced IT allow greater efficiencies in terms of
operation costs, and new functions and services
for its operators and end users. Today nearly all
new infrastructure investments incorporate a
“smart” component as part of the project, such as
process control systems1 and automation technology. Among such examples are smart (electric)
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grids and intelligent transport systems (Box 1.2).
This trend creates new risks related to cyber
threats to which all IT systems and networks are
susceptible.
Specifically, technological advances have created substructures within critical infrastructures,
which are usually referred to as critical information infrastructures (CII) (Box 1.3). It is important to

For example, process control systems used by the energy
utility industry to control and monitor the generation, transmission, storage, and distribution of electric power, gas, and
heat in combination with controlling the supporting processes, ISO/IEC TR 27019:2013.
1
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Box 1.2. Urbanization Is Putting Pressure on Infrastructure Efficiency and Resilience
Urbanization is one of the key trends not only in LAC, but also globally. According to Dobbs et al. (2011), the
global urban population has been rising by an average of 65 million people annually during the past three
decades, the equivalent of adding seven cities the size of Chicago a per year, every year. Among others, the
LAC region could be deservedly named the world’s urban leader. Indeed, in 1950, only 40 percent of the
population lived in urban areas in LAC. In 1990, that number had increased to 70 percent and, in 2013, to
79 percent.a UN Habitat estimates that, in 2050, 90 percent of LAC’s population will be urban.
Concentration of the population in urban areas raises many issues related to sustainable development.
Reliability and robustness requirements for urban infrastructure are among the challenges, as they become
increasingly critical for highly concentrated urban citizens. Protecting critical infrastructures within cities thus
deserves special attention within the national critical infrastructure protection (CIP) frameworks in LAC.
Consider, for example, urban transportation infrastructure, which must fulfill more than one role at a
time: driver aids, fare collection, traveller information, traffic monitoring, security (including surveillance of
vehicles, stations, running-way, public transport infrastructure, and facilities), demand-responsive transport,
etc. Interruption of such a system in a big city could cause chaos. Similarly, a disruption of the urban energy
distribution systems would trigger serious disorder.
In the LAC region, transport projects that include elements of intelligent transport systems are only just
gaining a presence. These systems are being integrated into surface transportation systems on a projectby-project basis and, nationwide, their architectures are still rare. However, over time, the natural pace of
development of many critical infrastructure sectors foresees technological evolution toward smart systems.
In this context, the region has time to incorporate CIIP measures from the very beginning, which is far more
efficient than doing it later.
Sources: Arsht (2014); Dobbs, Manyika, and Woetzel (2015); Dobbs et al. (2011).
a

See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS.

Box 1.3. Critical Infrastructure and Critical Information Infrastructure
Critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure (CII) are different but linked. However, the link is
largely being overlooked. For the purpose of this publication, which addresses critical infrastructures in general, it is important to distinguish between the two. Critical infrastructures include but are not limited to CII,
thus CII is critical infrastructure, but not all critical infrastructures are CII. Failure of CII may lead to failure of
critical infrastructure, but critical infrastructure may fail for many other reasons in no way related to CII. For
instance, critical infrastructure could fail as a result of a natural catastrophe like an earthquake or flood, while
failure of CII is mainly caused by cyber-related threats (i.e., cyber-attacks) or by failure of a critical infrastructure. This implies that critical infrastructure is more susceptible to a broader variety of risks than CII.
As a consequence of critical infrastructure protection (CIP) policies, regulations are addressing a much
broader and more comprehensive set of risks, including, but also far beyond, CII-related risks. Protection of
CII is much more focused on technology.
Consequently, risks attributed to failures of critical infrastructure and failures of CII are usually being
perceived differently. For instance, the WEF (2015), in its annual Global Risk report, considers failure of critical infrastructure an economic risk, while failure of CII is technological. In the 2015 edition of the report, the
scores for the likelihood parameter were comparable for both; however, the risk of CII breakdown was perceived to have twice the impact of a failure of critical infrastructure. This result may partially be attributed to
currently greater awareness of threats related to cyber security.
Source: Authors; WEF (2015).
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Box 1.4. ICT and Foreign Direct Investments, 2013–14
In 2013, the ICT sector was identified as the fastest growing sector for FDI globally. In 2013, ICT and internet
infrastructure activity attracted $48.7 billion of the $61.6 billion invested in the sector globally, which appears
to correspond with the growth of subsectors that all require high levels of infrastructure deployment. The
capital spent on ICT and internet infrastructure in 2013 was the highest recorded since FDI markets began
tracking the data. In LAC, the ICT sector accounted for $17.0 billion of capital investments and was the second
biggest sector in terms FDI in 2013.
As a part of data and voice communications infrastructure, there is rising demand for cloud storage
and data back-up infrastructure, which forms an important part of CII. Not surprisingly, despite an overall
decrease in FDI growth, from 11 percent in 2013 to 1 percent in 2014, capital investments in data centers
have been on the rise since 2009, both in terms of capital investments and number of projects. Globally,
between 2009 and 2014, data center FDI increased on average 12 percent year-over-year for projects and
3.5 percent for capital investments. So far, LAC countries are not among the top destinations for data
center FDI. However, there are important preconditions for that in the future. For instance, software and IT
services in LAC accounted for the largest number of FDI projects, at 121, despite a fall of 18 percent compared with 2013.
Source: Authors and fDi Intelligence (2014; 2015).

distinguish between them and to keep in mind that
neither should be addressed in isolation from the
other. This study addresses CIIP, and for the purpose of this publication, the term critical infrastructures includes CIIs.
There are a number of reasons CIIP deserves
significant attention. Not only are elements of CII
penetrating traditional critical infrastructures, but
also CII could be seen as a standalone critical infrastructure. Examples include elements of information and communications technology (ICT) and
ICT systems such as internet connectivity and telephony communications networks. The complexity
of CIIP derives from its decentralization in terms
of geographical location and ownership. Of all
the traditional critical infrastructure sectors, ICT is
perhaps the one attracting the most participation
from private capital, including significant foreign
direct investments (FDI) (Box 1.4). Therefore, CIIP
frameworks for CII ultimately rely on public–private cooperation and information sharing. The LAC
region is not an exception, as investments in ICT
are expected to increase with the overall growth of
ICT markets in the region.

4

Selection of Case Studies
Currently, a number of countries have acknowledged the significance of CIIP by enacting relevant
policies and regulations. However, the majority of
nations are only starting to recognize the importance of CIIP. The objective of this section is to
review the policy and legal measures for CIIP in
selected countries and regions to start the process
of developing best practices and formulating lessons learned. This section discusses in detail the
CIIP approaches in the EU as a region and in five
countries: Finland, Korea, Spain, the UK, and the
United States.
The EU region was selected as a unique example of a regionally coordinated CIIP framework.
Region-wide CIIP coordination reveals a number
of advantages that may be beneficial for LAC.
Examples of EU member states were also reviewed
(Finland, Spain, and the UK) to showcase deviations in the advancement of national CIIP strategies, taking into account national specifics and
also differences in implementing the EU CIIP
framework.
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Among the criteria for selection as a case
study were the maturity of CIIP and the level of
know-how accumulated over time. Spain, the UK,
and the United States were selected based on long
and outstanding experiences at the national level,
where CIIP considerations were affecting national
policies and legal framework starting from the last
century. Spain’s case was also included because of
the country’s close economic and social relationship with the LAC region.
High dependency on modern technologies
was another selection factor. Finland and Korea
were selected because of outstanding ICT sector

environments and high reliance on modern technologies. Those experiences will become increasingly important for the LAC region, as more
technological advances will be introduced across
different critical infrastructure sectors.
Additionally, the set of countries selected represents different geographic regions and includes
countries of different sizes. All these variations
allow readers to appreciate different aspects of
CIIP and measures put in place. Lastly, case studies of five LAC countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Costa Rica, and Mexico) are provided for reference
in the appendices.
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2

Policy and Governance
in Selected Countries
Why Is a Critical Infrastructure
Information Protection Policy Needed?
The concept of critical infrastructure information
protection (CIIP) is not new. Safeguarding strategic national resources and assets has been part
of national defense planning since World War II
and throughout and after the Cold War. However,
modern realities have had a significant impact on
governments’ perception of CIIP and the ways it
is being addressed. The change in perception is
motivated by (1) security concerns, (2) long-term
development objectives, and (3) financial considerations. Because of these considerations, countries are trying to identify and protect their critical
assets against a variety of threats. The starting
point is a coherent policy and legal environment.
This chapter is dedicated to policy, legal, and regulatory approaches in the countries selected as case
studies. The authors also review adopted governance frameworks and summarize the experiences
of the countries. First, the authors briefly discuss
the three motivations for CIIP.

Security
Society, businesses, and politics depend on wellfunctioning critical infrastructures. An important
task of preventive security policy is to safeguard
facilities of major importance to the community

whose failure or disruption would cause a longterm shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to
public order, or other dramatic consequences. The
terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington,
DC, on September 11, 2001, in Madrid in 2004, and
in London in 2005 are some examples related to
risks and vulnerabilities from people. However, infrastructures are being threatened not only by terrorist attacks, but also natural disasters such as the
Japanese earthquake and tsunami in 2011, which
caused a Level 7 nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, as well as other types of
serious accidents, breakdowns, and system errors.

Development
Beyond security, long-term development policy
relies on the integrity of critical infrastructures. Not
surprisingly, the World Development Report 2014
(World Bank, 2014) was dedicated to managing
risks. The report argued that a risk-based approach
to policy planning could be a powerful tool for
development as well as for critical infrastructures
since the resilience and robustness of infrastructure
are important preconditions for national advancement (Box 2.1). Even though the report was not
dedicated to analyzing specific risks, it provided
powerful advice on risk management frameworks
that could be used by governments, including for
the purpose of CIIP.
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Box 2.1. Insights into Risk Management from the World Development Report 2014
In 2014, the World Bank’s annual flagship publication (World Bank, 2014), was dedicated to development
risks. It argued that risk management can be a powerful instrument for development, not only by building
people’s resilience and thus reducing the effects of adverse events, but also by allowing them to take advantage of opportunities for improvement.
The following were five important insights of risk management from the report:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Taking on risks is necessary to pursue opportunities for development. The risk of inaction may well be
the worst option of all.
To confront risk successfully, it is essential to shift from unplanned and ad hoc responses when crises
occur to proactive, systematic, and integrated risk management.
Identifying risks is not enough. The trade-offs and obstacles to risk management must also be identified,
prioritized, and addressed through private and public action.
For risks beyond the means of individuals to handle alone, risk management requires shared action and
responsibility at different levels of society, from the household to the international community.
Governments have a critical role in managing systemic risks, providing an enabling environment for
shared action and responsibility, and channeling direct support to vulnerable people.

Source: Authors based on World Bank (2014).

Financial
The financial losses due to critical infrastructure
failures are significant and impact both the public and private sectors. Without proper policy to
address CIIP, a country’s costs of doing business
could rise significantly. For instance, in September
2003, an electrical blackout in Italy (Jonkeren et
al., 2012) affected the whole country, cutting off
the energy supply to approximately 45 million
people. Electricity was not supplied for between
1.5 and 18 hours in different regions of the country. Economic analysis of the negative impact of
the breakdown in one critical infrastructure (electricity) to the interlinked industries showed that
the full system of 56 industries at the national level
resulted in economic losses of €81.79 million for
the 11 critical infrastructure industries (those with
the highest interdependency) and €123.17 million for all 56 industries combined (Jonkeren, et
al., 2012). Moreover, the authors estimated that
the cost of 24 hours of downtime as a result of a
cyber-attack on a critical infrastructure averages
US$6 million per day (Hämmerli and Renda, 2010).
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The estimated cost of cyber-attacks was thought
to be $1.75 billion yearly, but this estimate does
not take into account the opportunity cost to businesses that experience loss of service. According
to an Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development report on malicious software, the
estimated annual loss to U.S. businesses caused
by malware is US$67.2 billion (OECD, 2008). Thus,
CIIP is first and foremost a matter of national interest and responsibility. The following sections organize and outline good practices in CIIP policy.

CIIP Policy and Governance in the
European Union
Strategy and Legislation
Threats to the economic and social wellbeing of
citizens were major drivers for the creation of the
European Union (EU) critical infrastructure protection (CIP) framework and a number of disruptive
events led to its strengthening.
The EU is an economic and political partnership between 28 European countries based on the
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TABLE 2.1. Key Policy and Legal Documents Forming the EU’s CIIP Framework
Year

Title

Objective

2003

A Secure Europe in a Better World—
European Security Strategy, December 12, 2003 (EU, 2003)

Defines the EU’s security environment and identifies key security
challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU.
Provides the conceptual framework for the Common Security and
Defense Policy.

2004

European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(EPCIP) (EC, 2004)

High level document establishing the basic CIP pillars for the EU.

2006

Communication from the Commission on the EPCIP 12.12.2006
COM(2006) 786 final (EC, 2006)

Explanatory document to facilitate transposition of the EPCIP at
the national level.

2008

Directive 2008/114 to identify and designate European critical
infrastructures and evaluate the need to protect them (EU, 2006)

Mandates principles and procedures to delineate critical
infrastructure at the EU level, or the national critical infrastructure
that is recognized as critical infrastructure on the EU level.

2010

The Stockholm Programme—An Open and Secure Europe
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010/C 115/01 (EU, 2010)

Formulates a roadmap for EU work for justice, freedom, and
security.

2010

Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council on the EU Internal Security Strategy
in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure Europe, 22.11.2010
COM(2010) 673 final (EC, 2010a)

Identifies and tackles common EU security threats, such as
national disasters, criminal networks, and radicalization.

Supporting documents
2012

Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the
EPCIP SWD(2012) 190 final (EC, 2012a)

Summarizes the results of the review of the EPCIP and CIP
Directive.

2013

Commission staff working document on a new approach to the
EPCIP, 28.8.2013 SWD (2013) 318 final (EC, 2013)

Institutes a new approach for the EPCIP organized around three
pillars: prevention, preparedness, and response.

Source: Authors.

rule of law: everything that it does is founded on
EU treaties (EU, 2012) voluntarily and democratically agreed to by all member states. In the EU,
critical infrastructure has been defined (EU, 2008)
as an asset or system that is essential to maintain
vital societal functions. Damage to, destruction of,
or disruption of a critical infrastructure by natural
disaster, terrorism, criminal activity, or malicious
behavior may have a significant negative impact
on the security of the EU and the wellbeing of its
citizens.
As a result of that common understanding
among all the member states, the EU has developed a set of documents (Table 2.1) that together
form the EU approach to CIP. The approach is
guided by three strategies:
1.

The CIIP dedicated strategy widely known
as the European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which was
adopted in 2004.

2.

The European Security Strategy (since 2003).

3.

The European Internal Security Strategy (since
2010).

The region’s most important CIIP legislative
effort is Directive 2008/114 to identify and designate European critical infrastructures, the CIP
Directive. These and other EU-level CIP initiatives
are discussed in more detail below.
The CIIP concept was first introduced to the
EU’s strategic security policy system in 2003. The
motive was the recognition that ubiquitous integration of technology had increased European
dependence on—and thus vulnerability to—interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, and
information, among other sectors. Security policy
changes implied that EU member states also had
to account for CIIP targets in their national policies.
The EPCIP, a CIP-dedicated strategy, was
developed in 2004 by the European Commission,
an executing arm of the EU, at the request of the

Policy and Governance in Selected Countries

9

Box 2.2. Measures Taken at the EU Level to Facilitate Implementation of the EPCIP
A number of strategic initiatives facilitating research and development, capacity building, and connectivity
among stakeholders involved in CIP were established under the EPCIP umbrella.
The Prevention, Preparedness, and Consequence Management of Terrorism and Other Security-Related
Risks program was designed to protect citizens and critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks and other
security incidents by fostering prevention and preparedness, namely by improving the protection of critical
infrastructures and addressing crisis management. The key objective was to support CIP policy priorities by
offering expert knowledge and a scientific basis to better understand the critical nature and interdependencies at all levels. Under the EPCIP, the European Commission funded over 100 projects from 2007 to 2012.
The Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) portal was established as an internetbased multi-level system to exchange CIP ideas, studies, and good practices. The portal, which has been up
and running since mid-January 2013, also serves as a repository for CIP-related information. This initiative
seeks to raise awareness and contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe.
The European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection was created to “foster the emergence of innovative, qualified, efficient, and competitive security solutions, through networking of European
experimental capabilities.” It aims to link existing European laboratories and facilities to carry out critical
infrastructure-related security experiments and test new technologies, such as detection equipment.
Source: Authors based on European Commission (2006).

European Council. The EPCIP was the first highlevel EU document instituting the basic CIP pillars for the whole region. It also recognized and
described the threats that could result in the loss of
vital services and set the aim to enhance the EU’s
CIP capability. In particular, EPCIP originated the
following:

••
••
••

A description of critical infrastructure.
Selection criteria to determine whether a particular infrastructure or element of an infrastructure is critical.
General merits of the critical infrastructure
security management process.

The EPCIP applies to EU member states and
three member countries of the wider European
Economic Area.1
All the EU member states are guided by the
EU-level strategy and are obliged to transpose the
strategy’s pillars nationally. This principle underpins the CIP system across the EU. To facilitate
this process, in 2008, the European Commission
issued a Communication on the EPCIP, designing
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the process of implementation in member states
(Table 2.1). Implementing the EPCIP was supported
by a number of different initiatives, including support for national research and development efforts
in CIP (Box 2.2).
Adopting the CIP Directive was an important
step in forming the EU-level CIP legal framework.
The current scope of the CIP Directive is limited to
the energy and transport sectors. This was the first
step in a methodical approach to identify, designate, and protect critical infrastructures at the EU
level, the European Critical Infrastructures (ECI). 2
The CIP Directive requires all member states to
identify, designate, and protect ECIs in the energy
and transport sectors; it indicates the information
and communications technology (ICT) sector as a
priority for possible future expansion of its scope.

The European Economic Area, which includes the EU
countries plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, allows
the three additional countries to be part of the EU’s single
market.
2 Critical from a European perspective refers to a situation
where disruption of a critical infrastructure would have an
impact on at least two member states.
1
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The Directive mandated that the responsibility to
protect critical infrastructures, including national
and European infrastructures, lies with the member states and with the owners/operators of critical infrastructures. It imposed fulfilling a series
of obligations and undertaking certain actions.
For instance, the CIP Directive requires owners/
operators of designated ECIs to prepare operator security plans and advanced business continuity plans and to nominate Security Liaison
Officers, thereby linking the owner/operator with
the national authority responsible for CIP. The CIP
Directive also defines key CIP terms such as critical
infrastructure, European critical infrastructure, risk
analysis, sensitive CIP-related information, protection, and owners/operators of ECIs. It specifies that
member states had to take the necessary steps to
comply with the Directive by January 12, 2011. The
EU member states transposed the provisions of the
Directive by incorporating them into their national
legislative and regulatory frameworks. They used
a variety of technical and legal approaches, such
as amendments to existing laws and regulations,
new laws, resolutions, procedural changes to existing CIP-related activities, and decrees and executive orders. Specific examples of the CIP Directive’s
transposition in Finland, the UK, and Spain are
described in more detail below.
In 2009, CIP became an integral part of the
EU-level program with the formulation of a roadmap for EU work in justice, freedom, and security
for the period 2010–14 known as the Stockholm
Programme. The program aims to meet challenges
and strengthen justice, freedom, and security
with actions focusing on the interests and needs
of citizens. One of its objectives is to reduce critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Moreover, it provided strategic guidance and basis for the Council,
the Commission, the European Parliament, and the
member states to draw up and implement policies to
further improve measures for the protection, security preparedness, and resilience of critical infrastructure, including ICT and services infrastructure.
The EU’s CIIP framework further evolved in
2010, when CIIP was referenced in the EU Internal

Security Strategy as a security threat. The strategy
called for better protected critical infrastructures
from criminals who take advantage of modern
technologies. It also recognized that the EU should
continue its work in protecting critical infrastructures because they are essential for society and
the economy to function. The strategy also emphasized that these threats call for improvements to
long-standing crisis and disaster management
practices in terms of efficiency and coherence.
Currently, the region is reviewing the CIP
Directive and EPCIP. Both are the result of the
Stockholm Programme, which stressed strengthening incentives to further legislative efforts. One
of the motivations to review the CIP Directive
was the potential need to increase the number of
critical infrastructure sectors beyond transport
and energy. The review was conducted in 2012 in
close cooperation with the member states and relevant stakeholders. 3 In 2013, the review process
resulted in a European Commission Staff Working
Document that suggested a new approach for
the EPCIP.4 The document suggested more practical implementation of CIP activities under the
three main pillars: prevention, preparedness,
and response. Among others, new approaches
aimed to take better account of interdependencies between critical infrastructures. During the
drafting of this publication, the EPCIP was being
amended and the review of the CIP Directive was
still in progress.

Governance and Regulation
From the standpoint of governance and practical
implementation at the EU level, the ECI protection
process is divided into three phases: identification,
designation, and protection of ECI (Figure 2.1).
Since 2013, the EU has been piloting a new, more
engaged approach to EPCIP.

3 See staff working document adopted in 2012 listed in
Table 2.1.
4 See staff working document adopted in 2013 listed in
Table 2.1.
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FIGURE 2.1. Phases for Governance and Regulation of European Critical Infrastructure Protection

Identify
ECI

Designate
ECI

Protect
ECI

•
•
•
•
•

Apply sector criteria
Apply cross-cutting criteria
Apply critical infrastructure definition
Apply transboundary element
Identify potential critical infrastructure and move to next phase

•
•
•
•

Inform member states that may be significantly affected by critical infrastructure
Engage in bilateral discussion with those member states
Agree with member states that may be affected
Designate critical infrastructure and move to next phase

•
•
•
•

Verify existence of or develop operator security plan
Review operator security plan regularly in year after designation
Verify existence of or develop security liaison officer
Report to European Commission every two years about risks, threats, and vulnerabilities by critical infrastructure sector

Source: Authors based on European Commission (2012).

The pilot aims to optimize the protection and
resilience of four selected European critical infrastructures (EC, 2013):

••

European Organization for the Safety of Air
Navigation (Eurocontrol)
•• Galileo, a global navigation infrastructure under
civil control, consisting of 30 satellites and the
associated ground infrastructure
•• Electricity transmission grid
•• Gas transmission network
The four critical infrastructures were selected
on the basis of:

••

••
••
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Cross-border both physically (i.e., the infrastructures are located in the territory of more
than one member state) and at the level of the
service provided (i.e., a disruption of service in
one member state could affect several other
member states, causing a domino effect).
Cross-sector in that they cover the transport,
space, and energy sectors.
Interest of the operators/owners to participate in the pilot and share their experiences.

Throughout the pilot, the European Commission analyzed how to increase the dialogue
between the operators/owners of the critical
infrastructures and all actors across Europe who
would be affected by an event compromising
the functionality of the critical infrastructures. In
2014, the Commission set a roadmap after which
the Commission’s report on progress and the
next steps should follow. Some actions, responsibilities, and timelines are presented in Table 2.2.
The table represents a governance model for
ECI protection at the EU level and within the
European Commission. This is an internal process
formed within the European Commission and its
relationship with the member states. It would be
a good example of how the CIP approach could
be developed and implemented in any other
region, including LAC, as a whole or in separate
countries.
The Directorate General for Migration and
Home Affairs (DG HOME) is a structural unit of
the European Commission that manages policies
that aim to ensure all activities necessary and
beneficial to the economic, cultural, and social
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TABLE 2.2 Distribution of Roles and Responsibilities for ECI Protection at the EU level
Action 1: Design EU approach to protect and increase resilience of ECI

Actor

Timeframe

Detailed assessment and analysis of processes and methodologies used in the
selected cases.

DG HOME (lead), JRC
(support), and selected
stakeholders

Agree on the criticalities and interdependencies of the selected cases.
Agree on concepts, definitions, and a methodology for critical infrastructure risk
assessment and risk management.

DG HOME (lead), JRC
(support), and selected
stakeholders

Starting in the
second half of
2013

Agree on preparedness measures, such as contingency planning, stress tests,
awareness raising, training programs, joint courses, and exercises and/or staff
exchanges.

DG HOME (lead), JRC
(support), and selected
stakeholders

Starting in the
second half of
2013

Explore the possibilities for establishing teams of EU recovery specialists in case of a
major critical infrastructure failure to help with long-term recovery of critical services
and to be deployed at the request of member states.

DG HOME and DG ECHOc

Starting in the
second half of
2013

Assess achieved results and identified gaps.

DG HOME (lead) and JRC
(support)

First half of 2014

Discuss and validate the EU approach by member states and stakeholders.

DG HOME, member states,
and critical infrastructure
operators

First half of 2014

Action 2: Broaden implementation of the EU approach

Actor

Timeframe

Identify and select other possible pan-European infrastructures to implement the
developed approach.

DG HOME, member states,
and critical infrastructure
operators

Second half of
2014

Implement for the selected pan-European critical infrastructures.
Continue consensus and dissemination of the selected approach to regions, with
projects covering Euro-regions or involving a group of member states.

DG HOME (lead), JRC
(support), critical infrastructure
operators, and member states

Second half of
2014

Link the funds under the Internal Security Fund to implementing the developed EU
approach.

European Commission

As of 2014

a

b

Starting in the
second half of
2013

Source: EC (2013).
a
DG HOME is Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs.
b
JRC is Joint Research Center, an in-house research center of the European Commission.
c
DG ECHO is Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection.

growth of the EU. It is the leading entity for the
formation of the CIP plan within the European
Commission. 5 The Joint Research Center (JRC),
the European Commission’s in-house research
center, supports assessment and analysis activities (Table 2.2, Action 1).6 Research institutions routinely and systematically participate in
assessing and assigning CIP, which is the most
resource consuming activity. Considered to be
the best practice, this assessment and assignment enables outsourced scientific and research
capacity that is usually not available in public
institutions. When discussing the contingency
and mitigation measures in case of major critical infrastructure disruptions, the European

Commission also involves its Directorate General
for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG
ECHO) to support long-term recovery of critical
services.7 For the purpose of the pilot exercises,
owners/operators of critical infrastructures were
also closely involved. The results of the pilot
clarified the CIP approach at the regional level
and were closely discussed with all EU member
states. At the time of writing this publication, the
activities listed in Table 2.2 were not finalized.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm.
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research-topic/critical-infrastructure-protection.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/.
5

6

Policy and Governance in Selected Countries

13

CIIP Policy and Governance in Finland
Strategy and Legislation
Finland’s CIIP policy is part of its national security
framework. The main objectives of the framework
are to secure functioning of the society, analyze
risks, commission a governance model for emergency situations, and put in place responsibilities
for all the actors, including private sector and nongovernmental organizations. One of Finland’s earlier security strategies (2006) captured the notion
of CIIP as the “functioning of the economy and
infrastructure” pillar of the Strategy for Securing
the Functions Vital to Society (Finland, 2006a). This
strategy included seven vital functions (Box 2.3).
During its conception, the document outlined nine
threat scenarios related to disruption of critical
infrastructures and 61 associated special situations.
This logic and the overall structure of the strategy were based on an updated version of the Society
Security Strategy (Katri Suvando, 2011) written in
2010. Similar to the previous strategy, securing vital
functions is maintained by implementing 18 strategic tasks that are associated with each vital function. The CIIP strategic tasks include acquiring and
allocating funds, safeguarding insurance services,
securing the fuel supply, preserving electric power,
defending ICT systems, and guaranteeing housing.
The critical infrastructure sectors and protection policies are defined in the Security of Supply
Act and in the Decree of the National Emergency
Supply Agency. Line ministries are responsible
for securing vital functions within their respective
competencies. This approach facilitates formulating and subsequently implementing CIIP-related
provisions throughout the different sectors.
Protection of each critical infrastructure is
defined and implemented through separate sectoral strategic documents. For instance, general
provisions for CIIP are established in a horizontally applied strategic document dedicated to the
growth of Finland’s information society, the National
Knowledge Society Strategy 2007–15 (Finland,
2006b). The document emphasizes the importance
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of the security of information networks so citizens
can trust electronic services. In addition, it highlights the importance of well-functioning substructures, stating that information networks depend on
basic infrastructure, such as electricity supply, and
emphasizing that security of supply of services for
the information society is especially important in
crisis situations. Further, the CIIP notion is elaborated in the Cyber Security Strategy (Finland, 2013)
that was adopted in 2013. In this strategy, Finland
recognizes that “national law should be considered from the perspective of international and EU
legislation.” When dealing with cross-border and
increasingly regional and global threats, discrepancies in national legislation may not be sufficient
to protect national interests. The document also
enacts a number of principles that are fundamental
for CIIP and considers the role of CII in other critical
infrastructures.
In particular, within the ICT sector, but also in
other sectors, most of the critical infrastructures
in Finland are privately owned and/or operated. 8
Public sector companies, for the most part, provide
cyber know-how and expertise, as well as security
services and defenses. For this reason, a national
approach to CIIP policy and legislation needs to
meet the existing environment and focus on raising CIIP competencies within business activities.
This system also seeks to build awareness and
strengthen cooperation between private sector
and relevant CIIP authorities.

Governance
The Government of Finland exemplified strong
political leadership and responsibility for providing strategic guidelines and making the required
decisions regarding allocating resources and prerequisites for CIIP. The Security Committee, which
is authorized under the Security Strategy for the

8 The UK is similar, with 80 percent of critical infrastructure
assets owned by the private sector. In the United States, 85
to 90 percent of critical infrastructure is privately owned.
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Box 2.3. CIIP as Part of Finland’s Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society
The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society was adopted in 2006 and aimed “to safeguard the
country’s independence, preserve security in society, and maintain the livelihood of the population.” It also
sets out the government’s guidelines for its line ministries.
The following functions were defined as vital:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Management of government affairs
International activity
National military defense
Internal security
Functioning of the economy and infrastructure
The population’s income security and capability to function
Psychological crisis tolerance
One of the seven vital pillars—functioning of the economy and infrastructure—is defined as follows:

“The functioning of the economy refers to the economic exchange which meets the population’s and the
business community’s basic needs and supports a sufficiently healthy state economy. The maintenance of
infrastructure means the technical structures and organizations, which are necessary to provide a livelihood
for the population and for the functioning of society. This entirety includes the safeguarding of the state
economy, the financial market and the insurance business as well as securing the electronic ICT systems and
transports. Furthermore, sustaining society’s basic economic functions, a competent labor force, preserving
a first-rate education system and research structure as well as understanding and adapting to the changes in
the environment are also included.”
This definition encompassed the understanding that the state should maintain the sustainable and safe
operation of the economy as a whole from fiscal, taxation, and other standpoints, but also references the
protection of critical infrastructures such as energy, finance, ICT, and transport.
The 2006 strategy was amended in 2010, but the logical flow was maintained. For instance, the vital
functions for society remained the same.
Source: Authors based on Finland (2006a).

Society, monitors and coordinates the implementation of activities.
Security and disturbance management require
the government and different actors to have reliable, real-time monitoring of the condition of society’s vital systems, including disturbances that
affect their functioning. Each ministry and administrative branch is responsible for CIIP and disturbance management within its mandate and must
carry out strategic tasks determined on the basis of
the desired end states. The CIIP regulatory system
is based on the clear assignment of relevant tasks,
service agreements, and common security management standards of the respective authorities

and actors in the business community. Each administrative branch assesses risk and analyzes security
maturity to find any significant cyber security vulnerabilities and risks and the level of their readiness
to respond to cyber-attacks.
In Finland, there are two major public agencies
dealing with CIIP. The National Emergency Supply
Agency (NESA)9 is a CIP-dedicated agency and
cross-sector administrative operative authority for
the security of supply of critical services in Finland.
NESA is part of the Ministry of Employment and

9

See http://www.nesa.fi/security-of-supply/.
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the Economy and is responsible for economic
preparedness, coordinating preparations within
the public administration, and developing and
maintaining the security of the supply chain. The
National Emergency Supply Council (NESC) is the
body that gathers experts from the private sector
and focuses on analyzing threats. Together NESA
and NESC formulate plans and guidelines for public
authorities and businesses with respect to managing and controlling threats and risks. NESA also has
a role in securing critical infrastructures by developing and financing technical backup systems and
electromagnetic pulse to secure premises for electronic systems. It has also participated in preparing
EPCIP and CIWIN.
In addition to the above cross-sectoral bodies, for critical infrastructures there are sectoral
agencies. For CIIP, the central government’s
data security and information management policies are steered and developed by the Ministry
of Finance. The Government Information Security
Management Board, acting under the Ministry of
Finance, processes and coordinates the central
government’s key information security and cyber
security guidelines.
Another CIIP body is the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority10 (FICORA) within the
Ministry of Transport and Communications. FICORA
is a general regulatory authority for issues concerning electronic communications and information
society services. FICORA’s mission includes issuing
technical regulations and coordinating standardization at the national level. It also oversees the protection of privacy and securing data in electronic
communications. FICORA also ensures that telecommunications operators are prepared for emergencies. The operators must report to FICORA any
significant information security incidents as well as
any threats, faults, or disturbances in telecommunication networks and services. Generally speaking,
FICORA is the agency responsible for the security of electronic communications networks that
link critical infrastructure sectors. For other critical
infrastructures, such as transport or energy, sectoral
agencies will be different.
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CIIP Policy and Governance in the UK
Strategy and Legislation
The impulse to enhance the UK’s CIIP framework
was the devastating floods the country faced in
2007, which was considered the country’s largest
emergency situation since World War II. The floods
cost the UK economy over £4 billion and the damage, specifically to critical infrastructure, was valued
at about £674 million. Crisis management activities
undertaken at the time proved that things could
have been handled more efficiently and have been
better organized and coordinated. The Pitt Review:
Lessons Learned from the 2007 Floods (Pitt, 2008)
was commissioned to undertake a comprehensive review of the processes implemented during
the event and recommendations to strengthen the
national CIIP framework against natural hazards.
Specifically, the review called for a more systematic
approach to building resilience in critical infrastructure. It suggested a cross-sector campaign involving owners/operators, regulators, and government
to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure
and essential services (today known as the Tripartite
approach, as shown in Box 2.4) especially to disruptions from natural hazards. In many respects, further
evolution of the UK’s CIIP framework is a follow-up
to the emergency events of 2007.
The National Security Strategy guides the
overall approach for the UK’s CIIP. The country’s
national security framework (similar to Finland’s)
encompasses the notion that a strong economy is
a vital basis for national security. Thus, the strategy
aims to ensure a secure and resilient environment
within the UK in the context of the selected risks.
To these ends, the UK government implemented its
annual National Risk Assessment (NRA) in 2008. An
NRA is intended to capture the range of emergencies that might have a major impact on all or significant parts of the nation. It focuses on domestic
civil emergencies that are most likely to materialize

10

https://www.viestintavirasto.fi/en/index.html.
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Box 2.4. The UK’s Approach to Building Infrastructure Resilience
In the UK, infrastructure resilience is defined as
the ability of assets and networks to anticipate,
absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruption.
Resilience is secured through a combination of
the principal components shown in Figure 2.2.

FIGURE 2.2. P
 hases for Governance and Regulation
of European Critical Infrastructure
Protection
Resistance
Reliability
Infrastructure Resilience

Resistance concerns direct physical protection
Redundancy
Response and Recovery
(e.g., erecting flood defenses). Reliability is
the ability of infrastructure to maintain operaSource: Authors based on European Commission (2012).
tions under a range of conditions (e.g., electrical cabling can operate in extremes of heat and
cold). Redundancy is the adaptability of an asset or network (e.g., the installation of back-up data centers).
Response and Recovery is an organization’s ability to respond to and recover from disruption.
Tripartite Approach: The appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of each component varies across the sectors because of, for example, the different types of infrastructure, technical opportunities, and business
models. Infrastructure owners should work with government and regulators to select the blend of these
components that will produce the most cost-effective and appropriate strategy.
Source: Authors based on UK (2010a).

within the coming five years. While an NRA is a
confidential evaluation, the government publishes
the document, which is known as the National
Risks Register (NRR). The objective of the NRR is
to advise people and businesses on how they can
better prepare for civil emergencies.11 The NRR also
provides useful information regarding how the UK
and its emergency services prepare for these risks.

programs. It lays down the roles and responsibilities
of public bodies. In 2011, the strategic framework
was complimented by the “Guide to Improving the
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and Essential
Services” (UK, 2011). The guide includes principles
of infrastructure resilience, the foundation of building processes, and guidance on various practices
(e.g., hazards, checklists, and information sharing).

The UK’s most recent National Security
Strategy, published in 2010 (HM Government,
2010), introduced innovations. For instance, a
new exercise, a National Security Risk Assessment
(NSRA) was put into practice.12 This exercise aims
to assess and prioritize all major areas of security risks nationally, domestically, and overseas.
Different from an NRA, an NSRA goes beyond
domestic risks and is repeated every two years.

Starting in 2009, at the sector level, the UK
government launched preparations for the annual
sector resilience plans for each of the nine critical infrastructure sectors that had been identified.
The sectoral approach is important as owners and
operators of critical infrastructures do not all face
the same set of risks and neither do they tackle the
security issues in the same manner. The differences

In 2010, the government adopted the “Strategic
Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the
Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption
from Natural Hazards” (UK, 2010a). The document
expands on principles (Box 2.4) and cross-sector

11 See National Risk Register, 2012 edition, at: https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-forcivil-emergencies-2012-update.
12 Risk assessement and prioritization methodology is described in the appendix of the National Security Strategy.
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Box 2.5. Summary of UK Sector Resilience Plans
Sector resilience plans set out the resilience of each critical national infrastructure (CNI) sector in relation to the
relevant risks identified in the NRA. The sector resilience plans provide guidance to sector actors related to protecting CNI, including nuclear and hazardous sites, and offer priority actions to increase the level of resilience.
For instance, the 2013 Sector Resilience Plan called actors to ensure that resilience plans incorporate the
risk of cyber-attacks. In the energy sector, one of the priorities identified was a need to perform risk assessments for oil and gas beach terminals from fluvial and coastal flooding. For the finance sector, the major risks
identified were disruption to energy and communications networks and damage to or destruction of key
financial assets and networks.
Source: Authors based on Guthrie and Konaris (2012); UK (2013a).

across critical infrastructure sectors and geographical locations mean there is no one size fits all
approach to improving resilience. Sectoral plans are
prepared in close cooperation with relevant regulatory agencies and private sector actors (Box 2.4).
Sector resilience plans are written in relation to the
risks identified in current NRAs. Although individual plans are confidential, the unclassified summary
of sector resilience plans is released annually.13 The
summary provides overall information about the
resilience of each critical infrastructure sector separately, identifies the risks and vulnerabilities, the
desirable level of resilience, a program of actions
for achieving the desired level, and methods of
reporting on progress toward achieving it (Box 2.5).
When it comes to specific critical infrastructure
segments, referred to as critical national infrastructures (CNI), there are dedicated sectoral policies
and regulations. Strengthening the sectoral CIIP
approach is, among other functions, performed
through the independent reviews requested by the
government for the particular sector.14 Afterward,
the government reports on implementing the relevant recommendations and further activities to
improve the resilience of the CNI.15
Examining the sectoral policies for CIIP, the UK
has adopted two major strategic frameworks: the
National Information Assurance Strategy (UK, 2007)
and the Cyber Security Strategy (Cabinet UK, 2015).
The first aims to provide ongoing assurance to the
government that the risks to information systems
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and the information they hold are appropriately
managed. One of the main government targets for
2015 was to achieve reduced vulnerabilities in government systems and critical infrastructures. The
second document is dedicated to securing the UK’s
cyber space. It is implemented through the National
Cyber Security Programme, which allocates financial
resources and activities dedicated to CIIP (Box 2.6).

Governance
In the UK, the main responsibility for resilience of
critical infrastructures lies with the owners and
operators of the infrastructure. The government,

13 The annual summary of Sector Resilience Plans for
2010–14 can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/sector-resilience-plans.
14 Performed by the independent parties.
15 For instance the resilience review for the transport sector was published in 2014, followed by the government’s response to the review in 2015. Both documents can be found
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417406/transport-resiliencereview.pdf; https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380213/cm-8968-accessible.pdf.
A review of the energy sector was undertaken by the
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee and
the government’s report was published in June 2015. The
response of the government can be found at: https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/440286/50226_Cm9083_Gov_response_to_
HoL_report_Accessible.pdf.
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Box 2.6. What It Costs to Implement the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy
To achieve the objectives of its National Cyber Security Strategy, the UK has set aside £650 million
(US$960 million) of public funding for a four-year National Cyber Security Programme. The total budget
dedicated to implementing the strategy is £860 million (until March 2016).
During the first three years of implementation, nearly two-thirds of the 2011–13 budget (£253.8 million)
was spent on technical capabilities to detect and respond to the most sophisticated threats. Most of these
activities were dedicated to increasing the resilience of critical infrastructures against cyber threats. During
the fourth year (2013–14), the budget allocated for this purpose was slightly less than half (£93.2 million).
The second and third largest expenditure lines were dedicated to cyber defense and combating cyber-crime.
Another of the strategy’s big priorities (and also expenditures) was engaging with the private and public
sectors. For that purpose, the UK, through the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills
and other delivery partners, spent £19.3 million in 2011–14 and planned to spend £21.1 million in 2014–15. The
National Cyber Security Programme’s objectives were to improve awareness of the cyber threat among businesses and the public, reduce the number of attacks on businesses, ensure a coherent approach across the
government, and work with those responsible for CNI to improve its protection.

FIGURE 2.3. T
 otal Planned Expenditures per Activity of the National Cyber Security Programme, 2011–15
(in British pounds)
£ 18.8m
£ 20.9m

£ 5.8m £ 5.1m
£ 2.6m
Cabinet office national sovereign capability to detect and defeat high end threats
Mainstreaming cyber throughout defense

£ 32.3m

Law enforcement and combating cyber crime

£ 40.4m

Private sector engagement and awareness
£ 347m

£ 90.1m

Improving the resilience of the public sector network
Education and skills
Indicent magement/response and trend analysis

£ 91m

Programme management, coordination and policy
International engagement and capacity building
Contingency

Source: Nao (2014).

regulators, and industry work closely together to
ensure future infrastructure investments consider
the needs for security and resilience. The requirements for investments in critical infrastructure
related to improving security and resilience are
guided by the following three principles:

••
••
••

Investments should be proportionate to risks.
Investments should be enabled by improved
sharing of information between those who
need to know.
Investments should be delivered at the lowest
practicable level.
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TABLE 2.3. Departments Leading Responsibility for Critical Infrastructures in the UK
Sector or subsector

Government departments

Communications

Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills

Ambulance*

Department of Health

Fire*

Department for Communities and Local Government

Coastguard*

Department for Transport

Police*

Home Office

Energy

Department for Energy and Climate Change

Finance

HM Treasury

Food

Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and Food Standards Agency

Government

Cabinet Office

Health

Department of Health

Transport

Department for Transport

Water

Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Source: Authors.
*These subsectors belong to the emergency services critical infrastructure sector but are presented separately because the governance bodies
are different.

At the national level, the Cabinet Office and
the Centre coordinate the CIIP framework for the
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI).16 The
Cabinet Office is the supreme governmental body
that decides on CIIP-related issues of major importance. For instance, this office aggregates sectoral
resilience plans for critical infrastructure.17 Produced
annually, the plans are provided to ministers to
alert them of any perceived vulnerabilities, with a
program of measures to improve resilience where
necessary. The Cabinet Office also decides on the
allocation of national funds to implement CIIP.
In addition, the CPNI provides security advice
and liaises with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat
of the Cabinet Office, which works to enhance
the nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from emergencies. It works closely with
the police and has a strong partnership with the
National Counter Terrorism Security Office and
the nationwide network of police specialists, the
Counter Terrorism Security Advisers. The Cabinet
Office and these security advisers also support
CPNI in providing guidance on securing critical
sites within the critical infrastructures.18
At the sector level, relevant government
departments take the lead in ensuring appropriate
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steps are taken within their jurisdiction to improve
protective security (Table 2.3). They also identify
critical infrastructures within their areas in consultation with CPNI and relevant organizations.

CIIP Policy and Governance in Spain
Strategy and Legislation
The major advancements in CIIP framework development in Spain were made in 2007 with the
approval of the very first National Plan for Critical
Infrastructure Protection and National Catalogue of
Strategic Infrastructure. Also in 2007, the government
approved an agreement on Critical Infrastructure
Protection authorizing the governance framework
to direct and coordinate the necessary actions to
protect critical infrastructures (Spain, 2007). This
paved the way for the establishment of the National
Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CNPIC)
under the Ministry of the Interior.
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/.
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/sector-resilience-plans.
18 See more at: http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/Who-wework-with/#sthash.vM6V5SwC.dpuf.
16
17
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Box 2.7. Regulation of Protection of Critical Infrastructure in Spain
After adopting Law 8/2011 regarding protecting critical infrastructure, the Ministry of the Interior issued regulations providing detailed guidance on the following issues:
National Catalogue of Critical Infrastructures: Includes list of critical infrastructures. Provides objectives and
describes the information update procedures and governance framework for the Catalogue.
Governance Model for CIP: Defines roles and functions of the institutions involved in CIP, including private
critical infrastructure operators.
The regulations specify the following for the CIP plans that are maintained in Spain (i.e., the national CIP
plan, sectoral CIP plans, the security and operational plans of critical infrastructure operators, and operational
support plans):

••
••
••
••

For each type, development objectives and process.
For sectoral plans and plans for critical infrastructure operators, composition and development requirements.
For all plans, process of approval and classification.
A review process.

Communication between critical infrastructure operators and public institutions: Defines security of communications, establishes the process of designating the critical infrastructure contact officers within the critical infrastructure operator, and provides protection for classified information.
Source: Authors based on Spain (2011).

The National Plan for Critical Infrastructure
Protection sets the criteria, guidelines, and operational capabilities to ensure protection of critical
infrastructures from various threats, both generic
and specific. The National Catalogue of Strategic
Infrastructures contains a complete, updated, and
verified list of all crucial domestic infrastructures.
It consists of specific characteristics of each critical infrastructure, such as its location, ownership,
scope of service provided, safety, and criticality level. Both documents are constantly updated
and are classified in accordance with national
legislation.
In 2011, Spain adopted legislation (Jefatura
del Estado, 2011) that set the overall governance
framework for CIIP, designating 12 critical infrastructure sectors and various protection measures
(Box 2.7) (Spain, 2011). Those legal acts formed
the basis of the national CIIP legal framework.
Apart from maintaining the national CIIP plan,
the law mandated preparation of strategic sectoral

plans to define protection activities in each of the
critical infrastructure sectors identified in the CIIP
framework. Moreover, it created procedures to designate the critical infrastructure operators. In this
regard, critical infrastructure operators are tasked
with a set of functions and obligations related to
maintaining certain security levels. The regulation
of CIIP processes is further elaborated in Box 2.7.
In June 2014, the government adopted plans for
five critical infrastructure sectors (electricity, gas,
oil, nuclear, and financial) and designated 37 new
operators of critical infrastructure. In January 2015,
a commission was organized to review the work
done to prepare the sectoral plans for the critical
infrastructures in the transport and water sectors.19
http://www.interior.gob.es/es/web/interior/noticias/
detalle/-/journal_content/56_INSTANCE_1YSSI3xiWuP
H/10180/3188420/?redirect=http://www.interior.gob.es/
es/web/interior/prensa/noticias?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_
GHU8Ap6ztgsg&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p
_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1l
19
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Additionally, Spain is one of the countries where
the national government empowers provincial and
regional authorities, thus Spain had to take additional legislative steps to coordinate the CIIP framework and delegate certain activities to the regions
and cities that are granted autonomy. Provincial
and regional authorities participate in the CIIP processes under the coordination of the government
through the Secretary of State for Security.
On the policy side, protection of critical infrastructure falls under the strategic framework of
national security within the first National Security
Strategy, which was adopted in June 2011. 20 Critical
infrastructures, services, and supplies were explicitly included among nine other threat and risk areas
identified. The strategy provided high-level guidance for CIIP and formed the groundwork for further
legislative initiatives and governance. In 2013, the
current National Security Strategy (Spain, 2013a)
was adopted. It included seven lines of action:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Shared responsibility and public–private
cooperation
Tiered planning
Balance and efficiency
Resilience
Coordination
International cooperation
Safeguarding the security of critical infrastructure in accordance with the National Plan of
Critical Infrastructure

Further, the National Cyber Security Strategy
guides the CIIP framework. It aims to be aligned
with initiatives similar with those of the region and
with relevant international organizations, particularly the EU Cyber Security Strategy. The National
Security Strategy mandated preparation of the first
Cyber Security Strategy in 2011 and the current
National Cyber Security Strategy (Spain, 2013b)
was adopted in 2013.

the framework of the National Security Council. Its
approach includes lines of actions related to CIIP and
implementing the National Cyber Security Policy.
The CIP Law mentioned in the previous section authorizes the governance framework for
CIIP. On the policy level, the Secretary of State for
Security under the Ministry of the Interior coordinates efforts. Main actors and their key functions
are listed in Table 2.4. The CNPIC21 coordinates and
works closely within 12 critical infrastructure sectors
to define specific security priorities and maintains
the National Catalogue of Critical Infrastructures.
CNPIC is a point of reference for both CIP and CIIP
(Theodore Puskas Foundation, 2013) nationally
and internationally.
Dedicated committees perform other important functions. Two examples are the National
Committee for Critical Infrastructure Protection
and the Interdepartmental Working Group on
Critical Infrastructure Protection. The former
approves sectoral strategic plans and designates
the critical infrastructure operators. The latter
develops those plans and suggests operators that
could be nominated as critical infrastructure operators. Both organizations include representatives
from autonomous regions and cities and are led
and coordinated by CNPIC.
Moreover, line ministries and public institutions assigned for each critical infrastructure sector are leading sectoral CIIP efforts. Assignment of
the ministries and public institutions is performed
through the CIP Law (Table 2.4).

CIP and CIIP Policy and Governance in
Korea
Different laws in Korea address CIP and CIIP. The
country began its digitalization campaign in the
1980s and, as a result, understood the need to
protect digital records, privacy online, and the

Governance
Spanish Security Strategy: Everyone’s responsibility, 2011: at:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/
?lang=en&id=130671.
21 http://www.cnpic.es/index.html.
20

The Prime Minister directs and supervises implementation of the National Security Strategy through
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TABLE 2.4. Main Actors of CIIP Governance in Spain
No.

Institution

Main functions

1.

Secretary of State for Security within the
Ministry of the Interior

Coordinates national CIIP efforts and heads the governance framework. Chairs the
commission for critical infrastructure protection.

2.

National Center for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CNPIC) established under the
Ministry of the Interior

Manages classifying and updating the National Catalogue of Critical Infrastructures. CNPIC is
responsible for coordinating and supervising the protection of national critical infrastructures
and is designated as the Spanish National Point of Contact at the international level.

3.

Ministries assigned for each critical
infrastructure sector

Promote and implement the CIIP security policies within their respective competencies and
critical infrastructure sectors.

4.

Autonomous communities and cities with
a statute of autonomy

Participate in CIIP process within their territories (e.g., declaring an area within its territory
as critical and approving operational support plans). Participate in the National Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection and meet with the interdepartmental working group.

5.

National Commission for the Protection of
Critical Infrastructure

Approve Sectoral Strategic Plans and designate critical infrastructure operators that are
proposed by the interdepartmental working group for CIIP. The Commission is a collegial
body chaired by the Secretary of State for Security.

6.

Interdepartmental Working Group for
Critical Infrastructure Protection

Develop Sectoral Strategic Plans and propose nominations for critical infrastructure
operators.

7.

Public and private operators of critical
infrastructure

Cooperate with the authorities that comprise the national CIIP system. Provide technical
advice on composing the catalogue of critical infrastructure. Provide updated information
about critical infrastructure. Participate in preparing sectoral strategic plans and in risk
assessment exercises. Prepare operational security plans. Appoint safety liaison and
contact point in case of European critical infrastructure.

Source: Authors based on Jefatura del Estado (2011); further actors and functions are established by the regulation on CIP approved by the Royal
Decree 704/2011, May 2011.

criticality of information infrastructure earlier than
other countries. This led to early actions for CIIP.
For that reason, this study looks at Korean CIP and
CIIP frameworks separately. The latest of the policies remains one of the oldest frameworks globally.

mandated preparation of CIP plans that aim to
define the activities in each of the critical infrastructure sectors, with the plans to be evaluated annually by the Minister of Public Safety and Security.
The plans are classified into four categories:

Legislation and Governance: CIP

1.

Protection goal and risk analysis

2.

Protection source management

3.

Protection activity implementation

4.

Situation management

In 2004, Korea adopted the Act on the Management
of Disasters and Safety (hereinafter referred to as
ROK CIP Law), which installed a disaster and safety
control system against various disasters to ensure
citizen security, physical safety, and safety of property (ROK , 2010). Within the ROK CIP Law, incidents include natural disasters, accidents beyond
a certain scale, and debilitation of the national
backbone systems for energy, communications,
and transportation, among others (Choi, Yoon, and
Shin, 2014). The Enforcement Decree elaborates on
implementing the ROK CIP Law ROK, 2015).
The governance model involves various stakeholders, as shown in Box 2.8. The ROK CIP Law

Strategy and Legislation: CIIP
The country’s digitalization initiatives forced
government to prioritize creating policies and
enabling a legal environment to support its
efforts. For instance, there was an urgent need
to significantly amend the laws related to information protection. Consequently, the very first
ROK CIIP Law was adopted in January 2001. This
law serves as the essential legislation for various cyber incidents and consists of many articles
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Box 2.8. Main Actors of CIP Governance in Korea
The Central Safety Control Committee (Central Committee) coordinates important policies on safety control and consults and coordinates between the related ministries. The Central Committee is chaired by the
Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister prepares and confirms development guidelines for basic plans for national safety
control duties and instructs the heads of relevant central administrative agencies.
A coordination committee is established under the Central Committee to consult on and coordinate
minor matters.
Local committees deliberate safety control plans in the relevant areas, and consult and coordinate the
safety control affairs performed by the disaster control agency.
The heads of relevant central administrative agencies designate national infrastructures deemed necessary to be continuously managed to protect the national backbone systems after undergoing deliberation
thereon by the Central Committee. They also prepare basic plans for safety control duties to be submitted to
the Prime Minister.
Source: Authors based on ROK (2010).

defining CII, outlining protective measures and
counters against cyber incidents, defining the
work of information security consulting agencies,
and specifying legal responsibilities and penalties for various entities. It also outlines the governance framework for CIIP and defines the roles
and functions of the Committee for the Protection
of Information Infrastructure (CPII). This committee allocates tasks of relevant ministries, institutes, the technical-level committee for Incident
Response, and other central administrative organizations. Other matters addressed within the ROK
CIIP Law are protection, prevention, countermeasures, technical support, technological advancement, international cooperation, and penalties for
cyber-crimes. The structure of the ROK CIIP Law
is outlined in Table 2.5 and its main provisions are
elaborated in the Box 2.9.
The Korean government and organizations
are under constant cyber-attacks. Consequently,
within their National Cyber Security Master Plan, 22
the government escalated cyberspace as another
operational domain like the nation’s territories on
land, air, and sea that need a state-level defense
system. Under the plan, the critical systems must
be encrypted, disaster recovery systems expanded,
and important data secured.

24

In March 2013, a sizable cyber-attack targeted
major broadcasting and financial companies. This
event triggered the preparation and adoption of a
comprehensive national cyber security strategy by
the government, the National Comprehensive Plan
for Cyber Security. 23 This plan was built around four
pillars (Prompt, Cooperative, Robust, Creative):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Enhance prompt response systems against
cyber threats.
Build smart cooperative systems between the
relevant authorities.
Improve the robustness of the protection of
cyberspace.
Apply creativity to deal with cyber security.

Governance: CIIP
The CPII deliberates the designation of CIIs, policies, and protection plans and coordinates countermeasures. The CPII is chaired by the Prime

National Cyber Security Master Plan, at: http://www.kcc.
go.kr/user.do?mode=view&page=A05030000&boardId=111
3&boardSeq=31663.
23 National Comprehensive Plan for Cyber Security, at:
http://www.msip.go.kr/web/msipContents/contentsView.
do?cateId=mssw311&artId=1212488.
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TABLE 2.5. Structure of the ROK CIIP Law
Chapters

Contents

Chapter I
General Provisions

Article 1
Article 2

Chapter II
System for Protecting Critical
Information and Communications
Infrastructure

Article 3
Article 4
Article 5

Chapter III
Designation and Analysis of
Vulnerabilities of Critical Information
and Communications Infrastructure

Article 8
(Designation of Critical Information and Communications Infrastructure)
Article 8–2 (Recommendation for Designation of Critical Information and Communications
Infrastructure)
Article 9
(Analysis and Evaluation of Vulnerabilities)

Chapter IV
Protection of Critical Information and
Communications Infrastructure and
Response to Intrusion Incidents

Article 10
Article 11
Article 12

Chapter V

Removed on May 22, 2009

Chapter VI
Technological Support and Private
Cooperation

Article 24
Article 25
Article 26
Article 27

(Technological Development)
(Support for the Management Organization)
(International Cooperation)
(Duty of Confidentiality)

Chapter VII
Penalty Provisions

Article 28
Article 29
Article 30

(Penalty Provisions)
(Penalty Provisions)
(Administrative Fines)

(Purpose)
(Definitions)

(Committee for Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure)
(Functions of Committee)
(Establishment of Measures to Protect Critical Information and Communications
Infrastructure)
Article 5–2 (Ascertaining Implementation of Measures to Protect the Critical Information and
Communications Infrastructure)
Article 6
(Establishment of Plans for Protecting Critical Information and Communications
Infrastructure)
Article 7
(Support for Protecting of Critical Information and Communications Infrastructure)

Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16

(Protection Guidelines)
(Orders for Protection Measures)
(Prohibition Against the Intrusion of Critical Information and Communications
Infrastructure)
(Notification of Intrusion Incidents)
(Restoration Measures)
(Organization of Headquarters for Countermeasures)
(Information Sharing and Analysis Center)

Source: Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure (ROK, 2013).

Minister and comprises vice minister-level officials
of related central administrative agencies.
The primary responsibility of CII management
agencies is CII protection. These agencies assess
and evaluate vulnerabilities to prevent and deal
with cyber incidents and institute countermeasures
for CIIs in their charge. They are also responsible
for notifying the relevant central administrative
agencies and investigation agencies regarding
the details of any incident, and rehabilitating the
affected infrastructures.
As a working-level committee, the Ministry of
Science, ICT, and Future Planning (MSIP) and the
National Intelligence Service (NIS) form guidelines for designing relevant plans. Also, one of their

major roles is to check whether protective measures are effective for the designated CII. The NIS
Director and Minister for MSIP inform the head of
the relevant central administrative agency of the
confirmation results regarding protective measure
implementation. They may ask the Korea Internet &
Security Agency (KISA) to perform the confirmation on their behalf should they deem it appropriate.
Supporting agencies include KISA, information
sharing and analysis centers, consulting companies
specializing in knowledge information security, and
the Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute. These agencies helped install the relevant
protective measures and technological support to
prevent and respond to incidents.
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Box 2.9. Key Provisions of the ROK CIIP Law
Initially adopted in 2001, the ROK CIIP Law represents one of the very first legal acts of this kind ever adopted
globally. The law authorized key CIIP institutions and put in place grounding provisions that even today
(after nearly 15 years) serve as a basis for CIIP frameworks. The following paragraphs outline the key reforms
brought by the CIIP Law.
Establish the Committee for the Protection of Information Infrastructure (CPII): Subordinate to the Prime
Minister’s Office (Article 3).
Set obligations related to risk analysis, risk-based protection measures, and protection plans: The head of
the infrastructure management organization should perform vulnerability analysis and evaluation on the facility under its jurisdiction, and form and implement protection measures for the facility. The head of the central
administrative organization should create and implement the protection plan for CII by area of jurisdiction
(Articles 5 and 6).
Provide technical support to CII owners and operators: Technical support for CII can be requested through
the head of the national institute or specialist institute according to Presidential decree (Article 7).
Identify and designate CII: The head of the central administrative organization should designate the infrastructure recognized as one that needs to be protected from electronic intrusions as CII after deliberation by
CPII (Article 8).
Notify about incidents: On discovery, the head of CII management should notify the related organization of
the disruption, paralysis, or destruction of the facility under its jurisdiction due to a cyber-incident. The head
of the organization should also take measures for recovery following damage and prevent the spread of damage (Articles 13, 14).
Information sharing and analysis center: Any person who intends to provide information concerning vulnerabilities, intrusion factors, and countermeasures or operate the real-time alarm and analysis system may
establish and operate an information sharing and analysis center (Article 16).
Penal provisions: Those who disrupt, paralyze, or destroy CII with electronic infringement behavior such as
hacking or computer virus can be imprisoned for a maximum of 10 years and fined 100 million won (equivalent to $100,000) (Article 28).
Source: Authors based on Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure (ROK, 2013).

CIIP Policy and Governance in the
United States
Strategy and Legislation
Strengthening the security and resilience of critical infrastructures against both physical and cyber
threats is one of the core policy objectives of the
United States. At the strategic level, protecting
critical infrastructures and key assets is among the
core mission areas within the President’s National
Strategy for Homeland Security (DHS, 2007).
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That priority was further elaborated at the strategic level within the National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and
Key Assets (DHS, 2003a). The strategy identifies a clear set of national goals and outlines the
guiding principles that underpin the efforts of the
United States to secure critical infrastructure and
assets. The strategy for physical CIIP compliments
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (DHS,
2003b), which focuses on assigning, assessing, and
protecting interconnected information systems
and networks. The physical and cyber strategies
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Box 2.10. Presidential Policy Directive on CIP No. PPD-21
Adopted in February 2013, the Presidential Policy Directive on CIP No. PPD-21 laid down the groundwork
for the CIP framework in the United States. It supersedes the Homeland Security Presidential Directive
No. HSPD-7 on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection issued in 2003. The need
for a new directive arose as a result of the shift and advance of the national CIP efforts that required clarification of the functions and responsibilities of the federal and relevant public agencies.
Directive PPD-21 guides national CIP efforts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Develop a situational awareness capability that addresses both physical and cyber aspects of how infrastructure is functioning in near-real time.
Understand the cascading consequences of infrastructure failures.
Evaluate and enrich public–private partnerships.
Update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Develop a comprehensive research and development plan.

The directive elaborates on the U.S. policy approach for CIP; defines CIP roles and responsibilities under
the strategic guidance of the Secretary of the Homeland Security; puts in place three strategic imperatives
that are aimed to be ensured by CIP efforts; guides CIP innovation, research, and development; provides
directions on implementing the directive; and designates critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific
agencies.
Under the directive, the federal government is responsible for strengthening the security and resilience
of its own critical infrastructure, for the continuity of national essential functions, and for organizing itself to
establish partnerships effectively and add value to the security and resilience efforts of critical infrastructure
owners and operators.
Source: Authors based on DHS (2013a); U.S. White House (2013).

share common underlying policy objectives and
principles. Together, they form the roadmap for
priority areas of homeland security.
At the federal level, legal acts empowering
strategic CIIP efforts are the Executive Orders of
the President (also called Presidential directives),
the first of which was issued in 1998 (U.S. White
House, 1998). The Directive recognized certain
parts of the national infrastructure as critical for
both the national economy and security, coordinated the primary steps for its safekeeping, and
laid the groundwork for a public–private partnership framework. The Directive, updated in 2003,
elaborated on provisions to identify, prioritize,
and protect critical infrastructure (U.S. White
House, 2003). Since 2013, Executive Order 13636,
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
and the Presidential Policy Directive on Critical

Infrastructure Security and Resilience (PPD-21)
have governed the CIIP framework of the United
States (Box 2.10) (U.S. White House, 2013).
In 2002, the United States also adopted legislation reorganizing and centralizing security functions at the federal level and aiming to meet existing
threats and challenges, the Homeland Security Act
(HSA). 24 This act leads the coordination and protection of critical infrastructure. HSA also facilitated the Critical Infrastructure Information Act
2002 (CII Act), 25 which regulates information
exchange between critical infrastructure operators
and public sector agencies. The objective of the CII

24 Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, http://
www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-act-2002.
25 Critical Infrastructure Information (CII) Act of 2002, at:
http://www.dhs.gov/publication/cii-act-2002.
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Box 2.11. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2013: New Developments
While the 2013 NIPP retains the basic building blocks of previous plans, it represents a significant evolution in
several areas. For example, the updated plan:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Elevates security and resilience as the primary aim of critical infrastructure planning efforts.
Calls for the establishment of national priorities—determined jointly by public and private sector
partners—that will drive action at the national level and inform the progression of goals and priorities at
the sector, state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT), and regional levels.
Focuses on creating a process to set critical infrastructure national priorities determined jointly by the
public and private sector.
Directs joint decision-making by public and private sector partners initiated at the sector, SLTT, and
regional levels.
Drives action at the federal level that in turn informs advancement of national goals and priorities.
Supports execution of the National Plan and achievement of the National Preparedness Goal at both the
national and community levels, focusing on leveraging regional collaborative efforts.
Integrates cyber and physical security and resilience efforts into an enterprise approach to risk management.

Source: DHS (2013b).

Act is to protect and prevent disclosure of sensitive
information related to the risks, vulnerabilities, and
events of critical infrastructures. It required trust
between the private sector critical infrastructure
operators and government agencies because collaboration among stakeholders is instrumental in
overcoming the resistance of the private sector to
share sensitive information. The current Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information program builds
on the provisions of this act.
The first National Security Strategy mandated the preparation of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP), which was issued in 2006.
The current NIPP 2013 (DHS, 2013b) represents an
evolution from concepts introduced in the initial version released in 2006 and revised in 2009 (Box 2.11).26
It provides guidance on efforts of stakeholders to
enhance the security and resilience of critical infrastructures across the country in conjunction with
national preparedness policy and integrates existing
and future critical infrastructure security and resilience efforts into a single national program.
In the United States , as well as countries discussed in the previous sections, the national plan
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consists of sectoral approaches as mandated
by PPD-21. It specifically tasks sector agencies,
referred to as sector-specific agencies (SSAs),
to lead a collaborative process for critical infrastructure security within each of the 16 critical
infrastructure sectors identified within the PPD21. Each assigned sector agency is responsible
for developing and implementing an appropriate
sector-specific plan, which details the application
of the NIPP concepts to the unique characteristics and conditions of their sector. At the moment
of drafting this publication, the SSPs were being
updated to reflect new requirements from the
NIPP 2013 and published on the official web-page
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). 27

NIPP official web-page, Department of Homeland Security, at: http://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan.
27 For instance, the current sector-specific plan for the communications sector can be found here: http://web.archive.
org/web/20141107223442/http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/nipp-ssp-communications-2010.pdf.
26
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Box 2.12. Main Responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security in Regards to CIIP
In carrying out the responsibilities assigned in HSA 2002, the Secretary of Homeland Security does the following:

•• Evaluates national capabilities, opportunities, and challenges in protecting critical infrastructure.
•• Analyzes threats to, vulnerabilities of, and potential consequences from all hazards on critical infrastructure.
•• Identifies security and resilience functions that are necessary for effective public–private engagement
••
••
••
••

with all critical infrastructure sectors.
Develops a national plan and metrics in coordination with SSAs and other critical infrastructure partners.
Integrates and coordinates federal cross-sector security and resilience activities.
Ascertains and studies key interdependencies among critical infrastructure sectors.
Reports on the effectiveness of national efforts to strengthen the security and resilience posture of critical infrastructures.

Source: Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-act-2002.

Governance
In the United States, protection of critical infrastructures is considered to be a shared responsibility among the federal and SLTT entities, along with
public and private owners and operators of critical
infrastructures. This section outlines the CIIP governance model established at the federal level.
In 2002, the DHS was created, led by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. 28 The Secretary is
the main authority responsible for providing strategic guidance, promoting a nationwide effort, and
coordinating federal activities to encourage the
security and resilience of critical infrastructures
(Box 2.12). DHS plays a key role within the effort
to implement the CIIP framework. Within DHS, the
structural unit responsible for CIIP is the National
Protection and Programs Directorate. Within this
unit, the Office of Infrastructure Protections leads
and coordinates national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience. In addition, the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications is working to prevent or minimize
disruptions to CII. Both offices manage aroundthe-clock monitoring and coordination centers:

••

The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center serves as a 24/7 cyber

••

monitoring, incident response, and management center and as a national point of cyber
and communications incident integration. 29
The National Infrastructure Coordinating
Center is the dedicated coordination and information sharing operations center, operating
around the clock and maintaining situational
awareness of the nation’s critical infrastructure
for the federal government. 30

At the sector level, a significant role within the CIIP
governance framework is assigned to SSAs, including preparing and implementing NIPPs and SSPs.
The SSAs have institutional knowledge and expertise
about the sector, possess familiarity and relationships
among the sector actors, and thus also play a critical
role in maintaining partnerships and dialoguing with
the critical infrastructure operators. The need for
SSAs arises from the understanding that each critical infrastructure sector has unique characteristics,
operating procedures, and risk profiles. In particular,
28 Homeland Security Act of 2002, at: http://www.dhs.gov/
homeland-security-act-2002.
29 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center, at: http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center.
30 National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, at: http://
www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-coordinating-center.
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TABLE 2.6. Critical Infrastructure Sector and Assigned Sector Specific Agency (SSA)
Critical infrastructure sector

SSA

Chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical
manufacturing; dams; emergency services; information technology;
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sectors

Department of Homeland Security

Defense industrial base sector

Department of Defense

Energy sector

Department of Energy

Financial services sector

Department of the Treasury

Food and agriculture sector

Department of Agriculture and
Department of Health and Human Services

Government facilities sector

Department of Homeland Security and
General Services Administration

Healthcare and public health sector

Department of Health and Human Services

Transportation systems sector

Department of Homeland Security and
Department of Transportation

Water and wastewater systems sector

Environmental Protection Agency

Source: Sector-Specific Agencies, Department of Homeland Security, at: http://www.dhs.gov/sector-specific-agencies.

SSAs are obliged to carry out the following main
roles and responsibilities for their respective sectors:

••

••
••

••

••

Strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, coordinate with the DHS and
other relevant federal departments and agencies, and collaborate with critical infrastructure
owners and operators and, where appropriate,
with other actors.
Serve as a day-to-day federal interface for the
dynamic prioritization and coordination of sector-specific activities.
Carry out incident management responsibilities consistent with statutory authority and
other appropriate policies, directives, and
regulations.
Provide, support, or facilitate technical assistance and consultations for the sector to identify vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents,
as appropriate.
Support the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
statutorily required reporting requirements by
providing sector-specific CII annually.

dedicated sector-specific agency (SSA) for eight critical infrastructure sectors and is a co-SSA with other
agencies for another two critical infrastructure sectors. For instance, the Office of Cyber Security and
Communications is the SSA for the Communications
and Information Technology sectors, while the Office
of Infrastructure Protection is the assigned SSA for
another six critical infrastructure sectors.
The National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center (NISAC)31, commissioned in 2001,
supports DHS efforts. 32 The initial objective was
“to serve as a source of national competence to
address critical infrastructure protection and continuity through support for activities related to
counterterrorism, threat assessment, and risk mitigation.” Today, the NISAC serves a broad spectrum
of objectives within its initial idea to inform decision-making and planning in CIIP (Box 2.13). The
Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis within
the DHS manages the NISAC. 33

http://www.sandia.gov/nisac/.
United States Code § 5195c – Critical infrastructures
protection, at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/
42/5195c.
33 Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, at: http://
www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis.
31

32

Assigned SSAs are listed in Table 2.6. DHS continues to play an important role in CIIP not only
nationally, but also at the sectoral level. DHS is a
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Box 2.13. National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
The NISAC began as a collaboration between Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in 1999 and was
incorporated by the United States Patriot Act of 2001 into the Department of Homeland Security on its inception in March 2003. The Office of Infrastructure Protection oversees the NISAC’s operations.
The NISAC conducts modeling, simulation, and analysis of the nation’s critical infrastructures. NISAC analysts assess critical infrastructure risk, vulnerability, interdependencies, and event consequences.
Requests for information or analyses are prioritized and supported by the Homeland Infrastructure Threat
and Risk Analysis Center. Joint ventures between the centers are often undertaken to create or advance a
needed capability to support multiple governmental decision-makers.
The NISAC plays a vital role under the NIPP, which relies on robust public–private information sharing to
protect and build resiliency for the nation’s vast infrastructure. The center’s multidisciplinary expertise covers
the full spectrum of 16 critical infrastructure sectors while focusing on the challenges posed by interdependencies and the consequences of disruption.
NISAC researchers and analysts conduct extensive modeling, simulation, and analysis to support risk
mitigation and policy planning. They also provide real-time assistance to DHS decision-makers during such
critical incidents as hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and manmade events.
Source: Authors based on http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-infrastructure-simulation-and-analysis-center and http://www.sandia.gov/nisac/analyses/nisac/.

The departments and agencies listed in Table 2.7
have additional federal responsibilities in specialized
or support functions related to critical infrastructure
security and resilience that will be carried out by, or
along with, other federal departments and independent regulatory agencies, as appropriate.

Observations and Recommendations
When reviewing the international experience in CIIP
policymaking and governance, a number of similarities become clear. Different countries arrived
at similar solutions while developing national CIIP
frameworks, meaning that those solutions proved to
be efficient. The authors recommend these standards
to countries that are developing their national CIIP
frameworks. The following summarizes the findings.

Prioritization of CIIP at the National Level
Preparing and implementing a CIIP framework
requires significant involvement of the public
and private sector. It requires dedicated financial
resources and participation of academia. A significant level of engagement can be achieved by high

prioritization of the CIIP agenda at the national
level through primary countrywide strategies, such
as a national security strategy.

Umbrella Framework for CIIP
CIIP involves many segments and different
actors from both the public and private sectors.
In those circumstances, a CIIP policy and legal
framework would benefit from a single overarching policy document encompassing all related
areas and actions, establishing a governance
framework, thus creating the full picture of the
CIIP framework.

Clear Governance Model for CIIP
CIIP governance at the national level should not
be complex. There should be one or only a few
policymaking bodies involved at the national
level, with clear assignment of sectoral coordination down the line. Each critical infrastructure
sector should have its own governance structure
that monitors implementation of sector-specific
CIIP measures, and coordinates and strengthens
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TABLE 2.7. Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Departments and Agencies within the CIIP Framework
Department or agency

Responsibilities

Department of State

Engage foreign governments and international organizations to strengthen the security and resilience of critical
infrastructures located outside the United States and to facilitate the overall exchange of best practices and lessons
learned.

Department of Justice,
including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)

Lead counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations and related law enforcement activities across the
critical infrastructure sectors. The Department of Justice is authorized to investigate, disrupt, prosecute, and
otherwise reduce foreign intelligence, terrorist, and other threats to, and actual or attempted attacks, threats, or
sabotage of the critical infrastructure. The FBI also conducts domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination of
cyber threat information and is responsible for the operation of the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force.
This task force serves as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent
information related to cyber threat investigations, with representation from the DHS, the intelligence community, the
Department of Defense, and other agencies.

Department of the
Interior

Identify, prioritize, and coordinate the security and resilience efforts for national monuments and icons and
incorporate measures to reduce risk to these critical assets, while also promoting their use and enjoyment.

Department of
Commerce

Engage private sector, research, academic, and government organizations to improve security for technology and
tools related to cyber-based systems. Promote the development of other efforts related to critical infrastructures to
enable the timely availability of industrial products, materials, and services to meet homeland security requirements.

Intelligence Community

Use applicable authorities and coordination mechanisms to provide, as appropriate, intelligence assessments
regarding threats to critical infrastructures and coordinate on intelligence and other sensitive or proprietary
information related to critical infrastructures.

General Services
Administration

Provide or support government-wide contracts for critical infrastructure systems and ensure that such contracts
include audit rights for the security and resilience of critical infrastructure.

Nuclear Regulatory
Commission

Collaborate, as appropriate, on strengthening critical infrastructure security and resilience within competence and
sector.

Federal
Communications
Commission

Partner on:
• identifying and prioritizing communications infrastructure;
• identifying communications sector vulnerabilities and working with industry and other stakeholders to address
those vulnerabilities; and
• working with stakeholders, including industry, and engaging foreign governments and international organizations
to increase the security and resilience of critical infrastructure within the communications sector and facilitating
the development and implementation of best practices promoting the security and resilience of communications
critical infrastructure.

All federal departments
and agencies

Provide information to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the national critical infrastructure centers necessary
to support cross-sector analysis and inform the situational awareness capability for critical infrastructures.
Classify, prioritize, assess, remediate, and secure their respective internal critical infrastructures that support their
primary mission functions. Such infrastructure must be addressed in the plans and execution of the requirements in
the National Continuity Policy.a

Source: U.S. White House (2013).
a
“It is the policy of the United States to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations
and Continuity of Government programs to ensure the preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing
performance of National Essential Functions under all conditions.” https://whitehouse.gov1.info/continuity-plan/.

collaboration among critical infrastructure owners
and operators.

Dedicated CIP Agency or Dedicated CIP
Capacity Within an Existing Body
A CIIP framework covers many critical aspects of
national security that involve a broad number of
sectors and market actors. Day-to-day operation
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and maintenance of CIIP requires dedicated attention, and human and financial resources. Many
countries found it practical to inaugurate a national
CIP-dedicated agency to handle this work. Others
established dedicated capabilities within existing
institutions. Despite the modalities, each country
that takes CIIP seriously had to increase its administrative and operational capacity dedicated to
CIIP.
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Regulations
CIIP regulations should set standards for the security of critical infrastructures and requirements for
restoration and recovery after emergency situations.
Regulations should be addressed with critical infrastructure operators, who should design schemes to
monitor particularly vulnerable critical infrastructure sites. An important objective of regulations is to
set up a mechanism to report security incidents to

competent authorities, usually a national Computer
Emergency Response Team. Instead of bans and
restrictions, it is better to get critical infrastructure
operators to realize the benefits of including resilience thinking throughout their organizations and
asset planning, from physical design to operational
procedures and contingency planning. Lost revenue,
reputational damage, contractual penalties, and the
potential for litigation are strong drivers for managing risks and building resilience.
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3

Determining and Identifying
Critical Infrastructures
What Is Critical Infrastructure?
Determining and identifying critical infrastructure assets that must be protected is the first step
toward improving national critical information
infrastructure protection (CIIP). The Institute of
Civil Engineers has defined critical infrastructures
as those that are especially important for the system as a whole or for other infrastructures (ICE,
2009). A more explicit definition refers to critical infrastructure as organizational and physical
structures and facilities of such vital importance to
a nation’s society and economy that their failure
or degradation would result in sustained supply
shortages, significant disruption of public safety
and security, or other dramatic consequences
(Germany, 2009). Wordings of definitions vary
from country to country, but overall, the objective
is to capture those infrastructure assets that could
be linked to the vital functions of the society and
economy and where failure could have significant
negative impact on both. Box 3.1 reviews some
definitions of critical infrastructure.
In this regard, the definition of critical infrastructure is close to the description of economic
infrastructure. The World Economic Forum (WEF)
defined economic infrastructure as assets that
generate growth and enable society to function.
In 2014, this definition was expanded to include
assets that enable society and the economy to

function. Examples include strategic infrastructure such as transport facilities (air, sea, and land),
utilities (water distribution networks, gas pipelines,
electricity grids, and electrical power generation),
flood defenses, waste management, and telecommunications networks (WEF, 2012). In turn, economic infrastructure is sometimes regarded as part
of the strategic infrastructure.
Apart from critical infrastructure, critical information infrastructure (CII) is related directly to
information and communications technology
(ICT) and CIIP relates to protection from cyberattacks. CII is a part of critical infrastructure and
both sub-jects are interconnected (Box 3.2).

Identifying Critical Infrastructures
Water, energy, and transport are among the common critical infrastructure sectors for most countries. But the full set of critical infrastructure sectors
varies depending on the specifics of the national situation in a particular country, including its economic
dependencies and supply chains. Particular sectors
could become critical (or not) depending on the existence (or not) of risks that could threaten its operation. This book outlines the situations in selected
countries and demonstrates the differences. What
is critical at the national level is determined by risk
assessments that allow decision-makers to understand existing risks (internal and external) to the
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Box 3.1. Definitions of Critical Infrastructure
All critical infrastructure definitions recognize the vital and indispensable importance of the service or function provided by the asset to the society. Most countries define infrastructure as critical if its disruption
would have a nationwide impact. However, the subject of impact varies slightly from country to country. For
instance, in the United States, the impact of critical infrastructure disruption is closely linked to the safety
and security of citizens and the economy. In the EU, the region-wide definition includes the economic and
social wellbeing of people. The definition from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also includes
any impact on the environment. The following are definitions of critical infrastructure from various entities.
International Organization for Standardization: Organizations and facilities that are essential to the functioning of society and the economy as a whole. The standard elaborates that a failure or malfunction of such
organizations or facilities would result in sustained supply shortfalls, make a significant impact on public
security, and have other wide ranging impacts.
International Telecommunication Union: The key systems, services, and functions whose disruption or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on public health and safety, commerce, and national security,
or any combination of these.
NATO: Physical or virtual systems and assets under the jurisdiction of a state that are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction may debilitate a state’s security, economy, public health or safety, or the environment.
EU: An asset, system, or part thereof located in a member state that is essential to vital societal functions,
health, safety, security, economic, or social wellbeing of people, and the disruption or destruction of which
would have a significant impact in a member state as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.
United States: The assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States
that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.
Source: Authors; EU (2008); ISO (2013); ITU (2008); Richardson (2008); Schmidt (2013).

country and how they are linked to essential services
and infrastructure in terms of impact. As outlined by
the Joint Research Center, the research arm of the
European Commission, effective risk assessment
methodologies are the cornerstone of a successful CIIP program. Risk assessment is indispensable
to identifying threats, assesing vulnerabilities, and
evaluating the impact on assets, infrastructures, or
systems, taking into account the probability of the
occurrence of these threats (Giannopoulos, Filippini,
and Schimmer, 2012). Consequently, the evaluation identifies not only what should be protected,
but also from what threats and what level of effort
is required. There are conventional risk assessment
methodologies that are currently used.
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Practically, however, one of the main constraints to identifying critical infrastructure is
limited knowledge and thus a lack of clarity for
appropriate input data for any risk assessment. In
particular, among the developing countries, the
knowledge about location, nature, condition, and
impact of threats related to a system’s failure, climate change, or terrorism is immensely limited.
Identifying critical infrastructures and particular
assets within critical sectors is thus a complicated
task that requires time, a systematic approach, and
good collaboration with and within potential critical infrastructure sectors. Preparing datasets of
assets within particular networks or sectors provides a better understanding of total infrastructure,
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FIGURE 3.1. Identifying Critical Sectors and Infrastructures
(1)
Identify
critical sectors

(2)
Identify critical subsectors
and services within the sectors

(3)
Identify specific critical
infrastructures and assets

Source: ENISA (2015).

which naturally includes infrastructure that needs
to be identified as critical. In other words, a dataset
offers a full picture of the situation and is a useful tool for supervision. As knowledge of critical
infrastructures and related expertise advance, the
accuracy of identification increases accordingly,
and thus each subsequent round of CIIP activities
becomes increasingly more accurate and specific.
As such, critical infrastructure identification could be visualized as a three-step process
(Figure 3.1):
1.
2.
3.

Identify critical infrastructure sectors
Identify critical infrastructure subsectors and
services
Identify specific critical infrastructures and
assets

Despite the visual simplicity, the major challenge within this process is in the last stage. There
is no single methodology to identify specific critical
infrastructures and assets. Those that are currently
applied are sector-specific because of the differences and complexities of individual sectors. There
are no common metrics to identify critical infrastructures that could be applied across sectors. For
example, the health sector completely differs from
the financial sector, chemical industry, or ICT sector.
It is highly unlikely that a common methodology and common criteria could be developed for
all sectors. For 10 specific critical infrastructure
sectors, 10 parallel asset identification processes,
each with its own methodology, approach, details,
and timeline, are necessary. Not to mention that
sectoral interdependencies is another important
parameter that should be taken into account within

each critical infrastructure sector as it affects sectoral CIIP methodologies and plans (Min et al.,
2009) (Box 3.2).
Recently interdependencies are increasingly
being studied by different countries. For instance,
there is an initiative to explore the interdependencies between the ICT and energy sectors because
of their increasing convergence.1 The impact of
cyber threats on different critical infrastructure
sectors is another interdependency that currently is highly relevant. Cyber security incidents
are a major concern and are perpetual threats
to CII (Buldyrev et al., 2010) and, in particular, to
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems. Distinguishing vulnerable elements that
could be impaired by cyber-attacks has to be performed in the CII identification process.
Governance and research bodies dedicated
to critical infrastructure protection (CIP) around
the world are putting significant effort into developing and researching methodologies and techniques to identify critical infrastructure. Despite
considerable progress, there is additional work
to be done. In that context, the need to involve
domestic academia and research bodies cannot be
overemphasized.
The sections that follow expand on the practices used by the selected countries to identify
critical infrastructure. Although it is not possible to
describe the methodologies used by each country

Cyber Security was the agenda of the Thematic Network on
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (TNCEIP) in 2011;
TNCEIP was established by DG ENERGY (structural unit of
the European Commission of the EU); http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/energy/newsletter/dg/2012/0119newsletter.html.

1
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Box 3.2. Interdependencies of Critical Infrastructures
Four types of interdependencies are identified for critical infrastructures:
Physical: The operation of one infrastructure depends on the material output of the other.
Cyber: Dependency on information transmitted through the information infrastructure.
Geographic: Dependency on local environment that simultaneously affects several infrastructures.
Logical: Any kind of dependency not characterized as physical, cyber, or geographic.
Besides cross-sectoral interdependencies (e.g., ICT and electricity, satellite navigation, and transport), in
Europe, intra-sectoral interdependencies of national infrastructures that form the European infrastructures
can be identified. For instance, the high-voltage electricity grid of the EU, which comprises the interconnected national high-voltage electricity grids.
Source: Giannopoulos, Filippini, and Schimmer (2012).

in great detail, this book provides a conception of
what metrics may be relevant to the process, definitions adopted by the countries, and what sectors
were classified as critical.

Critical infrastructure: an asset, system or
part thereof located in Member States that
is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and
the disruption or destruction of which would
have a significant impact on a Member State
as a result of the failure to maintain those
functions (European Communities, 2006).

European Union
Global threats and the disastrous events previously
faced by the EU accelerated the advance in CIIP.
The EU has defined the meaning of critical infrastructure, has identified sectors and assets, and has
initiated important programs, such as the European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(EPCIP). See CIIP Policy and Governance in the EU
in Chapter 2.
The EPCIP (European Communities, 2006)
defined critical infrastructure as those assets of the
highest importance for the community and that, if
disrupted or destroyed, would affect two or more
member states or a single member state if the critical infrastructure is located in another member state.
This definition includes trans-boundary effects resulting from interdependencies between interconnected
infrastructures across various sectors. Formally, the
critical infrastructure definition is introduced within
the European CIP directive as follows:
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It is important to note that EU-level critical
infrastructure consists of infrastructure located in
member states whereby its disruption or destruction would have a significant impact on at least two
member states. The European CIP Directive (EU,
2008) provides a list of 11 critical infrastructure sectors (Table 3.1).
The EU uses sectoral criteria to identify critical infrastructure. Criteria are provided in the
European Certification of Informatics Professionals
document on the basis of the severity of the consequences of disruption or destruction, which is
assessed based on the:

••

Public effect
affected)
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(percentage

of

population

TABLE 3.1. C
 ritical Infrastructure Sectors Identified
by the EU CIP Directive
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.		

Energy
Nuclear industry
Information communication technologies
Water
Food
Health
Financial
Transport
Chemical industry
Space
Research facilities

Source: EU(2008).

••
••
••
••

Economic effect (significance of economic loss
and/or degradation of products or services)
Environmental effect
Political effect
Psychological effect

Member states are tasked with identifying
those infrastructures that satisfy these criteria. The
absolute value for the threshold for each criterion
may vary, and it is the prerogative of each member state to specify it. For example, the impact on
the economy or on the portion of population may
be different depending on the size of the country
or composition of the economy. The energy, transport, and ICT sectors are considered to be critical at the EU level. Specific subsectors are already
identified for energy and transport (Table 3.2);
however, identifying subsectors for ICT is still in
progress because of the sector’s complexity. The
European Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) is tasked with this work.

To facilitate a cooperative approach, the relevant member states—those within which European
Critical Infrastructures (ECI) are identified and
those that may be affected by its disruption—are
negotiating the designation of ECIs. Once an ECI is
identified, a specific set of actions are taken by its
owners/operators to develop an Operator Security
Plan that documents the critical assets and security measures. Concessions do exist for ECI entities
that already have similar or equivalent requirements in place.
The CIP Directive empowers the authorities
in member states to be in charge of ensuring that
ECIs comply with its requirements. Each country’s
government chooses which particular authority or
authorities are responsible for transposing and/
or implementing the CIP framework. The member
state is accountable for properly transposing the
EU-level provisions into their national legislation. To
facilitate collaboration among member states, the
EU organized various groups to create a platform
to exchange information, experiences, and planning. For example, the Commission on the EPCIP
facilitated an integrated approach by creating the
CIP Contact Group. This group, which is chaired
by the European Commission, brings together the
CIP Contact Points from each member state. Each
member state appoints a Contact Point who coordinates CIP issues within the member state and
with other member states, the European Council,
and the Commission. Any other authorities in the
member state may also be involved in CIP issues.
In 2014, ENISA reviewed lists of national critical
infrastructure, associated subsectors, and services

TABLE 3.2. Subsectors of Energy and Transport Identified at the EU Level
Sector

Subsectors

Energy

• Electricity (infrastructures and facilities to generate and transmit electricity)
• Gas (production, refining, treatment, storage, and transmission by pipelines; LNG terminals)
• Oil (production, refining, treatment, storage, and transmission by pipelines)

Transport

•
•
•
•
•

Roads
Rail
Air
Inland waterways
Ocean and short-sea shipping and ports

Source: EU (2008).
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adopted by the member states. It then suggested
a reference list to be used in the initial stage of
member states reviewing the sectors and services
they may classify as critical at the national level
(Appendix 1). The list is not mandatory but can be
analyzed and adapted by each country based on
differences in critical infrastructure sectors, subsectors, and risks.
As a region, the EU’s considerable effort in
protecting critical infrastructures is an example
of best practices of a well-developed systematic
approach. For example, notable results have been
achieved in sectoral criteria to identify critical
infrastructure. The process of identifying European
critical infrastructures resulted in security and resilience measures through Operator Security Plans.
Currently, the EU is reviewing the CIP Directive to
identify additional European critical infrastructure
sectors.

Finland
Finland has a highly industrialized, largely freemarket economy that depends on technology
industries such as mechanical engineering, information technology (IT), telecommunications, and
electronics, as well as metals and forestry. Fifty
percent of total Finnish exports are from the technology industry (Technology Industries, 2014).
The industrial sector generates over 25 percent of
Finland’s gross domestic product and ICT’s share
remains over 10 percent (IMF, 2014). This very quick
look demonstrates the dependency of the Finnish
economy on the technologies and industrial sectors. Consequently, any disruptions to those essential sectors could result in dramatic consequences
for the Finnish economy.
Finland has defined CIIP as an objective to
ensure the continuity of production and infrastructure vital to society under all circumstances in such
a way that the living conditions of the population
and the critical functions of society are secured in
the event of disruptions and emergencies, including a state of defense. Finland aims to safeguard
national sovereignty and their citizenry’s ability to
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function in all circumstances by securing vital operations such as state leadership, the external capacity to act, military defense, internal security, the
economy, and society, maintaining the livelihood of
the population. See CIIP Policy and Governance in
Finland in Chapter 2.
For threats analysis, Finland uses a generic
threat scenario (Figure 3.2). A threat scenario is a
general description of disturbances in the security
environment which, should they materialize, could
jeopardize the security of society, the livelihood of
the population, or the sovereignty of the state.
Finland has identified nine critical infrastructure sectors (Table 3.3). According to Finnish
Security and Defense Policy (Finland, 2004), ICT
was identified as one of the critical infrastructure sectors because cyber security threats are
increasingly targeting national critical infrastructures. ICTs are used by the majority of government
agencies, security authorities, and vital industries.
Identification of ICT as one of the critical infrastructures leads to higher security standards for
constructing communication networks and data
systems.
In its CIIP approach, Finland is more focused
on critical infrastructure resilience than protection. Having an economy that largely depends
on the ICT industry, the Finnish CIIP strategy
puts significant emphasis on cyber security
threats. Numerous measures, including a strong
Computer Emergency Response Team, are in
place to safeguard critical infrastructures from
cyber-attacks. An extensive knowledge base,
strong expertise, a long tradition of close public–private cooperation, and cross-sector collaboration are cornerstones of Finland’s approach
to resilient cyberspace. Investments in technical
and organizational measures to strengthen cyber
security resulted in fewer infected computers,
earlier detection of malicious network activities using sophisticated tools and sensors, and
comprehensive reporting and investigation of
security incidents. According to experts, Finland
enjoys the most secure cyberspace in the world
(Microsoft, 2014).
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FIGURE 3.2. Finland’s Threats-Based Approach to CIIP
GLOBAL
Threats and phenomena
that can primarily be
affected by cooperation among states

The security of the future of the
Earth and its population
NATIONAL

Threats that primarily
focus on the state,
society, and the people

The security of the state,
the society, and the population

THE INDIVIDUAL
Threats that primarily
affect the individual

The citizen’s basic security

SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY

Source: Finland (2006a).

TABLE 3.3 Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Finland
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Energy networks and supply
ICT, including networks, SCADA, and payment systems
Transportation and logistics systems
Water supply and other municipal utilities
Infrastructure construction and maintenance
Financial services
Food supply
Health services
Media

Source: Finland (2006).

United Kingdom
The UK’s advanced infrastructure enhances its
national productivity and global competitiveness,
allowing businesses to grow and enabling them to
reach suppliers and deepen labor and product markets. In 2014, the UK’s National Infrastructure Plan
set out an ambitious infrastructure vision for £460
billion of planned public and private investment
(which includes oil and gas investment) (Atkins,

2015). To achieve and protect those investments,
the government maintains high safety and security
standards for infrastructure.
The UK identifies terrorism, espionage, and
cyber-attacks as the main threats to national critical infrastructures. Those threats could materialize individually or in combination, whereby
significant threats could come from international
terrorist acts combining mass casualties with substantial disruption to vital services such as energy,
transport, and communications (CPNI, 2010).
The country considers both traditional and cyber
espionage threats to UK interests, with the commercial sector being very much on the front line.
In today’s high-tech world, interest has moved
toward intellectual property in communications,
IT, genetics, aviation, electronics, and many other
industries. The risk of industrial cyber espionage,
in which one company actively attacks another
through cyberspace to acquire high value information, is real.
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The UK aims to protect its critical infrastructures using a combination of physical, information,
and personnel security measures. Physical security
measures aim to either prevent a direct assault on
premises or reduce the potential damage and injuries that can be inflicted should an incident occur.
Personnel security is a system of policies and
procedures that seek to manage the risk of staff
(permanent, temporary, or contract) exploiting,
or intending to exploit, their legitimate access to
an organization’s assets or premises for unauthorized purposes. Almost all critical industrial infrastructures and processes are managed remotely
from central control rooms, using various forms
of process control and SCADA technology. The
UK understands and mitigates electronic attack
risks to SCADA systems and facilitates this effort
through a focused program of CIIP.
The UK’s critical infrastructure is defined as
those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic)
that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential services on which the UK relies,
the loss or compromise of which would lead to
severe economic or social consequences such as
loss of life. Infrastructure sectors identified as critical are listed in Table 3.4. Assets within the critical infrastructures are identified as critical using
a Criticality Scale, which assigns categories for
different degrees of severity of impact (Box 3.3).
These assets are called Key Points.
Splitting critical infrastructure sectors into
subsectors allows for better organization of CIIP
implementation. For example, the communications sector is split into data communications, fixed

TABLE 3.4. Critical Infrastructure Sectors in the UK
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Energy
Communications
Emergency services
Financial services
Food
Government
Health
Transport
Water

Source: CPNI, at: http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/.
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voice communications, mail, public information,
and wireless communications. Emergency services is subdivided into ambulance, fire, and rescue, and includes the coastguard and police. And,
the energy sector is divided into electricity, natural
gas, and petroleum, among others.
The UK’s approach to CIIP puts particular
emphasis on terrorism threats. The threat of industrial cyber espionage is another particularity of the
UK’s CIIP framework. In other countries, greater
emphasis is being placed on the cyber security
aspects of CIIP.

Spain
Spanish critical infrastructure sectors were not
explicitly defined until 2007 when the State
Security Secretariat approved the National Plan for
the Protection of Critical Infrastructures (see CIIP
Policy and Governance in Spain in Chapter 2). The
plan defines critical infrastructures in relation to
threats, and Spain is particularity dedicated to the
security of its cyberspace. To this end, the National
Cyber Security Strategy (Spain, 2013b) targets CIIP
by strengthening prevention, defense, detection,
and response capabilities vis-à-vis cyber-attacks.
Spain defines critical infrastructure as “those
installations, networks, services, physical equipment, and information technologies whose interruption or destruction would have a grave impact
on the health, security, or economic wellbeing of
the citizens or on the efficient functioning of the
state institutions and of the public administration”
(Spain, 2007). Critical infrastructure includes a list
of 12 strategically critical sectors (Table 3.5).
In 2007, the government issued a catalog with
an exhaustive list of national critical infrastructures.
This classified catalog contains around 3,500 critical installations all over the country. The catalog
is a living document that is periodically updated.
These sensitive facilities include power grids and
plants, communications, finance, healthcare, food,
water storage, water treatment, and water networks, airports, ports, national monuments, and
the production, storage, and transportation of
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Box 3.3. Criticality Scale Used in the UK
FIGURE 3.3. The Three Dimensions of the Criticality Scale
CRITICALITY SCALE
CAT 5

IMPACT CATEGORIES

Infrastructure is categorized according to its
value or “criticality” and the impact of its loss.
This categorization is done using the Criticality Scale, which assigns categories for different
degrees of severity of impact.
Not everything within a national infrastructure sector (the UK has identified nine
critical infrastructure sectors) is critical. Within
the sectors there are certain critical elements
of infrastructure, referred to as Key Points, the
loss or compromise of which would have a
major detrimental impact on the availability or
integrity of essential services, leading to severe
economic or social consequences or to loss of
life. These critical assets make up the nation’s
critical national infrastructure and are referred
to individually as infrastructure assets. Infrastructure assets may be physical (e.g., sites,
installations, or pieces of equipment) or logical
(e.g., information networks or systems).
The Criticality Scale includes three dimensions:

CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CAT 4
CAT 3

CRITICAL THRESHOLD

CAT 2
WIDER NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CAT 1
CAT 0
IMPACT
ON LIFE

ECONOMIC
IMPACT

IMPACT ON
ESSENTIAL SERVICES

IMPACT DIMENSIONS

1.

Impact on delivery of the nation’s essential services

2.

Economic impact arising from the loss of an essential service

3.

Impact on life arising from the loss of an essential service

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) developed an impact-driven, vulnerabilityfocused, and threat-informed approach, which rates each Key Point on a Criticality Scale in the event of its
loss. This scale rates the impact of each Key Point on a scale of 5 down to zero. Sector significance and impact
on the UK population are key considerations in determining the rating of an event when applying this scale:
Category 5: catastrophic events
Category 4: severe events
Category 3: substantial events
Category 2: significant events
Category 1: moderate events
Category 0: minor events, with no impact on any sector
Once each Key Point is rated, CPNI provides security advice for its protection, which is then implemented
by the sponsor government department. For example, aviation falls under the Department of Transport.

Source: Authors based on CPNI, at: http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/#sthash.kUx3205S.dpuf; UK (2010b).
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TABLE 3.5. Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Spain
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Chemical industry
Nuclear industry
Investigative installations
Centers of power
Space
Energy
Telecommunications
Transportation
Water supply
Alimentation
Financial services
Public health

TABLE 3.6. Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Korea
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Energy
Telecommunications
Transportation
Financial services
Health and medical services
Nuclear energy
Environment
Government critical facilities
Water supply

Source: Korea (2010).

Source: National Center for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure.

dangerous goods, such as chemical, biological, and
nuclear materials.
The criteria for including such facilities in the
catalog is a mix of factors: range, scale and temporal effects and parameters, damage, economic
impact, and effect on essential services. The catalog is classified given its high sensitivity with
regards to national security.
Spain is a good example of a relatively recent,
rapidly advanced and adopted CIIP framework. The
major effort occurred between 2007 and 2013. The
country adopted a CIIP strategy, designed plans,
emphasized cyber security threats, and created a
catalog with an exhaustive list of the national critical infrastructure assets. Now Spain concentrates
on implementing and further improving its critical
infrastructures.

Korea
Korea’s CIP Law defines national critical infrastructure as “designated facilities deemed necessary to
be continuously managed to protect the national
backbone systems” (Korea, 2010). Table 3.6 provides a list of Korea’s nine critical sectors. Some
infrastructure facilities, such as telecommunications, can be designated as both critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure based on
different laws.
The Korean economy depends heavily on
international trade. In 2013, Korea was the eighth
largest exporter and seventh largest importer in
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the world due to its highly developed electronics,
motor vehicle, and heavy industries. The national
ICT infrastructure plays a crucial role in providing
public safety and stable services that are essential
for everyday life. Following the cyber-attacks in
2013, whereby government, news media, television
stations, and bank websites were compromised,
the government committed to stronger defense
of cyberspace. The following details the process
by which CII is identified and designated that was
recently put in place.
All ICT systems related to infrastructure that
could have a serious impact on national security
and the daily lives of citizens and the economy in
the event of a cyber incident are designated critical infrastructure. Those include ICT infrastructures
that the government, public agencies, or the private
sector operate and manage, as shown in Table 3.7.
There are 354 ICT infrastructures that were
designated as CII in 2015. They are run by 17 relevant central administrative agencies and 209 management organizations.
When there is a facility whose importance is
recognized by the Ministry of Science, ICT, and
Future Planning (MSIP) or the National Intelligence
Service (NIS), 2 the relevant central administrative
agency asks the management organization for a
designation appraisal. The relevant central administrative agency provides information such as evaluation methods for infrastructure designation and
detailed criteria for designation.

2

See also CIIP Policy and Governance in Korea in Chapter 2.
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TABLE 3.7. CII within Critical Infrastructure Sectors in Korea
Critical infrastructure sector

Critical information infrastructure

Administration

National information service network; internet and operation systems used by local governments

Finance

Internet banking system; cyber trading system operated by securities businesses

Communications

Internet-connected networks, IDC, VoIP, and IPTV service

Energy

Power generation control and supervision system; power transmission SCADA system

Water supply

Piped water supply purification and control system

Medical services

Health insurance management system; hospital information system

Transportation

Flight/voyage information management system; comprehensive railroad control system

Others

Election-related information / communications system; National Pension Management System

Source: Korea (2010).

The management organization evaluates
whether it can be designated as CII. The relevant
central administrative agency then confirms the
results of the management organization’s evaluation in consultation with experts that form the
Committee for the Protection of Information
Infrastructure (CPII) and assistance from the
Working-Level Committee. CPII then makes the
final decision. After the given infrastructure is
judged as requiring designation as CII, the relevant
central administrative agency gives a designation
notice to the management organization. The management organization installs a protection system,
including vulnerability analysis. The central administrative agency then posts a notice on the official
gazette. The process of CII designation is presented
in Figure 3.4.
The designated CII’s management organization is required to establish protective measures
every year to find and eliminate new vulnerabilities from a short-term perspective and must
implement an effective management system
by analyzing the ripple effects from long-term
incidents.
The management organizations of designated infrastructures should carry out activities to
strengthen infrastructure protection. Such activities are typically in three stages:
1.
2.

Analyze and appraise vulnerability
Devise a protection plan

3.

Confirm protective measures have been carried out

Table 3.8 shows the administrative, physical, and technical aspects of a vulnerability analysis. The assets that require vulnerability analysis
include information and control systems. If there
are other systems linked with CII, the influence
of the linked system on the infrastructure is also
included. The management organization should
select major vulnerabilities discovered during the
analysis and appraisal, and enter improvements into
the subsequent year’s detailed tasks for protective
measures. Such detailed tasks are divided into prevention and rehabilitation plans. The prevention
plan focuses on items targeted for improvement
based on the results of the vulnerability check for
incident prevention; the rehabilitation plan concentrates on forming a system to deal with incidents
and crisis situations.

United States
The United State’s critical infrastructures are
diverse and complex. In the past, the systems
and networks of the infrastructures were physically and logically independent and separate.
With advances in technology, the systems within
each sector became automated and interlinked
through computers and communications facilities.
Interdependent and interrelated infrastructure
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FIGURE 3.4. Process of Identifying and Designating CII
Leading dept.
Step

Executive committee

Relevant ministries

Management bodies

1. Preparation of designation criteria
Selection of
CII candidates

2. Delivery of designation
proceedings

Designation
recommended

Assessment of CII
candidates by management
bodies

Re-evaluation
required
Submission

Ministroes’
determination

3. Definition of scope
of CII candidates
4. Assessment of CII
candidates

Not required for
designation
Formulation of
self-defensive measures

5. CII determination

Not required for
designation

6. EC’s 1st deliberation
CPII’s deliberation
7. CPII’s deliberation
Posting the
designates CIIs
EC: Executive Committe
CPII: Committe on the Protection of II

Notice of
designation results

8. Posting the designated CIIs

9. Building security measures
and management system

Source: Finland (2006).

TABLE 3.8. Details of a Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability

Details

Managementrelated

Exposure in information security policy formulation and management; information security organization and human
resources security; and information security awareness and education and training.

Physical

Improper access control to the CII; installation of support facilities (e.g., power sources and firefighting facilities).

Technological

Weaknesses with unauthorized access to systems; vulnerability in information leaks and alteration; and delays in
services and service failures.

Source: MSIP Notice No. 2013–37.

is more vulnerable to physical and cyber disruptions because it has become a complex system
with single points of failure. The elements of critical infrastructure themselves are also considered
possible targets of terrorism. The authors selected
the United State’s best practices to be investigated
herein because of the advanced work on CIP since
national attempts at protection started in 1998,
much before any other country.
The United State defines critical infrastructure
as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
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so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters” (DHS, 2013a). The
government’s CIIP policy mission is to strengthen
the security and resilience of the nation’s critical
infrastructure by managing physical and cyber risks
through the collaborative and integrated efforts of
the critical infrastructure community (DHS, 2013b).
The current list of 16 critical infrastructure sectors
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FIGURE 3.5. Critical Infrastructure Identification Framework
Physical
Elements of
Critical
Infrastructure

Cyber

Set goals
and
objectivos

Identify
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Assess and
analyze risks

Implement risk
management
activities

Measure
effectiveness

Human
INFORMATION SHARING

Source: DHS (2013b).

was established in 2013 (U.S. White House, 2013)
(Table 3.9).
The government’s effort to identify critical infrastructure is based on a phased approach
(Figure 3.5). Three risk factors are considered
throughout the process: physical, cyber, and
human. This is similar to the UK, which considers
physical, information, and personnel security, and
to Korea, which looks at management-related,
physical, and technological factors.
The U.S. federal government identifies and prioritizes nationally significant critical infrastructure
based on the statutory definition and national considerations. Infrastructure owners and operators

TABLE 3.9. C
 ritical Infrastructure Sectors in the
United States
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Chemical
Commercial facilities
Communications
Critical manufacturing
Dams
Defense industrial base
Emergency services
Energy, including the production, refining, storage, and
distribution of oil and gas, and electric power (except for
commercial nuclear power facilities)
Financial services
Agriculture and food
Government facilities
Public health and healthcare
Informat ion technology
Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste
Transportation systems (including mass transit, aviation,
maritime, ground / surface, and rail and pipeline systems)
Water and wastewater systems

Source: U.S. White House (2013).

identify assets, systems, and networks that are
essential to their continued operations and delivery of products and services to customers. At the
sector level, institutions collaborate with owners
and operators to develop lists of infrastructure
that are significant at the national, regional, and
local levels.
The method of collecting critical infrastructure assets from the municipal level and placing it
on the national critical infrastructure list has had
its weaknesses. In 2006, the U.S. infrastructure list
included about 77,000 assets and it was not manageable. Therefore the approach was changed to
use more stringent criteria for critical infrastructure
selection (such as higher thresholds) to reduce the
list to several thousand assets.

Observations and Recommendations
Regarding Defining and Identifying
Critical Infrastructure
Definition of critical infrastructure: Defining critical infrastructure is the first step toward identifying critical infrastructures as it creates metrics
that can be used later to designate critical infrastructures. Most of the definitions include the
impact of a disruption as one of the metrics. The
size of impact is usually defined as nationwide.
Another metric is the subject of disruption, which
slightly varies from country to country. Moreover,
the traditional understanding of security (physical) is generally broadened to include economic
security.
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TABLE 3.10. Critical Infrastructure Sectors by Country
Critical infrastructure sectors

EU

United States

Finland

UK

Spain

Korea

Energy

+

+

+

+

+

+

Transport

+

+

+

+

+

+

ICT and (tele)communications

+

+

+

+

+

+

Financial

+

+

+

+

+

+

Water

+

+

+

+

+

+

Health

+

+

+

+

+

+

Food

+

+

+

+

+

Government facilities

+

+

+

Chemical

+

+

+

Nuclear

+

+

+

Emergency services

+

+

Research

+

+

Space

+

+

Critical manufacturing
and power centres

+

Dams

+

Commercial facilities

+

Defence industry

+

+

Media

+

Infrastructure maintenance

+

Environment
Total:

+

+
11

16

9

9

12

9

Source: Authors.
Note: In bold are sectors that are considered critical infrastructure in all the countries studied.

Risk assessment: Identifying critical infrastructures starts with a risk assessment at the national
level. The aim of the assessment is to understand
the risks to national security, including economic
security and citizen wellbeing. There are well-recognized methodologies that can be used for a risk
assessment.
Identify critical infrastructures: After risks are
known, an analysis is required to understand links
between those risks and national infrastructures.
The analysis should include risk tolerance per
infrastructure and per service, which will enable
the definition of critical infrastructure sectors,
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subsectors, and assets within critical infrastructures. Those assets will compose the list of national
critical infrastructures.
List of identified critical infrastructure assets:
Information about all the identified critical infrastructure assets should be stored in a centralized
list. This information is usually classified. It is important to ensure that a national critical infrastructure
list includes information about all critical infrastructure of national importance. Critical infrastructures
that are identified at sub-national levels and that
are not of strictly national importance could be
listed within the sub-national lists.
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List of critical infrastructure sectors: Composition of the critical infrastructure sector list will
vary from country to country depending on the
national circumstances (Table 3.10). There are six
sectors that were considered critical infrastructure

sectors in all the reviewed countries and the EU
(bold in Table 3.10) and it is likely that these sectors will compose the critical infrastructure sector
lists in Latin American and Caribbean countries
as well.
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4

Protection: Methods and
Forms of Implementation

T

he previous chapters elaborated the policy and legal frameworks that comprise the
basic steps to creating a critical information
infrastructure protection (CIIP) framework. They
also reviewed governance models, critical infrastructure assignment processes, and the selection of assets within critical infrastructure sectors.
These chapters also considered the risks that those
infrastructures are susceptible to and risk tolerance
levels in each case. Such preparatory work allows
countermeasures (or protection measures) to be
formulated to safeguard critical infrastructures.
The next step is to implement the protection and
resilience design.
Ultimately, CIIP implementation is an effort
of all the parties involved: the public sector, the
private sector, and public–private partnerships
(PPP). Critical infrastructure cannot be protected
in isolation and joint efforts multiply the level of its
defense. This chapter is dedicated to understanding implementation of CIIP.

internal affairs at strategic implementation. For
instance, in the United States, the Secretary of
Homeland Security leads CIIP at the political level
and the Department of the Homeland Security (the
line ministry for internal affairs) coordinates strategic implementation. In Spain, the political level
authority is the Secretary for Security of State and
the line ministry supports the implementation process. In the UK, the governmental structure that
decides on issues related to CIIP is the Cabinet
Office. The Cabinet Office:

••
••
••
••
••
••

Public Sector Approaches
Responsibility for developing and coordinating CIIP
policy rests first and foremost with the national
government. Because of the importance of national
security at the political level, the leading authority
on CIIP should be assigned to the entity in charge
of national security and the relevant ministries for

Develops and coordinates the CIIP framework;
Enacts a transparent and clear governance
framework;
Mandates clear authority at the political and
strategic levels;
Provides political support to the legislative side
of CIIP framework enhancement;
Supports implementation, regular review, and
adjustment of the CIIP policy; and
Ensures adequate budgeting to implement the
CIIP policy, including human resources and
planned activities.

At the technical level, countries mostly rely
on dedicated CIIP implementation bodies. For the
purpose of this study, the authors use the term
National CIP Agencies (NCIPA), which are institutions tasked with CIIP and that play a leading role
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in all activities related to selecting and protecting
critical infrastructures. Depending on their mandate, which can vary from country to country, they
are involved in:

••
••
••
••

••

Improving secondary legislation related to CIIP;
Supervising the implementation of relevant
legislation by the involved parties;
Auditing security plans of critical infrastructure
operators;
Advising critical infrastructure operators, sharing information, disseminating alerts on security threats, and supporting efforts for CIP and
resilience; and
Organizing joint exercises to test procedures
and strengthen relationships and cooperation
habits.

Collaboration among NCIPAs and critical infrastructure operators is another key policy issue.
Strong cooperation, which considers joint efforts
from both sides, is a prerequisite for successful
implementation of any CIIP-related initiatives and
programs. For example, to supervise and monitor
CIIP situations, NCIPAs need to receive information from critical infrastructure operators. In turn,
consolidated feedback from NCIPAs based on the
information provided, including threat awareness
and recommendations, is important and necessary
for critical infrastructure operators to secure their
assets. It is important to maintain two-way information exchange because one-way flow is unlikely
to be sustainable in the long term. Without seeing
clear interest from government, critical infrastructure operators are usually reluctant to cooperate
even if legally obligated.
As countries gain more experience in CIIP, it
becomes more evident that the public sector cannot secure all critical infrastructure assets at all
times. Operators of critical infrastructures cannot expect NCIPAs to protect and secure assets
because they do not own the infrastructure. Even
if that was possible, it would require substantial
financial and human resources. Therefore, CIIP policies must focus on supporting and advising critical
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infrastructure operators in their efforts to protect
assets as an alternative to substituting those efforts.
This approach is considered more sustainable in
the long term because it eventually increases the
capacity of critical infrastructure operators and the
resilience of their assets. Information sharing is an
example of this policy approach. While increasing
its capacity to monitor and provide early warning
at the national level, the public sector could play
an important role in sharing this information with
all critical infrastructure operators. As a result,
each critical infrastructure operator is individually
empowered to take preventive and/or defensive
measures.1 This way, the public sector invests in systems that benefit overall CIIP objectives, extending
the reach of CIIP activities and enabling the efforts
of each party to complement each other.
There are more instances of the public sector
providing valuable input into the CIIP implementation process without input from the private sector. Spain is one example. The National Center for
the Protection of Critical Infrastructure (CNPIC),
Spain’s NCIPA, is in charge of technically implementing the CIIP framework. For example, it promotes, coordinates, and supervises all CIP-related
activities at the national level. The CNPIC’s main
objective is to promote and coordinate the mechanisms needed to guarantee the security of the
infrastructures that supply services essential to
society. The CNPIC oversees the National Strategic
Infrastructure Catalogue and has set up a Security
Incident Response Team specialized in analyzing
and managing problems and incidents related to
technological security. If a critical infrastructure is
affected by a cyber-security incident, the operator
responsible for it is able to use the services provided by the Response Team.
The Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI), the UK’s national NCIPA,
provides advisory services such as information,

Prevention aims to decrease the risk related to critical infrastructure security and functionality. Defensive measures
are steps taken to detect attacks and incidents and react to
them or limit their negative impact.
1
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personnel, and physical security guidance to the
businesses and organizations that manage the
nation’s critical infrastructures. These activities
aim to reduce vulnerability to terrorism and other
threats. As needed, the CPNI can call on resources
from other government departments and agencies, including their domestic counter-intelligence
and security agency, Military Intelligence Section 5,
the Communications-Electronics Security Group,
and other government departments responsible
for national infrastructure sectors.
In Finland, the role of NCIPA is performed by
the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA).
NESA has a role in securing critical infrastructures
by developing and financing both technical backup
systems and electromagnetic pulse secure premises for systems. Finland’s vital information and
communications technology (ICT) systems are
located in the capital region and this concentration
in one area poses a risk. Therefore, NESA owns two
computer backup co-location centers outside the
capital region to secure the nation’s critical information technology (IT) systems.
In South Korea, the supervision of CIIP is performed by its multi-institutional, hierarchical structure chaired by the Prime Minister and comprising
vice minister-level officials of related central administrative agencies. This structure oversees the designation of critical infrastructures, and coordinates
and deliberates on protection policy and plans.
The MSIP and the NIS form the Working-Level
Committee and authorize guidelines to design relevant plans to confirm the adequacy of protective
measures. The NIS Director and the Minister of the
MSIP also inform the head of the relevant central
administrative agency of the confirmation results
regarding implementation of protective measures.

Private Sector Approaches
In most countries, the responsibility for the resilience of critical infrastructures lies with the owners
and operators. This is one of the guiding principles of many CIIP frameworks. The responsibility
encompasses a number of activities that critical

infrastructure operators are expected to carry out.
One such activity is to identify (or participate in
identifying) the critical assets and then ensure the
resilience of those assets. More specifically, critical infrastructure operators are asked to identify
and classify the infrastructures supporting critical
applications, according to their criticality. They are
responsible for determining the core processes and
the respective applications and services (solutions)
that are used to operate the applications.
Critical infrastructure operators are susceptible to risks that may have a detrimental effect on
society. These risks may be directly linked to the
critical service provided or may emerge from activities that are not related to the core business of the
critical infrastructure operator. Operators of critical
infrastructure are in charge of operating and securing their infrastructures, and thus could also be
legally obliged to carry out risk assessment analysis and submit business continuity plans to the
responsible government authorities. In some critical infrastructure sectors, they are also obliged to
comply with certain regulations that could impact
the operation, infrastructure, and/or data networks.
An example of such a sector could be finance
(ENISA, 2015). To comply with regulations, operators of critical infrastructure classify their infrastructures and processes as well as the respective
supporting applications and information. This is led
by prioritizing the critical infrastructure and adopting requirements for high priority infrastructures.
In certain cases, operators of critical infrastructure
have a highly diversified portfolio of services and
respective infrastructures. Such operators need to
apply a diversified approach according to service
criticality.
Currently there is no legal obligation for critical infrastructure operators to classify their own
infrastructure assets in Finland, the UK, or Spain.
However, the designated critical infrastructure
operator is required to identify their relevant
assets and services as critical from the perspective of operators. Afterward, the authorized government institutions classify information by the
criteria of national dependency on infrastructures
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and compose national critical infrastructure lists.
Critical infrastructure operators are responsible
for preparing security and contingency plans to
increase the resilience of their own critical infrastructure assets.
Sharing information related to different
aspects of the critical infrastructure is a common
responsibility of the operators. Given that information exchange is kept confidential, operators
are invited (less frequently obliged) to provide a
pre-defined list of information, including relevant
real-time information on the state of operated critical infrastructures. In the United States, operators
are invited to share relevant information through
the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
Program on a voluntary basis. A similar initiative is
in place in the UK.
It is also common for critical infrastructure
operators, from the same or different sectors, to
organize a forum to collaborate, share information, build capacity, and exchange expertise. One
example of such an initiative is the Association for
the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, which was
established in Spain in 2011. 2 The association is a
non-profit legal entity that serves as a forum for
debates about sectoral threats and risks, bringing
together professionals and experts to strengthen
the capacity of its members. It also functions as a
liaison for security professionals in matters of civil
information, security, fire safety, and environmental
protection.
There are also examples of industry-organized
bodies that work to improve CIP at the sectoral
level. For instance, the Finnish Information Security
Cluster, 3 created in 2012, is an association authorized by major Finnish information security companies to promote their business and operations
in national and international contexts. It is very
active in business advocacy and is significantly
engaged with important national projects. One
such project is Situation Awareness in Informatics
and Cyber Security, a national research project
funded by Tekes (the Finnish Funding Agency for
Innovation) and the Academy of Finland to improve
critical infrastructure with critical stakeholders
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domestically (academic institutions such as Aalto
University, University of Jyväskylä, and University
of Oulu) and abroad.

Public–Private Partnerships
The industry’s perception of government’s capability to manage critical situations is very important
for building trust and cooperation. It is particularly
important (and challenging) for governments to
maintain high capacity and organizational readiness that allows industry to feel it is an equal partner. Indeed, countries demonstrating highly evolved
public–private cooperation in CIIP are also those
countries where industry perceives that their governments are mostly or fully capable of adequately
managing critical situations. For instance, in 2010,
regarding cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure,
over 60 percent of industry representatives in the
UK and the United States regarded their governments as being mostly or highly capable of preventing or deterring a cyber-attack (Baker, Filipiak,
and Timlin, 2011). Both countries have well regarded
public–private cooperation frameworks and practices. At the same time, over 80 percent of industry
representatives surveyed in Brazil said they had no
confidence in their government’s abilities to prevent
or deter a cyber-attack, and in Mexico the number
was approximately 70 percent.4 In these countries,
public–private cooperation is weaker.
The mechanism to advance collective action
toward national critical infrastructure security and
resilience in the United States is based on voluntary
collaboration between critical infrastructure owners
and operators (including their partner associations,
vendors, and others) and their government counterparts. Since 1998, the first Presidential Directive
on CIP encompassed separate articles dedicated
to public–private cooperation (see CIIP Policy and

2 Asociación para la Protección de las Infraestructuras
Críticas, at: http://infraestructurascriticas.com/principal.
asp?pag=.
3 www.fisc.fi.
4 Ibid.
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Governance in the United States in Chapter 2). The
approach for PPP was to work within the set of areas
through the designated Sector Liaison Officer on
the public sector side and Sector Coordinator on
the operator side. The areas identified for cooperation included assessing the sector’s vulnerabilities to
cyber or physical attacks and making recommendations to eliminate significant vulnerabilities. Together,
these individuals were expected to contribute to a
sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance Plan.
Similar approaches of building a network of
representatives and organizing relevant activities was adopted in many other countries. This
approach laid the groundwork for joint collaboration, including determining CIIP-related initiatives and increasing the resilience and security of
national critical infrastructures. The experiences of
the countries studied for this report suggest that it
is the NCIPA that most commonly represents the
public side in CIIP PPP initiatives. Indeed, in Spain,
the CNPIC represents the public side within the
CIIP PPP initiatives, the Department of Homeland
Security in the United States, CPNI in the UK, NESA
in Finland, and the European Agency for Network
and Information Security in the EU.
In the United States, the Department of
Homeland Security is performing the NCIPA function. In 2006, the Secretary of Homeland Security
instituted the Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council. This touchstone provided the legal
framework for a cross-sector partnership mechanism to directly support various sectors’ interests
in engaging in public–private critical infrastructure
discussions and participating in a broad spectrum
of activities. 5 Specifically, the forums held by this
council support federal government deliberations
on critical infrastructure issues needing a consensus
when making formal recommendations. Sector and
cross-sector coordinating structures are defined in
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
The UK’s CPNI, its national NCIPA, maintains
close relationships with organizations and firms
that own and/or operate national critical infrastructures. Relationships have been cultivated over
many years between experienced security advisers

and managers. CPNI provides guidance in a variety of ways, through face-to-face consultations by
teams of specialists, training, online advice, and
written reports.
The CPNI facilitates information sharing of
CIIP research among stakeholders to inform them
of successful security planning across sectors. It
also disseminates information related to a wide
range of physical security products developed by
manufacturers of security equipment for use within
critical infrastructure sites. Furthermore, the CPNI
works with external partners to set professional
standards, maintaining the Register of Security
Engineers and Specialists. This register was created to promote excellence in the field of security
engineering and provide a means for individuals to
demonstrate competence in this discipline through
independent assessment. It is sponsored by CPNI
and is administered and operated by the Institution
of Civil Engineers.
In Finland, the NESA,6 which ensures the security of supply for strategic services for society,
collaborates with other organizations within the
National Emergency Supply Organization (NESO).7
NESO facilitates cooperation between the public
and private sectors by creating a vehicle for PPP
initiatives (Box 4.1).
At the level of critical infrastructure sectors,
there is also a need to involve sectoral organizations such as regulatory agencies. Some CIIP PPP
activities are led or co-led by such agencies. For
instance, in Finland, the Finnish Communications
Regulatory Authority is very active in CIIP, as is the
Korea Internet and Security Agency.
In the UK, the sectoral level PPP is implemented
through thematic working groups, for instance the
Electronic Communications Resilience and Response
Group (UK, 2013a). This group leads in developing
and maintaining cooperation between the telecommunication industry and government by:

CI Partnership Advisory Council homepage: http://www.
dhs.gov/cipac-sector-charters-and-membership.
6 http://www.nesa.fi/security-of-supply/.
7 http://www.nesa.fi/organisation/.
5
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Box 4.1. National Emergency Supply Organization
The NESO is a network that maintains and develops the security of critical supply of services in Finland on
the basis of PPP initiatives. Its primary objective is to ensure the conditions necessary for the operations of
organizations that are critical to security of supply. Hundreds of enterprises, government authorities, and
associations from various sectors of society are active in pursuit of NESO’s shared mission.
The NESO consists of the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), the National Emergency Supply
Council, and the individual NESO sectors and pools.
The NESA is tasked with planning and measures related to developing and maintaining security of supply. The statutory duties of the agency include providing support for the operations of the pools and sectors.
It is led by a chief executive officer in accordance with guidelines issued by the NESA Board of Directors.
The National Emergency Supply Council is a body that assesses and reviews the general state of security of the supply chain.
The general mandate for the NESO sectors is to steer, coordinate, and monitor preparedness in their
respective fields and to determine the goals for the pools.
The business-driven NESO pools are responsible for operational preparedness in their fields. The pools
are tasked with monitoring, analyzing, planning, and preparing measures to develop security of supply within
their individual industries, and with determining which enterprises are critical to security of supply.
Source: http://www.nesa.fi/organisation/.

••
••
••

Providing a forum to exchange information
between industry experts in telecommunications
and government with policy interests in resilience;
Planning, including ownership of the National
Emergency Plan for the telecommunications
sector; and
Providing response capability for emergencies through the National Emergency Alert for
Telecommunications.

The group is chaired by an industry representative and hosted by the Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills, and meets four times a year.
Similar groups exist in other critical infrastructure sectors. For example, in the downstream oil
and gas subsectors of the energy sector, governmental responsibility for CIIP is assigned to the
Department of Energy and Climate Change. For
the purpose of PPP, the department’s coordination group (UK, 2103c) was formed to play the key
role in fostering joint industrial and governmental
work that responds to disruptions (or potential disruptions) to the energy supply chain. The coordination group acts through the same vital areas as
telecommunications:
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••
••

••

Exchanging information between industry and
respective governmental authorities;
Planning the crisis management system
through, for example, public consultations and
annual exercises, and coordinating individual
corporate emergency plans using the crisis
management system; and
Providing capabilities to respond to emergencies through:
•• Initial evaluation, by exchanging information between operators and governmental
officials and initiating further steps for crisis management procedures; and
•• Implementing the Department of Energy
and Climate Change Upstream Crisis
Management Plan by assessing the information received and providing consolidated advice about CIIP to the sector on
the emerging situation.

Similarly, in the United States, under the framework of the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council,
there exists the Sectoral Coordinating Councils.
Each council comprises government and sector
charters. Each charter operates under unique articles.
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Box 4.2. Information Exchange for Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection in the EU
As a result of the adoption of the CIP Directive, the European Commission created the Thematic Network
on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (TNCEIP). This initiative is hosted within the Directorate General
Energy. The TNCEIP comprises owners and operators of European energy infrastructure in the electricity, gas,
and oil subsectors. This thematic network allows operators to exchange information on threat assessment,
risk management, cyber security, etcetera.
The TNCEIP organizes periodic meetings that are hosted by different member states across the EU.
This facilitates exchange of practices on infrastructure protection issues and closer collaboration among
the energy operators and institutions from different countries. In 2013, TNCEIP meetings were hosted in
Ispra, Italy, and Vienna, Austria. The meeting in Italy was dedicated to interdependencies, including interdependency between energy and ICT. In Austria, the meeting was dedicated to issues of physical security
in the energy sector, such as Physical Protection Systems. In 2014, the TNCEIP meeting, which was hosted
in Madrid, Spain, was dedicated to experiences in international collaboration, exchange of best practices,
transfer of knowledge in security (both physical and cyber) between subsidiaries in different countries, and
coordination for resolving international crises.
The TNCEIP is launching a periodical newsletter, representing the position of energy operators and owners regarding policy and legislative processes at the EU level. In 2012, during the review process of the EPCIP
and CIP Directive, the TNCEIP issued a Position Paper, EU Policy on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
outlining the position of the EU energy sectors on the priorities that new programs should embrace.
Source: Authors based on DG ENER, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/, TCNEIP Newsletter, EC (2012b).

For instance, the Communications Coordination
Council exists under the Communications Sector
Coordinating Charter8 and Communications
Government Coordinating Charter.9 Sector coordinating charters are self-organized and comprise
critical infrastructure operators and owners, while
government coordinating charters comprise public
sector institutions, including sectoral agencies.
A similar approach is observed in the EU.
For instance, in the energy sector, the European
Commission supported the inauguration of the
Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure
Protection (TNCEIP) (Box 4.2).10 This network
brings together critical infrastructure operators, representatives of member states, and the
European Commission and serves as a forum for
information exchange and cooperation.
Partnering at the sectoral level usually involves
more stakeholders. Spain’s Cyber Security Institute
promotes knowledge sharing and collaboration
among the main actors and experts involved in the
sector to improve cyber security in the country.11
The institute carries out analytical work (studies),

awareness (events), and training (certification in
cyber security), among others. The UK funded the
Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre12 as part of
Oxford University’s Martin School.13 The center is a
global thought leader in cyber security that implements the best practice working archetype of governments working with academia and industry to
create the best policy. Among many of its initiatives,
the center has developed the Capacity Maturity
Model, designed to identify needs for capacity
Article of operation of Communications Sector Coordinating Charter at: http://www.dhs.gov/cipac-sector-chartersand-membership.
9 Article of operation of Communications Government Coordination Charter at: http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/cipac-comms-gcc-charter-508.pdf.
10 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/
protection-critical-infrastructure.
11 https://cybersecuritymonth.eu/ecsm-countries/spain/
iii-cyber-security-forum-of-the-spanish-cyber-security-institute-an-isms-forum-iniciative.
12 Under the National Cyber Security Program, see CIIP Policy and Governance in the UK in Chapter 2.
13 ht tp: //w w w. ox fo rd m a r ti n . ox . a c . u k /re s e a rc h /p ro grammes/cybersecurity/.
8
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Box 4.3. Cyber Security Capacity Maturity Model
The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre promotes an increase in the scale, pace, quality, and impact of
cyber security capacity-building initiatives around the world. Among its initiatives, the center has created a
first-of-its-kind benchmark to measure cyber security capacity maturity across five dimensions. The aim of
the benchmark is to help nations self-assess, benchmark, plan investments and national cyber security strategies, and set priorities for capacity development.
Working with key stakeholders from across the international community, the center has begun to successfully apply the model globally, alongside partners such as the World Bank, Organization of American
States, and Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization. The first report released as a result of this
work was launched in June 2015 in Kosovo.
Source: Based on Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity/; Cyber Center works with the
World Bank in Kosovo, 2015, http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/news/2015-GCSCC-Kosovo-launch.

building, and has developed global security capacity (Box 4.3). A new web portal facilitates greater
information exchange among researchers and consumers of research in cyber security, and acts as
a resource for experts and international partners.14
The Korean government organized information
sharing and analysis centers to provide technological support through their CIIP Law (see CIIP Policy
and Governance in Korea in Chapter 2). These centers serve to protect CII by sector, such as finance
and communications. They may provide information about vulnerabilities, intrusions, and countermeasures, and they may operate real-time alarm
and analysis systems if incidents occur.
Furthermore, PPPs related to CIIP are increasingly going beyond the private and public sector
stakeholders, with the general public increasingly
being involved. For instance, as part of its CIIP effort,
the United States is building a nationwide awareness
campaign about critical infrastructure, its importance,
and the need to protect it. For example, November
is now the month to recognize National Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Box 4.4).

Observations and Recommendations
Regarding Critical Infrastructure
Protection
Complementarity of efforts between the public
and private sectors: CIIP policies should focus
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objectives and activities on supporting critical
infrastructure operators in their efforts to protect operated assets as an alternative to substituting those efforts. This approach is considered to
be more sustainable in the long term as it eventually allows for increased capacity of operators and
resilience of critical infrastructure assets. It also
expands the reach of CIIP activities and complements the efforts of each party.
Partnering with the private sector: It takes time
and effort to build the level of trust and cooperation needed for CIIP. It took 10 to 15 years for countries to put in place successful partnerships and
deepen the level of cooperation. It will take time
for developing countries to build effective partnerships because they require comparable capacity
and capability from both sides. The public sector must be perceived as a strong partner in CIIP.
Leveraging national and regional academia for targeted research and development in CIIP may be a
good way forward in increasing the capacity of the
public sector in decision-making, providing expertise and advice to the private sector.
Partnering structures: This study showed that it
is efficient to introduce contact points within critical infrastructure sectors and the public sector. It is
14

www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity.
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advisable to maintain a sectoral approach for CIIP
cooperation as it allows for specific discussions of
sectoral aspects of CIIP implementation and measurement. Successful cases of cooperation demonstrate that it is possible to engage private sector
actors in the administration of sectoral structures,
such as co-leadership, organization of meetings,
and election of topics.
Establish sectoral CIIP working groups and develop a CIP community: For all critical infrastructure sectors, but particularly for those sectors with
high participation of the private capital and large
number of actors (e.g., ICT, transport, and financial), it is advisable to commission CIIP-dedicated
working groups or committees that would be led
or co-led by the private sector. Those bodies would
be instrumental in preparing and implementing the
national and sectoral CIP plans, enhancing information exchange, and building the CIP community. Regular CIP events at the national level as

well as regular sectoral gatherings to discuss current issues promote the CIIP agenda and identify
where efforts should be strengthened. Through
these structures, international cooperation, and
exchange of professional experience in CIIP would
be accomplished.
Involve academia and the research community:
Assessments of the vulnerabilities and risks as well
as other highly analytical work require considerable research capacity that is usually not available
within public institutions. Quality CIIP plans cannot be built without such scientific foundation. As
a result, countries examined in this chapter outsourced that capacity to national institutes and
research centers. Latin American and Caribbean
countries and the region should also consider this
approach. There could also be an opportunity to
build collaboration between academia and the
public sector, where national standardization agencies could also participate.
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5

Information Sharing and
Incident Management for CIIP
Who Shares What and When?

information

Information sharing is the most important element
of each stage of the critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) process. It provides better
understanding of threats, risks, and dependencies,
expediting knowledge sharing of possible countermeasures. Bi-directional information sharing is
recommended, meaning both public and private
sectors need to be involved and information needs
to circulate in both directions. Thus, information
sharing is a public–private partnership (PPP)-type
of activity. At the same time, information sharing
within the public and private sectors is important.
In the private sector, knowledge exchange is important not only within the same critical infrastructure sector, but also between the different sectors
because of the high convergence. For instance, the
financial sector may benefit from input from the

and

communications

technology

(ICT) sector because of the financial system’s
depen-dency on electronic communications.
A common operational landscape for information sharing is presented in Table 5.1. It is best
for governments and industry to work together to
designate who shares what and when. The table
offers some best practices from the United States
on how tasks could be divided among the public
and private sectors, as well as what agencies could
be involved.
In particular, efficient dissemination of information is essential for CIIP because of the interconnectedness of assets nationally and internationally.
For critical information infrastructure (CII), Spain
uses the System for the Exchange of Information
and Reporting of Incidents to coordinate, cooperate, and exchange information that affects national
interests with the central government, autonomous

TABLE 5.1. Information Sharing in the United States: Key Dimensions
What to share

Who should share

When to share

How to protect shared information

Government:
Threat intelligence
Warnings and advisories
Private sector:
Vulnerabilities
Solutions
Advisories

Intelligence agencies
Law enforcement agencies
Critical infrastructure owners/
operators
Coordination partnerships (at
all levels)

Pre-event:
Advisories
Warnings
During and after the event:
Remediation steps
Coordination of resources

Public key infrastructure
Strong policies, with penalties for misuse

Source: Authors based on U.S. practice.
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Box 5.1. Benefits of Information Sharing to CIIP
Information sharing has the following benefits for CIIP:

•• Raises awareness of the need to perform CIIP and related topics such as business continuity management and risk management.

•• Improves the level of education and knowledge about the subject.
•• While sharing experience, increases the skills of community members.
•• While following the topics discussed within the communities, serves as a channel to keep the government involved in the concerns of the community.

•• While using the private community, the government can directly address all or part of the community
with specific information. If the community uses a secure communication channel, this can even include
restricted information.
Source: EC (2011).

regions, local authorities, the private sector, EU
institutions, other member states, and relevant
international bodies to ensure awareness, capacity
building, and response competency.

How to Share?
It is common to hear that public and private stakeholders are largely unaware of critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) and therefore that awareness should
be increased. But what does it mean to increase CIP
awareness? What actions can lead to it?
To begin, both parties (governments and critical infrastructure operators) need to have a good
understanding of each other’s roles as well as some
underlying concepts and information. For example,
public sector stakeholders should be familiar with
critical infrastructures, entities that manage them,
and cross-sector interrelations (impacts) and risks.
In turn, critical infrastructure operators should
have a clear understanding about the public sector
approach to CIIP, the distribution of functions and
responsibilities across different public agencies,
and their own role and responsibilities within the
national CIP framework.
This process improves the quality of risk management across participants, and may thus raise
the level of protection. On this basis, CIP policymakers will have a better understanding of the
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level of protection and possible contingencies. For
example, sharing security information creates preconditions for an effective incident prevention system. Such common understanding will prove to be
essential in the case of a major incident where crisis
management is required (Box 5.1).
To support the CIIP process, sharing could
cover information about threats and vulnerabilities, good practices for technical and organizational protection measures, or security incidents in
critical infrastructure data. It is important to have
this exchange in a trusted and secure manner as
the nature of this information is usually sensitive.
To guarantee the confidentiality of the information exchange, the most widely used tool is the
Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), considered to be one
of the best practices (EC, 2011). TLP provides an
easy method to achieve confidentiality of sensitive material. One of the key principles of TLP is
that the originator of the sensitive information also
decides how widely it can be circulated by labeling
the information with one of four colors (Table 5.2).
The originator needs to ensure that the information provided corresponds to the code description and that the recipients are alerted about the
new threat and are able to take appropriate actions.
Above all, the information provider remains the
owner of the shared information and its sensitivity
classification.
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TABLE 5.2. TLP Color Code
Color

Meaning

Red

Personal for named recipients only. In the context of a meeting, for example, RED information is limited to those
present at the meeting. In most circumstances, RED information will only be passed verbally or in person.

Amber

Limited distribution. The recipient may share AMBER information with others within their organization, but only on a
need-to-know basis. The originator may be expected to specify the intended limits of that sharing.

Green

Community wide. Information in this category can be circulated widely within a particular community. However, the
information may not be published or posted publicly on the internet, nor released outside of the community.

White

Unlimited. Subject to standard copyright rules, WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.

Source: EC (2011).

FIGURE 5.1. Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network Scheme
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Source: European Commission.

Most sharing initiatives are based on regular
face-to-face meetings. If the report on vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents has to be shared with a
wider community, a secure electronic environment
proves to be useful. One example of an exchange
platform was developed in the EU, the Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network.1 The
network is an initiative of the European Commission
that is being coordinated by its Directorate General
for Home Affairs (Figure 5.1). Since its initiation in

2013, the network’s objective has been to improve
CIP in Europe by exchanging and discussing CIPrelated information, studies, and good practices
across all of the EU member states and in all relevant sectors of economic activity.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/critical_infrastructure_warning_information_network/index_en.htm.
1
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Box 5.2. UK Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership
The Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership was funded under the UK’s National Cyber Security
Program as part of the Cyber Security Strategy. Information is exchanged in relation to cyber-attacks and
vulnerabilities to physical and personnel-related threats.
Information exchanges bring together representatives from a specific critical infrastructure or across
multiple critical infrastructures. They also include relevant public organizations like law enforcement or intelligence services. Information exchanges are free to join and their membership is determined by the existing members. CPNI typically provides a co-chair and a coordinator for the exchange and acts as host for
the meetings. Representatives at information exchanges are expected to attend all meetings and generally
only two named members from the same organization are allowed. Substitutes cannot attend. Information
exchanges include elements presented in Figure 5.2.

FIGURE 5.2. CPNI Model of Information Exchange
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Source: CPNI.

To further good practices, some countries have
formed small trusted communities in which information can be shared in a secure and trusted way.
For instance, the UK’s Centre for the Protection
of National Infrastructure (CPNI) launched the
Cyber-Security Information Sharing Partnership
program in 2012. This program is a joint initiative
between industry and government. The goal is to
share cyber threat and vulnerability information to
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increase overall situational awareness, reducing the
negative impact on domestic businesses (Box 5.2)
(UK, 2013b).
Protecting confidentiality is an important subject
for information providers, in particular those in commercial critical infrastructure sectors. Information
that is valuable for CIP may be commercially sensitive and its disclosure may have a dramatic effect.
Thus the sharing process should follow (whenever
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Box 5.3. United States Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program
In 2002, the United States adopted a Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program. The program
aims to strengthen CIP-related information exchange. It provides legal certainty regarding how and by whom
information can be received and used. Specifically, the legal requirement is such that protected critical infrastructure information cannot:

•• Be disclosed through a Freedom of Information Act request or through a request under a similar state,
local, tribal, or territorial disclosure law;

•• Be disclosed in civil litigation; or
•• Be used for regulatory purposes.
Protected information can only be used by a federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial government employee
or contractor who:

•• Has taken appropriate training;
•• Has homeland security duties; and
•• Has a valid need to know that particular information.
Protected critical infrastructure information is specially marked and must be safeguarded, both physically and electronically, under specific procedures to avoid any improper disclosures. All of these protections
ensure that submitted information is protected and is used only by authorized homeland security professionals and used only for homeland security purposes.
Source: DHS (2014).

possible) a voluntary approach, with aspects of confidentiality (regulated disclosure) explicitly mandated within the relevant legal regulatory framework.
Such is the case in the United States, where separate legislation dedicated entirely to CIP information
sharing (Box 5.3) needs to be adopted.
In Korea, the Cyber-Threat Analysis and
Sharing System was developed to systemize the
procedures of intrusion detection, collection,
analysis, and cyber-threat data exchange and to
prompt countermeasures. The system collects various data from many enterprises, including security companies, popular web sites, and Korea’s
in-house computer emergency response team’s
system. It provides 36 types of reports for security vulnerabilities, fraudulent domains, and technical reports, among others, based on collected
and analyzed data. The information is shared with
external agencies through an Application Program
Interface (API) and homepage (Figure 5.3).

Cross-Border Information Sharing
Information sharing and analysis is paramount in
understanding cross-border interdependencies;
however, installing sharing practices is particularly
challenging. Cross-border information exchange
on a bilateral basis is instituted in nearly all case
study countries examined in the previous sections
of this book. The authors have observed that information exchange at the multi-national and regional
level proves to be very valuable as it provides a
strong networking opportunity and reinforces
bilateral relationships. Hence, the authors recommend information exchange in developing countries to join the international CIP community and
start collaborating.
However, initiatives that bring the CIP community together are limited and few are dedicated
specifically to shaping information exchange on a
multilateral level. One of the largest international
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FIGURE 5.3. Information Sharing for PPP
<ctex : external>
<ctex : when>
<ctex : sample>
<ctex : address>
<ctex : message>
</ctex : external>
Sharing list

Cyber-Threat Analysis & Sharing System
(C-TAS)

• Malicious URLs
• Black IPs/domains
Phishing
• Malware sample
• WebShell sample
• Analysis reports

External agency

Expression language : C-TEX
Sharing method :
1 API (export API)
2 Web (HTTPS)

Source: http://www.krcert.or.kr/.

information sharing initiatives currently in place
is known as the Meridian Process. This initiative’s ambitious objective is to exchange ideas
and initiate actions for the cooperation of governmental bodies on global CIIP issues through a
community of CIIP senior government policymakers and provides a forum to share international
best practices. The Meridian Process is guided
by the principle that advances in national CIIP
goals are only possible through close collaboration beyond national borders and even beyond
regions. Participation in the initiative is open to all
nations (Box 5.4).

The Meridian Process produces the CIIP
Directory, an authoritative compilation of CIIP
points of contact around the world, and particularly within the Meridian Community. The CIIP
Directory is disseminated using TLP and only
available to community members. The directory
is intended for national governments only. It is
not intended for general or commercial use. Each
country nominates a Directory Point of Contact
who maintains and updates their country’s entry
details.
In the context of cyber security, another international initiative is the Global Forum for Incident

Box 5.4. Meridian Process
The Meridian Process emerged from the first Meridian Conference, hosted by the UK in 2005. The host country changes each year with the aim to increase participation in the Meridian Community. Any country that
is engaged in CIIP and has attended more than one event can offer to host a forthcoming event. The host
country is usually decided two years in advance through discussion with the Steering Committee and an
endorsement from fellow delegates.
Each annual conference has been followed by an initiative in CIIP taken up by the host country to
strengthen the process, and various cooperative activities among members of the Meridian Community.
Every country that sends a delegate to a conference automatically becomes a member of the community
and is entitled to an entry in the Meridian Directory and access to its resources and activities.
Source: Authors based on The Meridian Process official web-site, http://www.meridianprocess.org/.
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Box 5.5. Establishment of the Global Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams
In November 1988, a computer security incident known as the “internet worm” brought major portions of the
internet to its knees. Reaction to this incident was isolated and uncoordinated, resulting in duplicated efforts,
and in conflicting solutions. Weeks later, the Computer Emergency Response Team’s Coordination Center
was formed. Soon after, the U.S. Department of Energy formed the Computer Incident Advisory Capability
to serve its constituents.
Over the next two years, the number of CSIRTs continued to grow, each with its own purpose, funding,
reporting requirements, and constituency. The interaction between these teams was challenging because of
the differences in languages, time zones, and international standards or conventions. In October 1989, a major
incident called the “wank worm” highlighted the need for better communication and coordination between
teams.
The Global Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams was formed in 1990 in response to this
problem. Since then, it has continued to grow and evolve in response to the changing needs of the incident
response and security teams and their constituencies.
Source: Global Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams, at: https://www.first.org/about/history.

Response and Security Teams. This forum comprises 330 accredited members and is the only
organization enabling cooperation among computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) on
a global scale. The forum brings together a variety of CSIRTs from government, commercial, and
educational organizations. It aims to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, to
stimulate rapid reaction to incidents, and to promote information sharing among members and the
community at large. The forum also aims to standardize information sharing practices across its
members and beyond. For instance, one of its special interest groups is working toward preparation
of “a common, standardized set of definitions for
all Traffic Light Protocol colors in English, a clear
usage guide explaining how, when, and where TLP
should be used to be most effective, and a governance document to explain the rules by which the
[special interest group] will govern the TLP standard in the future.” The group plans to present its
initial results in June 2016. 2

Crisis Management Practices
The security paradigm states that absolute protection status is not possible, even in hypothetical

situations when all measures are perfectly implemented. Incidents are inevitable since threats will
materialize. Parties involved in CIIP should thus
be prepared for crisis situations and plan defense
actions. The Latin American and Caribbean region
includes nine of the world’s top 20 disaster prone
countries (World Bank, 2016). Mitigating, preventing, and dealing with natural disasters cost
these governments about $2 billion a year (World
Bank, 2016).
The term crisis is defined as a major incident
where a supervisory organization and/or critical
infrastructure operator loses its ability to manage
and control the escalating situation. Crisis management is the process by which an organization deals
with a major event that threatens to harm the organization, its stakeholders, or the general public.
The government’s role is to ensure that crisis management agencies are organized, understand their
roles, and have resources to deal with incidents and
emergencies to mitigate dramatic consequences
for the public.
The continuity of critical infrastructure services
to perform crisis management functions is often
critical to counter operations, which consist of
2

See https://www.first.org/global/sigs/tlp.
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the preparedness, response, and recovery phases.
Crisis management includes the ability to operate national and regional crisis control center(s)
and local centers that support incident response
actions in the field. It is important to note, that
critical infrastructure operators are responsible
for using measures to avoid disruptions and having a plan for rapid service restoration. Whoever
is responsible for situation management is also
responsible for communications.
Effective and efficient crisis management
requires in-depth knowledge of critical infrastructures, their operations, and their dependencies.
Close cooperation and mutual understanding with
operators is required during incident response
planning, emergency preparedness (e.g., joint
training and exercises), crisis response, and restoration. Some countries legally oblige critical infrastructure operators to form a critical infrastructure
sector-specific crisis management arrangement or
formally be a part of the national or regional crisis management structure. Dedicated laws may
thus be required to actively involve critical infrastructure operators in the preparedness, countermeasures, and service restoration phases of crisis
management. Moreover, legislation for crisis management can be sector-specific or can cover all
critical infrastructure sectors.
Sector-specific legislation is made either
by the ministry responsible for the sector or by
the relevant regulatory agency, with possible
input from stakeholders. Broad legislation can
be a framework within which critical infrastructure operators are mandated to collaborate with
regional crisis management entities. It may also
provide a framework for crisis management at
the national level. For example, the UK approach
is based on section 32 article (4) (a) and (b) of the
Communications Act 2003 in relation to the Civil
Contingencies Act. The Electronic Communication
Resilience and Response Group comprises operators forming the national response capability for
ICT emergencies through National Emergency
Alert for Telecommunications. 3 In Finland, the
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security
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Policy acts as the contact point for stand-by
duties of the ministries. It keeps the administrative sectors informed about observed events and,
when necessary, convenes the cooperation bodies and experts from different administrative sectors to secure up-to-date access to information
(Finland, 2011). Other critical infrastructure sectors, such as the financial sector, have formed
similar business continuity and crisis mitigation
plans.
An adequate level of preparedness to manage
crisis situations could be achieved through simulation exercises at the operational, tactical, and
strategic levels and/or spanning multiple levels.
Exercises increase the level of readiness for emergencies and enhance the operators understanding of their roles, responsibilities, decision-making
cycles, and capabilities.

Incidents Management via CSIRT
The quantity and sophistication of cyber security
incidents increased dramatically in recent years
and both continue to intensify. Cyber-attacks
have an impact not only on the ICT sector but are
also significant threats to almost all critical infrastructures, such as Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition Systems.
CSIRTs respond to network and information
security incidents. Their main role is to quickly
address security incidents in electronic communications networks, and analyze and coordinate
actions to contain and eliminate threats, especially
when there is a potential risk to functionality of the
network or security of the data. CSIRTs could be
regarded as the fire fighters of cyberspace.
CSIRTs first came into existence in 1988, when
one of the first internet worms travelled throughout the worldwide web and interrupted the activities of most systems.4 That year, the first CSIRT

UK Category 2 Responders, 2003. Generic Emergency
Planning Arrangements for Telecommunications.
4 Worm is a type of virus that disseminates itself inside the
network.
3
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archetype was developed and registered in the U.S.
Patent Office; it is still functioning within Carnegie
Mellon University. The CSIRT model was developed
in the academic sector and proved to be successful. Today, CSIRTs have become the most important tool for managing information technology (IT)
security incidents for electronic communications
networks. Currently, there are several hundred
CSIRTs of different sizes and affiliations, including
national, commercial, and academic teams.
Under CSIRTs, managing security incidents
is carried out in three basic stages (Moira et al.,
2003):
1.
2.
3.

Receive and evaluate incident reports and
complete initial prioritization.
Study and technically handle the incidents and
inform target groups of users about the threats.
Respond to, statistically register, and prevent
the spread of incidents, and restore network
function.

CSIRTs include IT security experts whose main
objective is to respond to computer security incidents. These experts provide the necessary services
to handle incidents and support their constituents recovery from breaches. To mitigate risks and
minimize the number of required responses, most
CSIRTs also provide preventative and educational
services for their constituency. They issue advisories on vulnerabilities in software and hardware
and inform users about exploits and viruses taking advantage of these flaws. Having a dedicated
IT security team helps an organization mitigate and
prevent major incidents and helps to protect its
valuable assets. Further possible benefits are:

••
••
••
••

centralized coordination for IT security issues
within the organization (Point of Contact);
centralized and specialized handling of and
response to IT incidents;
the expertise at hand to support and assist
users to quickly recover from security incidents;
support for dealing with legal issues and preserving evidence in the event of a lawsuit;

••
••

resources to keep track of progress in the security field; and
cooperation within the constituency on IT
security (awareness building).

CSIRTs play an important role in crisis management because they operate 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week; this kind of access may not be available
within other critical infrastructure sectors. The UK’s
national Computer Emergency Response Team
acts as an apex organization, coordinating incident
countermeasures at the national level and supporting critical infrastructure companies. The team
helps companies handle cyber security incidents,
though some critical sectors have their own teams.
In the United States, CSIRT activities at the
national level are performed by the Computer
Emergency Readiness Team, which addresses
incidents concerning United States national security. The United States also hosts specific CSIRTs
acting in local sectoral networks as well as the
Coordination Center, which is the center for
the Software Engineering Institute. This center
researches software flaws that impact internet
security, publishes papers, and works with various
stakeholders to improve the security of cyberspace
as a whole. Other national CSIRTs include the
Government National Cryptologic Center in Spain
and the National Cyber Security Centre in Finland.
All of them cover CIIP as well.

Observations and Recommendations
Regarding Information Sharing and
Incident Management
Information sharing, which is a horizontal process,
is a cornerstone of CIIP. The following observations
may be useful to consider when designing national
information sharing practices.
Bi-directionality of information sharing: Good information sharing is a bi-directional, PPP-type activity
that involves both the public and private sectors. It
is a continuous effort that requires relationships be
maintained with information sharing partners.
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Trust and face-to-face communication: Experts in
best practices emphasize that quality information
sharing cannot be achieved without a high level of
trust. Any electronic system dedicated to information sharing would not build that trust and must not
replace good inter-personal relationships achieved
through regular face-to-face meetings.
Electronic tools for information sharing in CIIP:
When trust and relationships are maintained, electronic systems provide good facilitation of the processes and make it more efficient. In particular,
electronic systems are efficient in cases of large
CIP communities such as the EU and the United
States. The authors emphasize, however, that electronic systems serve to facilitate information sharing but are not essential to the process.
Mandating information sharing: Practical collaboration in information sharing has proven that, first
and foremost, it should be promoted as a voluntary
process and that obligations in these areas usually have limited success. Legal tools mandating
information sharing should be enacted to a limited
degree and for well-defined purposes, for instance,
in case of risk assessments and incident reporting.
Mandatory incident reporting of large disruptions
is mandated in the EU. Highly confidential information that needs to be shared must be regulated and
captured by the relevant legal frameworks as the
nature of the information tends to be sensitive from
both commercial and security standpoints.
National risk assessment and national CIIP plan:
Regular assessment of national risks helps shape
strategic national CIIP priorities. While performing national risk assessment, countries are increasingly going beyond the risks that arise domestically
to also include the international context. Different
countries find themselves susceptible to different sets of risks—there is no “one-size-fits-all” set
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of threats. National risk assessment should lead to
the preparation of a national CIIP plan that would
aim to address and mitigate those dangers. Such
a plan should provide clear guidance and allocate responsibilities for how security and reliability of the national critical infrastructure should be
ensured, coordinate public–private initiatives, and
initiate implementation review processes.
Regular critical infrastructure sector assessments
and preparation of sectoral CIIP plans: Routine
assessment of the resilience of each critical infrastructure sector to identify risks is a good practice
as it monitors the state of critical infrastructure
assets, gradually enhancing and adjusting resilience. Routine assessment could be integrated with
sectoral CIIP plans. The authors recommend that
this process be assigned to agencies that lead CIIP
efforts for each critical infrastructure sector.
Managing security incidents: Incident management is one of the key elements of CIIP. Security
incidents should be reported, investigated, and
addressed in a timely manner. Cyber-attacks have
an impact not only on the ICT sector, but are real
threats to all critical infrastructures. The authors
recommend that Computer Emergency Response
Team activities be adopted systematically from the
national level to the sectoral level for critical infrastructure operator networks. Such teams would
improve the detection of and reaction to security
events and the execution of responses.
Exercises: Simulation exercises are tools to understand and increase preparedness, and to detect
possible gaps in security and resilience. These exercises build relationships and partnerships within
the critical infrastructure community. The authors
recommend that exercises be performed regularly
at the national level as well as within sectors or
between the interconnected sectors.
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Current Status of CIIP
in the LAC Region
Survey Methodology and Results at the
Regional Level
One of the objectives of this study was to provide recommendations to Latin American and
Caribbean (LAC) countries regarding critical infrastructure information protection (CIIP) framework
development, taking into account the experiences
of a select group of countries and one region. To
better understand the situation in LAC, the authors
conducted an electronic survey to assess the status quo. The survey purposefully focused on critical infrastructure protection (CIP) instead of CIIP
to allow respondents to research and respond
more easily.
All LAC countries were surveyed, and electronic questionnaires were developed separately
for the public and private sectors. The online questionnaires were designed so many participants
could be interviewed in a relatively short period of
time. All the responses were stored in a database
so information could be aggregated and analyzed
using empirical and statistical methods. The public sector audience included government agencies,
ministries, and other public institutions that are likely
to be dealing directly or indirectly with governance
of critical infrastructure sectors as well as computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs).
The private sector audience included private and
public companies that operate infrastructures that

are likely to include critical infrastructure assets.
Companies were selected randomly within a structure to ensure the participation of each critical
infrastructure sector and service in each country.
Table 6.1 includes critical infrastructure sectors and
services that were surveyed. Representatives from
the public and private sectors were asked to identify their critical infrastructure sector or service
before beginning the survey.
The public sector questionnaire was designed
to increase the awareness of the policy and governance framework for CIP. The survey included
questions related to different aspects of a CIP
framework: strategy, legislation, and responsible
institutions; a list of identified national critical infrastructures; incidents; crises management; and public–private partnership (PPP) approaches.
The purpose of the private sector survey was
to find out how companies that are likely to operate critical infrastructure assets are approaching
security threats, dealing with incidents, and managing other CIP considerations. This survey included
questions related to critical infrastructure operators’ CIP practices such as risk assessment, methods
of incident and crisis management, ways to identify
threats to industrial systems, and how they protect
and defend their assets. Additionally, participants
were asked to provide examples of real incidents,
budgets allocated for critical infrastructure security,
and observations from results of security audits.
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TABLE 6.1. Critical Infrastructure Sectors Surveyed
Critical infrastructure
sectors and services

Subsectors

Information and communications
technologies (ICT)

Telecommunications, internet service providers

Energy

Gas, petroleum fuels, refineries, pipelines, electricity generation, and transmission

Finance

Banking, finance, and trading exchanges

Food

Production, storage, and distribution

Emergency services

Emergency and rescue services, disaster response

Health

Hospitals, public health, and laboratories

Transport

Transport and traffic infrastructure, including air, road, sea, rail, and cargo distribution

Utilities

Water, waste water, and waste management

Defense

Military, law enforcement, national security, and public security

Government

e-Government infrastructure and services, public administration, parliament, and justice

Critical manufacturing

Country specific

Civil contingency

–

Space and research

–

Information services and media

–

Chemical and nuclear

–

National monuments and icons

–

Other

Surveyed representatives were given an option to choose “Other” if they do not belong to any of
the above critical infrastructure sectors and services.

Source: Authors.

A total of 933 contacts were identified across
the region within all of the critical infrastructure
sectors and services. They were all invited to participate and 130 participants across all 26 countries
completed the surveys. The 13.9 percent response
rate should not be underestimated because the
topic of CIP is relatively new to the region and
some countries and stakeholders may be reluctant to share any type of sensitive information. The
response rate might have been lower if the surveys
had focused on CIIP.
The number of responses per country is provided in Figure 6.1. The following sections provide
some regional-level insights derived from the completed surveys. Results of the survey were also used
to understand CIP developments within each individual country. Where the response rate per country was higher (in 11 countries, there were five or
more respondents), it was possible to derive more
accurate conclusions than where the response
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rate was lower (in 15 countries, there were four or
fewer respondents). For the countries with lower
response rates, the information was still analyzed,
including an additional cross-check of the information whenever possible; however, the clarity of
national CIP development is less accurate and some
inaccuracies may remain. Of note, each country was
also included in a cluster, and the clusters were then
analyzed.
In six countries, no private sector surveys
were submitted. In eight countries, the private
sector response rate was higher than that of the
public sector, which could indicate awareness and
engagement.
The authors note that the surveys were provided to the bodies (public and private) that were
likely to have a role in governing or operating critical infrastructure assets but that the survey was
entirely voluntary. Responses are a measure of a
personal interpretation of facts and a subjective
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FIGURE 6.1. Number of Responses Submitted per Country and per Sector
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3
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1
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2

3
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3
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3
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5
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1
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2

1
1
2

Guatemala

6
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1

3

Ecuador

1

3
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1

2

Costa Rica

6
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4

6

Chile

6

2

4
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3
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1
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1
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4
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2
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1
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90%
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Source: Authors.

reflection of familiarity with CIP issues from the
individuals filling in the questionnaires. As is typical of large-scale surveys, the accuracy of this
research is not absolute and information should
be treated with caution in relation to the actual
CIP situation at the country level. Results of this
research were aggregated using empirical and
statistical methods. To achieve higher accuracy
and precision, the authors recommend further
research with onsite visits in individual countries;

face-to-face interviews with CIP-related bodies,
companies, and local experts; and exercises measuring CIP effectiveness.

Observations on CIP Framework
Development at the Regional Level
The authors’ analysis of the information from the
completed surveys allowed them to summarize the
CIP situation in LAC and to project similar results
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FIGURE 6.2. Number of Responses per Critical Infrastructure Sector or Service
Government
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1
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Source: Authors.
*A respondent may have chosen “Other” if they did not want to identify the critical infrastructure sector or service they represent. There were no
respondents from the food, utilities, critical manufacturing, space and research, information services and media, or national monuments and icons
sectors or services.

for CIIP. The sections that follow present the most
prominent findings from the surveys for the public and private sectors. The authors note that the

majority of responses across both sectors were
received from the ICT, defense, finance, transport,
and energy sectors (Figure 6.2).

FIGURE 6.3. Number of Public Sector Respondents per Critical Infrastructure Sector or Service
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Source: Authors.
*A respondent may have chosen “Other” if they did not want to identify the critical infrastructure sector or service they represent. There were no
respondents from the food, utilities, critical manufacturing, space and research, information services and media, or national monuments and icons
sectors or services.
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FIGURE 6.4. CIP Strategy Adoption in LAC, 2015
There is no need
0%
for CIP strategy
There is no CIP strategy adopted,
but the necessity of CIP strategy
is well understood

27%

CIP strategy adoption is
within the government's plan
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42%
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Main Observations from the Public Sector
Survey
In total there were 84 respondents to the public
sector survey and the majority were provided by
public organizations dealing with government services and infrastructure and the ICT, energy, transport, and defense sectors (Figure 6.3).
Survey results indicate that slightly above
40 percent of LAC countries have adopted a CIP
strategy or that elements of CIP are integrated into

30%

40%

50%

the national security strategy (Figure 6.4). The positive result is the region-wide understanding of the
need for a CIP strategy or the existence of plans
to develop a CIP strategy. The current low CIP
strategy adoption rate points to the gap between
understanding the importance of addressing CIP
issues and actual framework development.
Primary and secondary CIP legislation is not
widely developed across the region, or at least
information about legal CIP frameworks is not well
known within the countries (Figure 6.5). Of the

FIGURE 6.5. Adoption of CIP Legislation in LAC, 2015
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FIGURE 6.6. CIP Governance Framework in LAC, 2015
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countries in the region, respondents from 35 percent reported no legislative practice in CIP and
23 percent were not aware of CIP legislation in
their country. Respondents from only 27 percent
of LAC countries reported that there were laws
for CIP and 15 percent were aware of government
decisions addressing CIP. These results indicate an
important gap between the strategic planning of
CIP activities and implementation of a CIP framework, including setting up relevant procedures and
assigning responsibilities.
Regarding CIP governance models, the most
common was the strategy whereby different ministries and agencies had different roles in CIP
policymaking, administration, and management
(43 percent) and only 35 percent of LAC countries
were reported as having a dedicated government
institution responsible for CIP. In the rest of LAC
countries, respondents said there was no responsible body appointed (Figure 6.6).
When asked to list national critical infrastructure
sectors and services, respondents were not consistent and in some instances participants within the
same country provided different information. Lists of
critical infrastructure sectors and services also varied among countries; however, variations were not
significant, with respondents from most countries
reporting transport, energy, government, healthcare,
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ICT, emergency services, and water. Those results
correlate with international practices like those provided in Table 6.1. The finance, dams, food, critical
manufacturing, and defense sectors were mentioned
less frequently. The critical infrastructure sectors and
services referred to least were chemistry, research,
and nuclear and space. Based on these results, the
authors concluded that critical infrastructure sectors
and services are not clearly identified in each LAC
country or at least that there is not sufficient awareness regarding identification. However, the authors
did find good overall understanding of what critical
infrastructure sectors should be on the national level.
Respondents from almost half of the LAC countries (43 percent) noted that crisis management
plans had been adopted for critical infrastructure
and 35 percent noted that their country evaluates
and exercises those plans to keep them up to date.
The responses show that crisis management is part
of national emergency or defense frameworks.
Unfortunately, most LAC countries were not seen
as being properly prepared for crisis situations, with
respondents from 27 percent reporting no crisis
management plan in place and from 30 percent not
being aware of such plans (Figure 6.7).
According to the findings, 35 percent of LAC
countries require critical infrastructure operators to
report security incidents to responsible authorities
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FIGURE 6.7. Adoption of CIP Crisis Management in LAC, 2015
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(e.g., CSIRTs) and five countries (19 percent) have
established sanctions or penalties if a critical infrastructure operator does not report a security incident. Disruption types included natural disasters
(earthquakes and hurricanes) in Belize, Mexico, and
Chile; technical damage (electricity blackout, dam
break, and internet cable damage) in Panama and
Paraguay; and cyber-attacks in Ecuador and Belize.
Moreover, respondents from another 35 percent of
LAC countries reported that risk evaluations and
physical and/or cyber vulnerability analysis was
being done for critical infrastructures. They mentioned this practice is done mostly within public
institutions and the financial, electricity, and telecommunications sectors.
Respondents from the majority (65 percent)
of LAC countries claimed governments cooperate with the private sector for CIP. This is a positive
indication that could lead to improving CIP in each
country and in the region.

Main Observations from the Private Sector
Survey
In total, 46 public and private companies operating in critical infrastructure sectors were surveyed.
The most active were companies operating in the
energy, ICT, and financial sectors (Figure 6.8).

20%
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40%

50%

Of the surveyed companies, 54 percent identified parts of their assets as critical infrastructures.
The same proportion of organizations reported
having crisis management plans for operated critical infrastructure assets (Figure 6.9). When asked
to name managed critical infrastructure assets,
most of the companies referred to IT infrastructure, communications networks, and SCADA systems. From the information provided, the authors
observed that understanding critical infrastructure
assets is largely limited to the IT and communications components of operated infrastructures. This
means that critical infrastructure is likely perceived
as critical information infrastructure (CII), which is
not accurate and excludes many non-ICT critical
infrastructure assets.
At the same time, as much as 40 percent of
surveyed companies reported not performing regulated risks assessments for cyber threats applicable to critical infrastructure (Figure 6.10). In the
context of rapidly increasing cyber-attacks and
espionage incidents, this is a high risk. Companies
that reportedly assess cyber threats indicated
doing so every two years. In the constantly changing environment of cyber threats, a two-year interval is probably not frequent enough.
Only 33 percent of companies surveyed take
into account security risks when reviewing the
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FIGURE 6.8. N
 umber of Responses Provided by Private Sector Representatives per Critical Infrastructure Sector
or Service
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*A respondent may have chosen “Other” if they did not want to identify the critical infrastructure sector or service they represent. There were no
respondents from the food, utilities, critical manufacturing, space and research, information services and media, national monuments and icons,
health, civil contingency, or chemical and nuclear industry sectors or services.

stability of the organization’s Industrial Control
System (ICS) and SCADA. Only 28 percent still
have an impression that security is not an issue
for ICS and SCADA because it is supposed to be
an isolated system by design (Figure 6.11). In this
regard, 23 percent of companies registered an
increase in incidents targeting the ICS and SCADA
systems during the past year, while only 5 percent

registered a decrease in such incidents. When
asked to measure financial losses from such incidents, companies reported the measured impact
within the range of several thousand U.S. dollars to
at least to $200,000.
The majority of responses reveal that cyberattacks are considered the main threat for critical infrastructures. Respondents indicated that

FIGURE 6.9. Critical Infrastructure Assets Managed by Companies in LAC
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FIGURE 6.10. Assessment of Cyber Risks by Companies in LAC
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When it comes to information sharing practices, 48 percent of respondents would support
sharing risk information related to CIP with external stakeholders such as regulators, government
bodies, or banks, but 28 percent opposed that idea.

Methodology and Criteria to Cluster
LAC Countries
While this study did not aim to provide per-country
recommendations, the authors still attempted to

FIGURE 6.11. Perception of Security Risk Related to ICS and SCADA
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TABLE 6.2. Four Stages of CIP Policy and Governance Model Development
CIP policy and governance model development
Stage 4

•
•
•
•
•

National CIP efforts are guided by the national strategy.
CIP-dedicated primary and secondary legislative acts are adopted.
CIP responsibilities and functions are explicitly formulated and linked to instructions.
CIP strategy implementation plan is adopted with descriptions of specific measures.
PPP model for CIP (including a national Computer Emergency Response Team, or CERT) is in place.

The countries in this category are mostly advanced in CIP policy and governance. They have taken specific measures to
manage CIP at a national level, have a dedicated budget to improve the protection of critical infrastructure assets, and have
developed a working plan to implement CIP policy.
Stage 3

• A general framework for CIP is in place, including policy and legislation.
• Implementation of CIP measures is fragmented.
The countries in this category have a CIP strategy, legal acts, and responsible ministries, but national supervision is weak,
usually with only CERTs actively involved.

Stage 2

• CIP policy is part of the national defense system.
• CIP importance is understood, but the framework is not systematically organized.
The countries in this category have acknowledged the importance of CIP for national defense and have incorporated CIP into
the national security plan; however, the definition of national security does not incorporate economic security. These countries
do not address CIP as part of national policy with special attention to cyber threats (CIIP).

Stage 1

• No clear activities related to CIP policy or governance model development.
The countries in this category have no systematic organization of CIP at the national level and no clear legal basis for CIP.

Source: Authors.

tailor recommendations to national CIP development. With that objective, the countries were clustered into four groups based on two criteria: (1) level
of development of CIP policy and governance and
(2) level of critical infrastructure identification and
protection. The authors note that currently there
is no single regional or global source for CIIPrelated information. Therefore, this study is one of
the first attempts to understand CIP readiness at
the regional level, including gaining some insight
into the level of CIP awareness across the different public and private stakeholders. Taking this
into account, the results of the survey were used to
understand CIP development within each country
in the region and served as a basis for clustering.
The first criterion examined the level of CIP policy and governance model development as well as
the established CIP framework for each country. CIP
activities should be guided by a CIP policy and legal
framework and be performed within the existing governance structure. A well-established CIP framework
is thus a cornerstone for consistent improvement
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in CIP in a country. Table 6.2 provides descriptions
of four stages of CIP policy and governance model
development that were used to cluster the countries.
Indeed, CIP efforts can be successful only when they
are collaborative across all stakeholders and within
an environment that is highly aware and supportive. Thus, criteria used to assign countries to a particular stage are more qualitative than quantitative.
The authors needed to establish not only the presence of CIP strategy (and other level acts), but also
to evaluate the level of awareness of a national CIP
framework and an understanding of its relevance. In
some countries, responses were more numerous and
aligned, while in other countries, not only were the
responses less numerous, but also contradictory, signaling a lower level of awareness and engagement.
The second criterion was designed to capture the work performed so far related to identifying and protecting critical infrastructure assets. It
reflects implementation of an existing CIP framework. As with the previous criterion, four stages
were defined (Table 6.3).
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TABLE 6.3. Four Stages of Critical Infrastructure Identification and Protection
Critical infrastructure identification and protection
Stage 4

• Specific criteria to identify critical infrastructure assets are established.
• Program to implement critical infrastructure security measures is working.
The countries in this category are mostly advanced in CIIP and have implemented specific measures to identify and protect
critical infrastructure assets.

Stage 3

• The overall framework to identify critical infrastructure sectors is established.
• Identifying and cataloguing critical infrastructure assets is in progress.
The countries in this category have a methodological approach to identifying critical infrastructure assets and services, with
specific steps and responsibilities assigned to stakeholders.

Stage 2

• Identification of critical infrastructure sectors is performed.
The countries in this category have acknowledged some critical sectors to maintain vital societal functions.

Stage 1

• There is no systematic approach to identify critical infrastructure sectors.
The countries in this category have no system to identify critical infrastructure.

Source: Authors.

Clustering by these criteria reflects how a particular country deals with critical infrastructure and
what level of maturity it has achieved. These maturity levels range from the absence of activities to
identify critical infrastructure assets (Stage 1) to the
presence of well-established measures to specify
critical infrastructure assets (Stage 4). For instance,
countries that were reviewed as best international
benchmarks in the previous sections of this book
could be associated with the most advanced stage.
The following section reviews national CIP
efforts and provides results from clustering.
Countries were clustered on the two criteria separately since countries could be in different stages for
each criterion. This approach allowed the authors to
adjust to the needs of each country, therefore possibly better directing national CIP efforts.

Review of CIIP Efforts across LAC
Countries and Clustering
Based on the analysis of the information collected,
the authors concluded that disparities in the maturity of CIP frameworks across LAC are significant.
Major differences were observed in the level of CIIP
policy making, governance, and approach to critical infrastructure identification.

Stage 3: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico
None of the LAC countries reached the level of
CIIP that could be associated with Stage 4. Five
countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico—demonstrated notable efforts in CIIP
framework development and implementation.
Argentina, for instance, identified critical sectors and adopted its National Program for Critical
Information and Cybersecurity Infrastructure
(ICIC)1 in 2011. Protecting critical infrastructure
assets is covered by separate legal acts (e.g., the
penal code). The National Directorate of CII and
cyber security coordinates national CIP efforts,
while sector ministries implement sectoral CIP
competencies. The ICIC’s critical infrastructure
group (ICIC-GICI) surveys, identifies, and classifies CII , while its administrative arm (ICIC-CERT)
reviews the reports and works to find solutions to
cyber incidents targeting national critical infrastructure. 2 Since 2012, Argentina has performed
annual exercises to strengthen protection and

1
2

See http://www.icic.gob.ar/.
https://www.first.org/members/teams/icic-cert.
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readiness of national critical infrastructure. More
information about Argentina’s approach to CIIP is
provided in Appendix 2, which features the country’s national case study. Notwithstanding good
overall CIP efforts, the number of survey responses
received from Argentina was low (three in total;
one from the public and two from the private sectors). Yet, the information about their CIP framework and activities is well structured and available
online. Among the reasons for low participation
may have been an unwillingness to share information related to CIP, but it could also indicate low
awareness of the subject at the national level.
In Brazil, the critical infrastructure sectors
are identified; however, current practical activities
related to CIP are oriented toward ICT. Different
elements of a CIIP framework are covered by strategic documents regarding civil defense, a growth
acceleration program, and an electronic government program. 3 At the level of the legal acts, criminal law, a cybercrime bill, and the penal code mainly
address CIIP. The Institutional Security Cabinet and
the Ministry of Planning coordinate CIIP efforts at
the national level, while other institutions such as
sectoral ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Science and
Technology and the Ministry of Communication) are
assigned relevant CIP competencies. The national
CERT responds to cyber incidents targeting critical
infrastructure, while the CSIRT deals with incidents
that affect networks that belong to the federal public administration. Brazil has established a multistakeholder organization for cooperation in CIIP,
the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee. As in
Argentina, the number of responses from Brazil was
only three and public sector institutions provided
all of them. Also, survey responses were somewhat
contradictory, which may signal uneven awareness of CIP efforts across public bodies in Brazil.
None of the private companies that were contacted
responded, which may indicate an unwillingness
to share information related to CIP, but it may also
indicate a low level of engagement.
Chile’s CIP legal framework is well developed
at the sectoral level. Critical infrastructure sectors are identified and relevant actions have been
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taken to strengthen identified critical infrastructure assets (Box 6.1). Legislation was adopted to
address states of emergency caused by nature
and human or productive activities. Regulations
to protect, recover, and continue telecommunications critical infrastructure were adopted in 2012.
The National Emergency Office and the Chilean
Armed Forces have roles in CIP crisis situations,
as does the Committee for Cyber Security, which
was created to prepare a national cyber security
policy. Telecommunications operators are obliged
to report incidents, and the country’s CSIRT is
responsible for the governmental sector, including
responsibility for CIIP. There were six respondents
to the surveys from Chile (two from the public and
four from the private sectors), which suggests a
good level of awareness in general and particularly
in the private sector. This level of response is a positive sign that companies are engaged in CIP, which
is essential for successful implementation.
In 2014, Colombia defined critical infrastructure sectors and began identifying critical infrastructure assets by collecting relevant information
from critical infrastructure operators. A national
digital catalog of critical infrastructure assets was
completed in 2015. The country has a well-established disaster and risk management approach
and is recognized as a regional leader (Box 6.2).
Recently, Colombia updated its National Plan for
Disaster Risk Management for 2013–25 and adopted
a cyber security and defense strategy. The Ministry
of National Defense is responsible for coordinating national activities for CIP. Other institutions
involved in CIIP are the Joint Cyber Command and
the Policy Cyber Center. Colombia’s CERT is reacting to cyber incidents within the government sector. CSIRT-CCIT is a national team for all types of
cyber incidents. Moreover, Colombia has established a PPP working group on CIIP. The financial
sector makes an effort to evaluate risks and protect critical infrastructures. Unlike in Argentina

http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/
livro_branco/lbdn_2013_ing_net.pdf.
3
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Box 6.1. Sectoral CIP in Chile
The history of disasters in Chile has led to the adoption of legal measures to reduce risk and respond to disasters. However, Chile has no strategy specifically for CIP generally—critical infrastructures are being protected
at the sectoral level. This work has led to notable improvements in critical infrastructure resilience and robustness, particularly in the telecom sector.
In February 2010, Chile faced a strong earthquake (8.8 on the Richter scale) that affected a large part
of the vital telecommunications infrastructure, damaging communications, both commercial and emergency
services. At that time, this type of infrastructure was not regulated by the state as critical, meaning there were
no standards established for minimum energy autonomy or capacity extension for communication channels.
After the earthquake, Chile undertook important legal reform, identifying critical infrastructure assets within
the telecom sector and establishing a set of minimum requirements to improve the robustness of and protect
those assets.
Results of this work were observed after the earthquake in September 2015. The country’s critical telecommunications infrastructures were not damaged, and internet, radio, and television services operated
smoothly. Some outages were reported due to a fault in electricity supply.
In the Energy sector, in 2012, Chile established the Undersecretary of Energy’s Domestic Energy Security
Committee whose role is to advise on relevant actions in case of a disaster that affects the energy supply.
Additionally, the country has undertaken exercises to test communication protocols with public entities, electric companies, and the hydrocarbons sector.
Overall, Chile’s national electricity system serves around 1,500 companies, and corporate consumers
of energy were identified as priority (critical) installations and registered by the Ministry of Energy in the
Priority Energy Installations of Information Systems. These installations must regularly update relevant
information for coordination purposes. They must also maintain required facilities in case of an emergency
affecting energy supply, such as maintaining appropriate backup energy systems, taking into account the
population served.
Source: Authors.

Box 6.2. Colombia’s Risk and Disaster Management Framework
In LAC, Colombia has established itself as a leader in developing a comprehensive vision for risk and disaster
management. Colombia’s advanced system is anchored on investments in structural measures, risk assessments, early warning and emergency response, institutional support, and financial and fiscal measures at
the national and municipal levels, as well as the organization of national and local entities for emergency
response.
The country’s long history in organizing and designing risk management measures started with instruments such as the National System for Disaster Prevention and Response (1985) and the National Plan for
Disaster Prevention and Response (1998). Recently, Colombia approved a new national policy and a National
System for Disaster Risk Management Law 1523 (2012) that reflects a paradigm shift in which disaster risk
management is explicitly recognized as a part of the development process. Also the law provides stronger
incentives for local governments to invest in risk reduction and strengthen technical assistance.
Source: World Bank (2014).
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and Brazil, respondents to the survey in Colombia
represented both the public and private sectors. In
total, 12 responses were received from Colombia, of
which six were from public agencies and six were
from the private sector.
In Mexico, critical infrastructure is defined as
strategic within the General Civil Protection Act.
The National Security Council governs CIIP, while
line ministries are involved at the sectoral level.
The Technical Secretary of the National Security
Council reports on the National Risk Agenda and
the country’s inventory of strategic infrastructure
(see Appendix 6 for the case study on Mexico’s
approach to CIIP). Increasingly, the country is
focusing on cyber risks. Identification of CII assets
is addressed using a dedicated methodology and
rules established in the administrative manual of
general application in the field of ICT, and information security. Mexico’s CERT manages cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. CIIP policy is
addressed through the National Security Law and
the National Digital Strategy. Secondary legislation and the penal code also cover cyber security
issues. The Expert Committee on Information
Security was created to coordinate CIIP. The
National Center for Cyber Incident Response was
created to respond to attacks on the technological assets of critical infrastructure. There were 10
respondents to the surveys from Mexico, of which
the majority, seven, were submitted by the public
sector. The authors note, however, that answers
from different stakeholders were contradictory
in a number of instances, which may signal that
raising awareness in the public sector may be
beneficial.

Stages 2 (Framework) and 3 (Identification):
Bolivia and Panama
Two countries—Bolivia and Panama—have developed CIP frameworks and defined critical infrastructure sectors, but need to advance the
identification of specific critical infrastructure
assets. Both countries are therefore in the Stage 3
cluster for CIP framework development and in
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Stage 2 for critical infrastructure identification.
There were fewer respondents from Bolivia (three)
and Panama (two). Only public sector surveys were
submitted from Panama.
In Bolivia, law defines critical sectors. The
approach to CIIP framework development is
based on risk evaluation. The National System for
Risk Reduction and Disaster and/or Emergency
Response has been adopted and structured in
three territories (see Appendix 3 for the case study
on Bolivia’s approach to CIIP). Bolivia’s national
CSIRT is under the auspices of the Agency for
Development of the Information Society in Bolivia;
operations began in 2014. Since 2015, the Center
for Computer Incidents Management under the
Agency of Electronic Government and Information
Communications Technologies has initiated incident management for the public sector.
In Panama, the National Strategy establishes
critical infrastructure sectors for cyber s ecurity and
critical infrastructure protection. The Authority for
Public Services of the Republic of Panama regulates
and monitors utilities and critical infrastructure
in the water, sewerage, electric power, telecoms,
television, and natural gas sectors. Other institutions in charge of CIP are the National Authority for
Government Innovation and the National System of
Civil Protection. Incidents targeting critical infrastructure are reported to the Authority for Public
Services and CSIRT Panama. There is a PPP working group for CIP.

Stage 2: Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru
Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru have some elements
of CIP frameworks in place. Respondents did not
identify many systematic sectoral initiatives to
identify critical infrastructure assets. All three
countries are grouped in Stage 2 for CIP framework
development and Stage 2 for critical infrastructure
identification.
According to the information submitted
through the surveys, in Costa Rica, current activities related to CIP mostly focus on CIIP. Costa Rica
declared its intention to develop a National Cyber
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Security Strategy following the Inter-American
Cyber Security Strategy. The Law for the Protection
of Personal Data partly covers matters related to
cyber security. The Ministry of Science, Technology,
and Telecommunications is the authority in charge
of cyber security. In 2012, a Costa Rican CSIRT was
created under this ministry to respond to cyber
incidents that affect the government sector. There
were 10 respondents from Costa Rica, with the
majority (six) from the public sector.
In Ecuador, CIIP coordination is assigned to
the National Secretariat of Public Administration
and the National Secretariat for Risk Management.
Respondents noted that the country performs
exercises to strengthen its disaster management
capacity and coordination. The country has plans
to advance development of electronic government, which will require strengthening of CIIP in
the public sector. There were eight respondents
from Ecuador, of which five were from the private
sector.
In Peru, the Ministries of Energy, Transport, and
Defense are involved in CIIP. There is a PPP working group on CIIP. Private sector companies provided examples of practices to determine critical
infrastructure, preparations for crisis management,
and mechanisms to protect critical infrastructure.
There were five respondents from Peru, three of
which were from private companies.
For all three countries, the authors note that
there is a good level of awareness regarding the
national status quo and engagement in CIP within
the public and private sectors. Both factors could
support the countries’ efforts to advance the CIIP
agenda.

Stages 2 (Framework) and 1 (Identification):
Belize, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Guyana, Jamaica, Paraguay, and Uruguay
In seven countries—Belize, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Paraguay, and
Uruguay—respondents identified certain elements
of CIP framework. However, the authors could not
recognize a systematic approach to identifying

critical infrastructure sectors. The authors clustered these countries in Stage 2 for CIP framework
development and Stage 1 for critical infrastructure
identification.
In Belize, critical infrastructure sectors are
mentioned in separate legal acts such as the
Telecommunications Act, the Electronic Evidence
Act, the Electricity Act, and the Public Utilities
Commission Act. The Ministry of National Security;
the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Energy,
Science, and Technology; and the public utilities have roles in CIIP. The National Emergency
Management Organization approved crisis management plans for some types of national emergencies such as hurricanes. Cyber threats are
recognized as important risks to critical infrastructure, in particular the ICT market.
In the Dominican Republic, the National
Development Strategy includes some aspects
related to CIIP. The Office for the Development of
Information Technology and Communication has a
role in strengthening cyber security.
In Guatemala, CIIP is partly mentioned in the
National Plan for Integrated Risk Management and
the National Reconstruction Plan. Elements of critical infrastructure are covered by separate legal acts,
including the Law on National Coordinator Disaster
and the Law of the National Security System. The
National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction takes
part in the CIIP management process.
In Guyana, the Ministry of Home Affairs intends
to work on cyber security. The Civil Defense
Commission is responsible for crisis management
and periodically evaluates readiness for natural disasters such as floods. Guyana’s CSIRT has
responded to information regarding security incidents of national importance since 2013.
Jamaica’s Cyber Security Strategy was
adopted in 2015. It aims to increase the resilience of CII systems. The Ministry of Water, Land,
Environment, and Climate Change is responsible
for policymaking, administration, management,
and resilience for water. The Ministry of Transport,
Works, and Housing has the same responsibilities
for traffic systems.
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Paraguay’s CSIRT has been active since 2012.
The government is developing a national cyber
security plan.
Uruguay plans to advance development of
electronic government, while the country’s CSIRT
coordinates protection of the state’s CII assets.
The authors identified very limited information
regarding CIP from the electronic surveys from
the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Paraguay
since there were only three respondents from each
country, and there were only two respondents
from Uruguay. In Uruguay and Jamaica, only the
public sector filled in the survey. There were four
respondents from Guyana: two from the public and
two from the private sectors. Belize and Guatemala
demonstrated a good level of awareness of CIP,
particularly across the public sector. Of the 10
respondents from Belize, 9 were from the public
sector. Seven respondents from Guatemala were
from the public sector and a further eight were
from the private sector.

Stage 1: Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela
The Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela were clustered in Stage 1
for both criteria, meaning that most of the work
required for CIP is still ahead.
In the Bahamas, the Ministry of Public Works
is examining the CIP issue and the National
Emergency Management Agency has a role in crisis situations.
In Barbados, the CSIRT coordinates defense
against cyber-attacks. Though private sector companies identify critical infrastructure, prepare for
crisis management, and have mechanisms to protect critical infrastructure, no respondents reported
activities to develop CIP policy or protect critical
infrastructure at the national level.
Similarly, respondents from El Salvador
noted an absence of activities related to developing a national CIP policy. The Directorate of Civil
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Protection and the Ministry of Environment have
competencies in CIP.
According to the information submitted by
Haitian respondents, government bodies are discussing CIP legislation and the establishment of a
national CSIRT with the private sector.
In Honduras, the Ministry of Infrastructure and
Public Services and the Ministry of Energy have
competencies in CIP. Respondents noted that
some risk assessment activities are performed in
the energy, finance, and transport sectors.
Nicaragua’s main CIP authority lies within
the country’s defense sector bodies. However,
telecommunications companies do perform risk
evaluations and monitor the security of critical
infrastructure assets.
In Suriname, the Ministry of Defense, the
National Bureau for Security, and the Central
Intelligence and Security Agency have competencies in CIP. National coordination for crisis and disaster is under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense
and the National Coordination Centre for Disasters.
Respondents from Trinidad and Tobago
reported an absence of activities related to CIP
policy development and protection of critical
infrastructures at the national level. The national
CSIRT coordinates defense against cyber-attacks.
Respondents from private sector companies indicated that cyber incidents threaten their critical
infrastructures.
Similarly no specific activities related to CIP
were noted in Venezuela. Nonetheless the government CSIRT is handling cyber incidents targeting
national critical infrastructures.
There were a good number of respondents
from Suriname (seven), Honduras (six), and
Nicaragua (five). There was less participation from
the Bahamas, Barbados, and El Salvador, with
four respondents each. Three contributions were
received from Trinidad and Tobago, two from Haiti,
and one from Venezuela. In Barbados, Nicaragua,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, the majority
of responses were provided by the private sector;
there were no contributions from the private sector
in the Bahamas or Suriname.
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TABLE 6.4. Consolidated Results of Clustering of LAC Countries for Two Criteria
Criteria

Level of CIIP policy and governance model development

Critical infrastructure identification practice

Stage 4

No Countries

No Countries

Stage 3

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico

Stage 2

Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru

Stage 1

Bahamas, Barbados, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela

Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela

Source: Authors.

Consolidated Clustering Results
Table 6.4 provides the consolidated clustering
results for the two criteria. Countries that were
classified in two different stages are in bold.
Figure 6.12 shows that the majority of Stage 2
and 3 countries (of which there are 17) have undertaken certain steps toward developing a CIIP framework and establishing a governance model. Further
efforts are needed to develop legal frameworks to
regulate efforts to protect critical infrastructures.
It is also obvious that the majority of countries in
Stage 1 (there are 16) still need to undertake efforts
to identify critical infrastructures, thus more work

needs to be done to systematically identify critical
infrastructure sectors and move toward identifying
and cataloguing critical infrastructure assets.

Observations and Recommendations
In general, the LAC countries included in Stage 1
have a poor basis for CIIP. These countries have
no practical approach in place to address CIIP,
have made no progress (and sometimes have no
motivation) in initiatives to secure and strengthen
national critical infrastructures, and have not formally defined critical infrastructures. The key recommendation for that cluster is to build awareness

FIGURE 6.12. Number of Countries by Stage
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and capacity related to CIIP within the public sector. This should help change the mindset and motivate and initiate CIP framework development.
Countries clustered in Stage 2 understand
the importance of CIIP and have addressed CIIP
issues in one way or another. However, attempts
are mostly fragmented, distributed between ministries, and there is no systematic approach at the
national level or it is not fully implemented. It is
highly probable that ongoing support for this cluster would advance CIP framework development
and boost the resilience of critical infrastructures
significantly.
Stage 3 encompasses LAC countries that
stand out from the others because of the maturity
of CIIP work performed. Although these countries
have resources and practices in CIIP, there remain
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important gaps within their CIP frameworks and
implementation efforts. This is why no LAC countries were classified as Stage 4, which represents
best practice countries that were analyzed within
the context of this study.
Table 7.1 in the next chapter provides a consolidated list of the recommendations that LAC
countries may find useful to implement. Not all of
the recommendations are equally relevant for all
of the countries since they depend on the current
level of CIP framework maturity. The relevance of
each recommendation is emphasized separately.
As countries advance toward Stage 4, certain recommendations become less relevant. Alternatively,
it may be too early for some recommendations
for countries in the early stages of CIP framework
development
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7
Recommendations

T

his chapter provides a consolidated list of
recommendations for CIIP framework development and implementation. The relevance of each recommendation is demonstrated
as follows: ‘+’ for low relevance; ‘++’ for significant

relevance; and ‘+++’ for high relevance. Low relevance means, for countries currently at this stage,
the recommended activity has already been performed or should be performed at a later stage.

TABLE 7.1. Consolidated List of Recommendations
Clusters and relevance
No.

Recommendations

Stage 1

Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

a. Policy and Governance
1.

Prioritize CIIP at the national level: Preparing and implementing a CIIP framework
requires significant involvement of the public and private sector as well as dedicated financial
resources and participation of academia. A significant level of engagement can be achieved
by prioritizing the CIP agenda at the national level by developing primary national strategies
such as the national security strategy.

+++

+++

++

+

2.

Overarching framework for CIIP: CIIP involves many sectors and actors from both
the public and private sectors. CIIP policies and legal frameworks benefit from a single
overarching policy document that encompasses all related areas and actions and establishes
the governance framework. Such a document creates a full picture of the CIP framework.

+++

+++

++

+

3.

Clear governance model for CIIP: At the national level, CIP governance should not be
complex. Only one or a few bodies should be involved, each with a clear assignment for
sectoral coordination. Each critical infrastructure sector could have its own governance
structure to monitor implementation of sector-specific CIP measures, and coordinate and
strengthen collaboration among critical infrastructure owners and operators.

+++

+++

++

+

4.

Dedicate a CIIP body: A CIIP framework covers many critical aspects of national security
and involves a broad number of sectors and stakeholders. Day-to-day operation and
maintenance of CIIP requires dedicated attention and human and financial resources.
Government should create an inter-agency body responsible for ensuring the resilience
and protection of critical infrastructure from security threats. Many countries have found it
practical to commission a CIIP dedicated agency for this work, while others created dedicated
capabilities within existing institutions. The CIIP body should be responsible for policy
oversight of national infrastructure in collaboration with industry, develop mechanisms to
improve information sharing between the interconnected sectors, investigate vulnerabilities
at critical infrastructures, and perform security audits. This body should strive to form CIIP
competence and play a crucial role in the national CIIP framework.

+++

+++

++

+

(continued on next page)
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TABLE 7.1. Consolidated List of Recommendations (continued)
Clusters and relevance
No.

Recommendations

5.

Regulate: Regulations should set standards for the security of critical infrastructure and
requirements to restore and recover assets after emergency situations. Regulations should
be addressed to critical infrastructure operators and design schemes to monitor particularly
vulnerable critical infrastructure sites. An important objective of regulations is to require
security incidents be reported to competent authorities (usually the national computer
emergency response team). Instead of bans and restrictions, critical infrastructure
operators should be helped to realize the benefits of including resilience thinking throughout
their organizations and asset planning, from physical design to operational procedures and
contingency planning. Lost revenues, reputational damage, contractual penalties, and the
potential for litigation provide strong drivers for managing risks and building resilience.a

Stage 1

Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

+

++

+++

+++

b. Critical Infrastructure Identification
6.

Define critical infrastructure: Defining critical infrastructure is the very first step toward
identifying critical infrastructures because it creates metrics. Most definitions include
impact of disruption as one of the metrics. The extent of the impact is usually defined as
nationwide. Another metric is the subject of disruption, which varies slightly from country
to country. Security is one focus, however the traditional understanding of the security (as
physical) needs to be broadened to include economic security.

+++

++

+

+

7.

Assess risk: Identification of critical infrastructures starts with a national-level risk
assessment exercise. The aim of the exercise is to understand what risks are most likely to
hinder national security, including economic security and citizen wellbeing. There are wellrecognized risk assessment methodologies that can be used for this exercise.

++

++

+++

+++

8.

Identify critical infrastructures: After the risk assessment, risks need to be linked with
the national infrastructures. Analysis should include understanding risk tolerance for each
infrastructure asset and service. This will expedite selection of critical infrastructure sectors,
subsectors, and assets within critical infrastructures. Those assets will compose the list
of national critical infrastructures. Countries should clearly define which specific network
assets are covered and should be secured and resilient. Countries that are starting to work
on identifying critical infrastructures should adopt a methodology to identify critical assets
and services as well as internal-external interdependencies. A step-by-step approach,
starting with the identification of critical sectors, is recommended, followed by subsectors,
services, and finally infrastructures and assets.

+++

+++

+

+

9.

Database of identified critical infrastructure assets: Information about all identified
critical infrastructure assets should be stored in a centralized list. This information is usually
classified. It is important to ensure that the national critical infrastructure list includes
information about all critical infrastructure of national significance. Critical infrastructures
that are identified at sub-national levels and that are not of strictly national standing could
be listed within sub-national lists.

++

+++

++

++

10.

List of critical infrastructure sectors: Composition of the critical infrastructure sector
list will vary from country to country depending on national circumstances. Six sectors
were considered critical in all the reviewed countries and the EU: energy, transport, ICT,
financial, water, and health. It is likely that these sectors will be considered critical in LAC
countries as well.

+++

++

+

+

+++

+++

+++

+++

c. CIIP: Methods and Forms of Implementation
11.

Complementarity of efforts between public and private sectors: CIIP policies should
focus objectives and activities on supporting critical infrastructure operators in their efforts
to protect operated assets as an alternative to substituting those efforts. This approach
is considered more sustainable in the long term, as it eventually leads to the increased
capacity for critical infrastructure operators and resilience of their assets. It also permits
the reach of CIIP activities to be expanded and the efforts of each party to become
complementary.

(continued on next page)
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TABLE 7.1. Consolidated List of Recommendations (continued)
Clusters and relevance
No.

Recommendations

Stage 1

Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

12.

Partner with the private sector: It takes time and effort to build the level of trust and
cooperation needed for CIIP. It took 10 to 15 years for countries to put in place successful
partnerships and deepen the level of cooperation. It will take time for developing countries
since well-functioning partnerships involves comparable capacity and capabilities from
both sides. The public sector will need to make an effort to be perceived as a strong partner
in CIIP. Leveraging the national and regional academia for targeted CIIP research and
development may be a good way to increase the capacity of the public sector in CIIP
decision making and allow it to provide expertise and advice to the private sector.

+++

+++

+++

+++

13.

Critical infrastructure operators: Operators need to have a resilience strategy that
uses the principles of redundancy, resistance, reliability, response, and recovery to protect
against disruptions. This strategy requires buy-in from other stakeholders, including the
supply chain, customers, and other operators. Because of growing physical and cyber
security threats, critical infrastructure operators must implement incident management
systems that cover systematic registration and investigation of, and reaction to, security
incidents.

+

+

++

+++

14.

Establish sectoral CIP working groups and develop community of CIP experts: For
all critical infrastructure sectors, in particular for those with high participation of private
capital and a large number of actors (e.g., ICT, transport, and financial), it is advisable
to establish CIP dedicated working groups or committees that would be led or co-led by
the private sector. Those bodies would be instrumental in preparing and implementing
national and sectoral CIP plans and they would enhance information exchange and build
the CIP community. Regular CIP events at the national level as well as regular sectoral
CIP gatherings to discuss current issues among the experts would raise the profile of the
CIP agenda and identify where efforts should be strengthened. Through these structures,
international cooperation and exchange of professional experience in CIP could be
implemented.

+++

+++

++

+

15.

Involve academia and the research community: Assessments of the vulnerabilities
and risks and other highly analytical work requires considerable research capacity that
is usually not available within public institutions. Quality CIP plans cannot be built without
scientific and technical foundation from national institutes and research centers. This
approach should be considered in LAC as well since it could also be an opportunity to build
collaboration between academia and the public sector. National standardization agencies
could also be involved.

+++

+++

+++

+++

16.

Skilled specialists and engineers: Advanced skills are an important element of any
CIP program. The issues related to CIP are relatively new, emerging, and sophisticated.
To effectively implement a CIP framework, the public and private sectors need skilled
specialists. Sometimes, the amount of funds invested into hardware and software is
irrelevant, since it is up to specialists maintaining the critical infrastructure to use and
implement those tools. Countries need to invest in training and building the capacity of
existing critical infrastructure personnel. They should also encourage universities to
develop science, technology, engineering, and mathematics study programs related to CIP
and cyber security. Currently such programs are rare in academia.

+++

+++

+++

+++

d. Information Analysis and Sharing
17.

Bi-directionality of information sharing: Good information sharing is a bi-directional,
PPP-type of activity, meaning it involves the public and private sectors. It is also requires a
continuous effort to maintain strong relationships with information sharing partners.

+++

+++

+++

+++

18.

Trust and face-to-face communication: Experts in the best practices of information
sharing emphasize that quality exchanges cannot be achieved without a high level of
trust.b Any electronic system dedicated to information sharing could not build that trust and
should not replace good interpersonal relationships achieved through regular face-to-face
meetings.

+++

+++

++

++
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TABLE 7.1. Consolidated List of Recommendations (continued)
Clusters and relevance
No.

Recommendations

Stage 1

Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4

19.

Use electronic tools to share CIIP information: When trust and relationships are
maintained, well-functioning electronic systems provide good facilitation of the process and
make it more efficient. In particular, electronic systems are effective in cases of big CIP
communities, like the EU and the United States. Though electronic systems can facilitate
information exchange, it is important to understand that they are not essential to the
information sharing process.

+

+

++

+++

20.

Early warning system: Any early warning system is a practical and useful CIP prevention
tool. The purpose of such systems is to detect security threats and cyber-attacks, identify
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, prepare for the danger, and act accordingly to mitigate
or avoid it. All countries should invest in an early warning system at the national and crosssectoral levels.

+

++

+++

+++

21.

Mandate information sharing: Practical collaboration in information sharing has proven
that, first and foremost, it should be promoted as a voluntary process and that obligations
usually have limited success. Legal tools mandating information sharing should be enacted
to a limited degree and for well-defined purposes, as in the case of risk assessments and
incident reporting. Mandatory incident reporting of large disruptions is mandated in the EU.
In regards to highly confidential information that necessitates sharing, it must be regulated
and captured by the relevant legal frameworks as the nature of the information tends to be
sensitive from both the commercial and security standpoints.

+++

+++

++

+

e. Crisis Management Practices
22.

Assess national risks and national CIP plan: Regular assessment of national risks
supports the shaping of national strategic priorities, and CIP measures and priorities. While
performing national risk assessment, countries are increasingly going beyond the risks that
arise domestically to include the international context. Different countries find themselves
susceptible to different sets of risks than the others, since there is no one-size-fits-all
archetype. National risk assessment should lead to preparing a national CIP plan that would
aim to address and mitigate those risks. Such a plan should provide clear guidance and
designate responsibilities for how security and reliability of the national assets are ensured,
coordinate public–private initiatives, and put in place implementation review processes.

+++

+++

++

+

23.

Regularly assess critical infrastructure and prepare sectoral CIIP plans: Routine
assessment of the resilience of each critical infrastructure sector to identify risks is a good
practice as it monitors the state of critical infrastructure assets, enabling gradual enhancements
and adjustments for increased resilience. The latter process could be integrated within
sectoral CIP plans. Agencies should be assigned to lead CIP efforts at the sector level and
critical infrastructure operators that fully or partially operate identified critical infrastructure.
Sectors need to enforce more frequent inspection of critical infrastructure and update the
list of critical assets. Due to rapid advancements in the interconnection of systems, a system
component previously assessed as non-critical can become critical in a short time.

++

+++

+++

+++

24.

Manage security incidents: Incident management is one of key elements of CIP. Security
incidents should be reported, investigated, and reacted to in a timely manner through
efficient Security Incidents Management. As cyber-attacks impact not only the ICT sector,
but are threats to all critical infrastructures, systematically adopting computer emergency
response activities from a national level team to sectoral teams for critical infrastructure
operator networks is recommended. This would improve security events detection, reaction
and execution.

++

+++

+++

+++

25.

Exercise: Simulated exercises are tools to understand and increase critical infrastructure
preparedness, detection of possible gaps in security, and resilience. These exercises also
support relationships and partnerships within the critical infrastructure community. Performing
regular exercises at the national and sector levels as well as between interconnected sectors
is recommended.

+

+++

+++

+++

a
Peter Guthrie, Thalia Konaris, 2012. Infrastructure Resilience, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/286993/12–1310-infrastructure-and-resilience.pdf.
b
Ibid.

92

BEST PRACTICES FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIIP)

References
Alberti, J. 2015. “Pre-Investment in Infrastructure in
Latin America and the Caribbean: Case Studies from Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.”
Monograph Series No. IDB-MG-286. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Available at http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6792/Pre-InvestmentInfrastructure.pdf?sequence=1.
Arsht, A. 2014. “Urbanization in Latin America.”
Washington, DC: Atlantic Council. Available at
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/
articles/urbanization-in-latin-america.
Atkins. 2015. “The Skills Deficit: Consequences &
Opportunities for UK Infrastructure.” China:
Atkins. Available at http://www.atkinsglobal.
com/~/media/Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/ukand-europe/uk-thought-leadership/reports/
Th e% 20 S kills % 20 D ef icit % 20 Re p o r t % 20
for%20Digital%20Infrastructure.pdf.
Baker, S., N. Filipiak, and K. Timlin. 2011. “In the Dark:
Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks.”
McAfee Second Annual Critical Infrastructure
Protection Report. Written with the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Santa Clara, CA: McAffee. Available at http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rpcritical-infrastructure-protection.pdf.
Buldyrev, S. V., et al. 2010. “Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks.”
Nature. 464(7291): 1025–28. Available at www.
nature.com/nature/journal/v464/n7291/full/
nature08932.html.

Calderón, C., and L. Servén. 2010. “Infrastructure
in Latin America.” Policy Research Working
Paper 5317. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3801/
WPS5317.pdf.
Choi, D. S., K. H. Yoon, and J. D. Shin. 2014. “A Study
on Law Analysis for Efficient Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Journal of the Korean
Society of Hazard Mitigation. 14(1): 223–45.
Available at http://scholar.ndsl.kr/schArticleDetail.do?cn=JAKO201412835899931.
CPNI (Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure). 2010. “Protection against Terrorism, 3rd Edition.” London, UK: CPNI.
Available at http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/201 0/201 0 0 02-pro tec ting _ against _ terrorism _ 3rd _ edition .
pdf?epslanguage=en-gb.
DHS (Department of Homeland Security). 2003a.
“The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.”
Washington, DC: DHS, Government of the
United States of America. Available at https://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf.
——— . 2003b. “The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace.” Washington, DC: Department of
Homeland Security, Government of the United
States of America. Available at https://www.
us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
cyberspace_strategy.pdf.

93

——— . 2007. “National Strategy for Homeland Security.” Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, Government of the United
States of America. Available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf.
——— . 2013a. “Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and
Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” Fact Sheet.
Washington, DC: Department of Homeland
Security, Government of the United States of
America. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/EO-13636PPD-21-Fact-Sheet-508.pdf.
——— . 2013b. “NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience.” Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security,
Government of the United States of America. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/National-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf.
——— . 2014a. “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program.” Fact Sheet. Washington, DC:
Department of Homeland Security, Government of the United States of America. Available
at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/PCII-Fact-Sheet-2014-508.pdf.
Dobbs, R., J. Manyika, and J. Woetzel. 2015. “The
Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends.”
McKinsey Global Institute. Available at http://
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/
the-four-global-forces-breaking-all-the-trends.
Dobbs, R., S. Smit, J. Remes, J. Manyika, C. Roxburgh, and A. Restrepo. 2011. “Urban World:
Mapping the Economic Power of Cities.” McKinsey Global Institute. Available at http://www.
mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20
Themes/Urbanization/Urban%20world/MGI_
urban_world_mapping_economic_power_
of_cities_full_report.ashx.
EC (European Commission). 2004. “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism.” Communication from the Commission

94

to the Council and the European Parliament,
COM(2004) 702 final. Commission of the European Communities. Brussels: EC. Available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0702&from=EN.
——— . 2006. “A European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection.” Communication
from the Commission, COM(2006) 786 final.
Commission of the European Communities.
Brussels: European Commission. Available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0786.
——— . 2010a. “The EU Internal Security Strategy
in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure
Europe.” Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, COM(2010) 673 final. Commission of
the European Communities. Brussels: European Commission. Available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=C
ELEX:52010DC0673&from=EN.
——— . 2010b. “The Stockholm Programme – An
Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens.” Notices from European Union
Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies.
Official Journal of the European Union. 115:1–
38. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XG0
504(01)&from=EN.
——— . 2011. “Recommended Elements of Critical Infrastructure Protection for Policy Makers in Europe: Good Practices Manual for CIP
Policies.” Brussels: Directorate-General Home
Affairs, European Commission. Available at
http://www.oiip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/
Dateien/Publikationen/FINAL_RECIPE_manual.pdf.
——— . 2012a. “The Review of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(EPCIP).” Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2012) 190 final. Commission of the
European Communities. Brussels: European
Commission. Available at http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/policies/crisis_and_
terrorism/epcip_swd_2012_190_final.pdf.

BEST PRACTICES FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIIP)

——— . 2012b. “Position Paper on EU Policy on
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection.”
Brussels: European Commission. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/
documents/20121114_tnceip_eupolicy_position_paper.pdf.
——— . 2013. “A New Approach to the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection,
Making European Critical Infrastructure More
Secure.” Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2013) 318 final. Commission of the
European Communities. Brussels: European
Commission. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisisand-terrorism/critical-infrastructure/docs/
swd_2013_318_on_epcip_en.pdf.
ENISA (European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security). 2015. “Methodologies for the Identification of Critical
Information Infrastructure Assets and Services.” Heraklion, Greece: ENISA. Available at
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/
methodologies-for-the-identification-of-ciis.
Espinosa, E. I. 2015. “Hacia una estrategia nacional
de ciberseguridad en México.” Journal of Public Administration, National Institute of Public
Administration (INAP), Mexico, 136, January
to April. Available at https://www.academia.
edu/12107238/Towards_a_Cybersecurity_
Strategy_in_Mexico.
EU (European Union). 2003. “A Secure Europe in a
Better World.” European Security Strategy of
the European Council. Brussels: EU. Available
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
——— . 2008. “The Identification and Designation of
European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve Their Protection.”
Council Directive 2008/114/EC. Official Journal
of the European Union. 345:75–82. Available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0114.
fDi Intelligence. 2014. “The fDi REPORT 2014:
Global Greenfield Investment Trends.” London, UK: The Financial Times Ltd. Available at

http://ftbsites.ft.com/forms/fDi/report2014/
files/The_fDi_Report_2014.pdf.
——— . 2015. “The fDi REPORT 2015: Global Greenfield Investment Trends.” London, UK: The
Financial Times Ltd. Available at http://report.
fdiintelligence.com/.
Figueroa, V., D. L. Vera, and L. Hormazábal. 2011.
“Chilean Armed Forces and their Role in Emergencies, Disasters and Catastrophes: Considerations for an Institutional Policy on Psychosocial
Education.” Santiago: Pontificia Universidad
Catolica De Chile, Facultad De Medicina, Departamento de Psiquiatría. Available at http://
medicina.uc.cl/docman/cat-view/1380.
Finland. 2004. “Finnish Security and Defence
Policy 2004.” Helsinki: Prime Minister’s
Office, Government of Finland. Available at
h t tp: //w w w. d e f m i n . f i /e n /p u b l i c a ti o n s /
finnish_security_and_defence_policy.
——— . 2006a. “The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society.” Government Resolution
23.11.2006. Helsinki: The Security and Defense
Committee, Government of Finland. Available
at http://www.defmin.fi/files/858/06_12_12_
YETTS_ _in_english.pdf.
——— . 2006b. “A Renewing, Human-Centric and
Competitive Finland: The National Knowledge
Society Strategy 2007–2015.” Helsinki: Information Society Programme, Prime Minister’s
Office, Government of Finland. Available at
http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/publicacoes1/Strategia_englanti_181006final.pdf.
——— . 2011. “Security Strategy for Society.” Government Resolution 16.12.2010. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, Government of Finland.
Available at http://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/
press_releases/2011/the_security_strategy_
for_society_now_available_for_download_
in_english.4724.news.
——— . 2013. “Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy.”
Finland Government Resolution 24.1.2013. Helsinki: Secretariat of the Security Committee,
Government of Finland. Available at http://
www.defmin.fi/files/2378/Finland_s_Cyber_
Security_Strategy.pdf.

References

95

Finnish Technology Industries. 2014. “Economic
Situation and Outlook.” Helsinki: The Federation of Finnish Technology Industries. Available at http://teknologiateollisuus.fi/en/news/
situation-and-outlook-finnish-technologyindustry-12014.
Germany. 2009. “National Strategy for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP Strategy.” Bonn:
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Republic of Germany. Available at http://www.bmi.
bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/598732/
publicationFile/34423/kritis_englisch.pdf.
Giannopoulos, G., R. Filippini, and M. Schimmer.
2012. “Risk Assessment Methodologies for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Part I: A State of
the Art.” JRC Technical Note EUR 25286 EN –
2012. Brussels: Joint Research Center-Institute
for the Protection and Security of the Citizen,
European Commission. Available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/RA-ver2.pdf.
Guthrie, P., and T. Konaris. 2012. “Infrastructure and
Resilience.” Foresight project ‘Reducing Risks
of Future Disasters: Priorities for Decision Makers’. Report produced for the Government
Office of Science. London, UK: Government
of the UK. Available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286993/12-1310-infrastructure-and-resilience.pdf.
Hämmerli, B., and A. Renda. 2010. “Protecting
Critical Infrastructure in the EU.” Brussels:
Centre for European Policy Studies. Available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/15445/1/Critical_Infrastructure_Protection_Final_A4.pdf.
ICE (Institution of Civil Engineers). 2009. “The
State of the Nation: Defending Critical Infrastructure.” London, UK: ICE. Available at
ht tps://w w w.ice.org .uk /getat tachment /
media-and-policy/policy/state-of-the-nationcritical-infrastructure-2009/SoN_DCIreport_
final_web.pdf.aspx.
ISO (International Organization for Standardization). 2013. “Information Technology –
Security Techniques – Information Security

96

Management Guidelines Based on ISO/IEC
27002 for Process Control Systems Specific
to the Energy Utility Industry.” ISO/IEC TR
27019:2013. Geneva: ISO. Available at http://
www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/
catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=43759.
ITU (International Telecommunication Union).
2008. “Report on Best Practices for a National
Approach to Cybersecurity: A Management
Framework for Organizing National Cybersecurity Efforts.” ITU Study Group Q.22/1.
Geneva: ITU. Available at http://www.itu.
int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-draftcybersecurity-framework.pdf.
Jefatura del Estado. 2011. Ley 8/2011, de 28 de abril,
por la que se establecen medidas para la protección de las infraestructuras críticas. Available
at http://www.sisonline.com/files/7387.pdf
Jonkeren, O. E., et al. 2012. “Economic Impact Assessment of Critical Infrastructure Failure in the
EU: A Combined Systems Engineering – Inoperability Input-Output Model.” The 20th International Input-Output Conference. Available
at
https://www.iioa.org/conferences/20th/
papers/files/903_20120516091_JonkerenIIOA2012SE-IIMmodel.pdf.
Korea. 2010. “Framework Act on the Management
of Disasters and Safety.” Korea Act No.10347.
Sejong-si: Reliable Ministry of Government
Administration, Republic of Korea. Available at
http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engMain.do.
——— . 2013. “Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure.” Act
No. 11690. Seoul: Government of Korea. Available at http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?me
nuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%A0%95%E
B%B3%B4%ED%86%B5%EC%8B%A0%EA%B
8%B0%EB%B0%98%EB%B3%B4%ED%98%B8
%EB%B2%95#liBgcolor0.
——— . 2015. “Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety.” Korea Presidential Decree
No. 26285. Seoul: Government of Korea.
Available at http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.
do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=%EC%

BEST PRACTICES FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIIP)

9E%AC%EB%82%9C%20%EB%B0%8F%20
%EC%95%88%EC%A0%84%20 -%20
liBgcolor4#liBgcolor0.
Microsoft. 2014. “Microsoft Security Intelligence
Report, Volume 17.” Redmond, US: Microsoft.
Available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/
download/confirmation.aspx?id=44937.
Min, H-S J., et al. 2009. “Toward Modeling and
Simulation of Critical National Infrastructure
Interdependencies.” Washington, DC: National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC), Department of Homeland Security,
Government of the United States of America.
Available at http://www.sandia.gov/nisac/wp/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/04/
modeling-and-simulation-of-critical-infrastructure.pdf.
Ministerio del Interior. 2011. “Real Decreto 704/2011,
de 20 de mayo, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de protección de las infraestructuras críticas.” Available at http://www.cnpic.
es/Biblioteca/Legislacion/Generico/REAL_
DECRETO_704-2011_BOE-A-2011-8849.pdf.
OECD (Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development). 2008. “Malicious Software (Malware): A Security Threat to the
Internet Economy.” Ministerial Background
Report, DSTI/ICCP/REG(2007)5/FINAL. Paris:
OECD. Available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/53/34/40724457.pdf.
Pitt, M. 2008. “Learning Lessons from the 2007
Floods.” Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http:/
archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/_ /
media/assets/www.cabinetof fice.gov.uk /
flooding_review/pitt_review_full%20pdf.pdf.
Richardson, J. P. 2008. “A Management Framework
for Organizing National Cybersecurity/CIIP
Efforts.” ITU-D Secretariat. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union. Available at
https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/
docs/richardson-cybersecurity-frameworkand-readiness-assessment-CITEL-Mar-08.pdf.
Schmitt, M. N. 2013. “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.”

Prepared for the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Available at
ht tps: // issu u .co m /n ato _ ccd _ co e/d o c s/
tallinnmanual/3?e=0/1803379.
Spain. 2007. “Acuerdo sobre protección de infraestructuras críticas.” Madrid: Ministry of Interior, Government of Spain. Available at http://
www.cnpic.es/Biblioteca/Legislacion/Generico/ACUERDO_CONSEJO_DE_MINISTROS_
de_2_de_noviembre_de_2007.pdf.
——— . 2013a. “The National Security Strategy: Sharing a Common Project.” Madrid: Prime Minter’s Office, Government of Spain. Available
at http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/
estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf.
——— . 2013b. “National Cyber Security: Strategy
2013.” Madrid: Prime Minter’s Office, Government of Spain. Available at https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-securitystrategies/ncss-map/NCSS_ESen.pdf.
Theodore Puskas Foundation. 2013. CIIP Matters.
7(1). Available at http://www.cnpic.es/Biblioteca/Noticias/Newsletter_Meridian_vol7_
no1_June_2013.pdf.
UK (United Kingdom). 2007. “A National Information Assurance Strategy.” London, UK: Central
Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet
Office, Government of the UK. Available at
http://old.culture.gov.uk/images/working_
with_us/nia_strategy.pdf.
——— . 2010a. “Strategic Framework and Policy
Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure to Disruption from Natural
Hazards.” London: Cabinet Office, Government
of the United Kingdom. Available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/62504/strategic-framework.pdf.
——— . 2010b. “A Strong Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy”.
London, UK: Cabinet Office, National Security
and Intelligence, Government of the United
Kingdom. Available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/

References

97

a t t a c h m e n t _ d a t a /f i l e /6 1 9 3 6 /n a t i o n a l security-strategy.pdf.
——— . 2011. “Keeping the Country Running: Natural
Hazards and Infrastructure: A Guide to Improving the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and
Essential Services.” London: Cabinet Office,
Government of the United Kingdom. Available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61342/
natural-hazards-infrastructure.pdf.
——— . 2013a. “A Summary of the 2013 Sector Resilience Plans.” London: Cabinet Office, Government of the United Kingdom. Available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271370/
SRP_Public_Summary_2013.pdf.
——— . 2013b. “Government Launches Information
Sharing Partnership on Cyber Security.” Press
Release. London: Cabinet Office, Government of the United Kingdom, and The Rt Hon
Lord Maude of Horsham. Available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/governmentlaunches-information-sharing-partnership-oncyber-security.
——— . 2015. “2010 to 2015 Government Policy:
Cyber Security.” Policy Paper. London: Cabinet
Office, Government of the United Kingdom.
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-cyber-security/2010-to-2015-governmentpolicy-cyber-security.
UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico). 2015. “Artículo 28 Constitución Política
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.” Instituto de
Investigaciones Jurídicas. Mexico City, Mexico: UNAM. Available at http://info4.juridicas.
unam.mx/ijure/fed/9/29.htm?s.
U.S. White House. 1998. “Critical Infrastructure
Protection.” Presidential Decision Directive/
NSC-63. Washington, DC: White House, Government of the United States of America.
Available at http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/
pdd-63.htm.

98

——— . 2003. “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.” Homeland
Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7. Washington, DC: White House, Government of the
United States of America. Available at http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html.
——— . 2013. “Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience.” Presidential Policy Directive/ PPD21. Washington, DC: White House, Government
of the United States of America. Available
at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
WEF (World Economic Forum). 2012. “Strategic
Infrastructure: Steps to Prioritize and Deliver
Infrastructure Effectively and Efficiently.”
Geneva: WEF. Available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IU_StrategicInfrastructure_Report_2012.pdf.
——— . 2015. “Global Risks 2015, 10th Edition.”
Geneva: World Economic Forum. Available
at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
Global_Risks_2015_Report15.pdf.
World Bank. 2014. “World Development Report
2014: Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk
for Development.” Washington, DC: The
World Bank. Available at http://siteresources.
wo r l d b a n k . o r g / E X T N W D R 2 0 1 3/ R e s o u r
ces/8258024-1352909193861/8936935-1356
011448215/8986901-1380046989056/WDR2014_Complete_Report.pdf.
——— . 2016. “The World Bank Group A to Z 2016“.
Washington, DC: World Bank. Abailable at
ht tps: //op e n kn owle dg e .worldba n k .org/
handle/10986/22548
ZAGREB. 2008. “Informe Final: Estudio para la definición e identificación de infraestructura crítica de
la información en Chile.” ZAGREB Consultores
Limitada. Available at http://www.subtel.gob.
cl/images/stories/articles/subtel/asocfile/
infraestructura_critica_020309_v1.pdf.

BEST PRACTICES FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIIP)

